christian-democratic political observations

Political philosophical remarks on current issues

EDUARD FREI

Eduardo Frei foundation

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Observations

This book is the abridged English language version of articles that were published in Christen Democratische Verkenningen between 1997 and 2001 in Dutch and were collected by dr. A. Klink and translated into English by D. Tinholt in 2002.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface

In 2001 the board of the Eduardo Frei Foundation observed that in the countries in which the Eduardo Frei foundation assists with the establishment of a parliamentary democracy, there was a need for a publication about the idealistic aspirations of Christian Democracy. There was a need for a publication that outlines the political starting points of Christian Democracy in relation to its views of mankind and the world.

The publication before you, which came about in co-operation with the Scientific Institute for the CDA, aims to fulfil this need. A framework was chosen whereby not only the starting points of Christian Democracy are extensively dealt with, but in which there is also particular attention for the cultural and societal context in which, through specific politics, you can endeavour to realise Christian Democratic ideals. To give the reader not only general reflections of a fundamental and contextual nature, a choice was made to allow certain policy areas and societal issues to be reviewed. It concerns issues such as the future of Europe, the social enterprise, health care, environmental policy's, gene technology, etc.
The different articles were written against the background of Dutch politics and from within the centre of the CDA, the Christian Democratic party in the Netherlands. This background resounds here and there in the book, but never in a decisive manner. At the forefront are the general observations, that are not restricted to the Dutch time and place.

The boards of the Eduardo Frei Foundation and the Scientific Institute for the CDA express the hope and the expectation that this publication will indeed contribute to the observed needs.

8

Dr. J. van Laarhoven   **Mr. R.J. Hoekstra**

Chairman of the board of the   *Chairman of the board of the*
Eduardo Frei Foundation   *Scientific Institute for the CDA*

Politics based on (Christian) faith

Prof. dr. C.J. Klop

Introduction

In politics we come across two socio-political streams that can more or less be called each other's opposites, but which both find their roots in the period of history that is referred to with the term "Enlightenment": the time in which man emancipated himself as a free, autonomous citizen with respect to churchly and governmental supervision. One stream (liberalism) pleads for an as much as possible restrictive government for the sake of the freedom of the individual to decide for himself what the good life entails. The other (socialism) alternatively wants a larger role for the government for the sake of the weaker individuals in society so that all people are offered equal opportunities to that good life that is determined by themselves. This contribution focuses on a stream that has an entirely different perspective on political thought and action and from that perspective chooses a position in the debate on the role of the government. A stream that bases its politics on religious faith. In the Dutch situation it concerns the Christian faith, but in theory other parties that base themselves on another religion could also fall under this header. Elsewhere in the world there are indeed Jewish, Islamic and Hindu parties. In our country, an Islamic party does occasionally take part in elections for municipal districts in large cities, but for the rest such parties do not yet seem viable in the Dutch situation. Because we are dealing with the Dutch situation, we will limit ourselves to the development of political parties on the basis of the Christian faith. The questions that will thereby be dealt with, especially the matter of theocracy, similarly apply to political parties that are based on another faith.

In almost all Dutch political parties there are people that do not see their political actions and thought independently from their Christian faith, but we are dealing with a stream that places this realization at the foundation of the party itself. Some people refer to this as confessional politics, but in this chapter we prefer to not use this term: we refer to politics based on the Christian faith. If we concentrate on the Dutch situation, it specifically deals with the body of thought of people that are drawn to the CDA, the ChristenUnie and the SGP. The largest of the parties mentioned and the oldest representative of the Christian political stream is the CDA (Christen Democratisch Appél). The name "Christian democrat" was first used by a group of pastors and preachers that were a member of the French States General during the French Revolution. Almost one third of the representatives were priests – they were usually the only ones in the village that could read and write – of whom many remained when this parliament declared itself a constitutional assembly in 1789. These people came from the "lower clergy" and chose the side of the people as opposed to the nobility, the king

and the leadership of the church that was associated with the king. They made an active contribution in the deliberations and played an important role in the realization of the Declaration of the Right of Man and the Citizen. They did not form a political party. At that time, one could not speak of political parties in the modern sense, only of streams that formed "clubs" within the national parliaments.

The Restoration (the reinstatement of the monarchy in France and outside of it) contributed to the fact that these first Christian Democrats were not strongly recognizable as independent streams after the Napoleonic era. As of 1820, many Catholics and Protestants in European countries initially followed non-religious, predominantly liberal and later also socialist political streams. Towards 1880 these faithful had the upper hand over the conservatives within the churches, who wished to return to the balance of before the revolution. Still, many did not feel at home in these liberal and socialist streams after a while. The views in these parties about the relations between church and state and about the role of social organizations (in education, labour unions, health care and poor relief) to which many of these faithful were dedicated, led to tensions. Especially where the French Revolution and liberalism left their marks in the form of government, thus later in the nineteenth century parties based on the Christian faith came into being. These parties offered resistance against the rationalism (trust in the human mind) and the individualism of the Enlightenment and the lack of recognition of social organizations that ensued from this. They saw man as a morally inspired and responsible person and from this vision they wanted freedom of education, respect for private and churchly healthcare and poor relief, uplifting of the workers and they regarded business as a community of labour and capital.

In the Netherlands, a Christian political stream came into being as of 1849, when G. Groen van Prinsterer published his book "Ongeloof en Revolutie" (Disbelief and Revolution). Groen appreciated the achievements that the French Revolution had brought about, such as the constitutional state and the parliamentary system. He was however also of the opinion that these achievements should not be based on the trust in the human mind, but on the faith in God. Members of the Lower House of the Dutch Parliament who, like him, based their politics on faith, went to form their own "house club". In 1879 the Reformed founded the Anti-Revolutionaire Partij (Anti-Revolutionary Party) (ARP) under the leadership of Abraham Kuyper. With this name they wanted to indicate that they were not opposed to (contra) the achievements of the French Revolution, but only against (anti) its foundations. Although the Catholic leader Schaepman had already published an attempt at a Roman-Catholic party program in 1883, the Rooms-Katholieke

Staatspartij (Roman Catholic National Party) (RKSP, after the Second World War renamed as the Katholieke Volkspartij (Catholic People's Party) KVP) was first founded in 1926. These three parties merged into the CDA in 1980.

The political conviction

Source – Politics that bases itself on the Christian faith, draws its inspiration from the Good News (the literal meaning of the word 'Gospel') that God preached to man in the Bible. Suppression and injustice do not have the final say. Poverty and alienation are not part of the Creation as God intended it. Every person, however vulnerable, has eternal value. Everyone has to be judged at their true value. Where people have been led by evil, recovery is possible. God's Son came to earth to give an example and to relieve mankind from unbearable guilt. Politics on the basis of the Christian faith wants to be led by the Good News. It offers a perspective that is beyond comprehension. It sharpens the consciousness of abuses. It shows that the results of political effort can never be perfect and always require criticism and improvement. However, it also shows that dedication to a better world does have meaning. This Biblical message is aimed at all people in all aspects of their lives: in the household, in labour, in the relations with others, but also in political participation. It calls on all to live in peace and freedom, to bear responsibility, to show solidarity and to act as good stewards. A society in which the Biblical justice can flourish as a gift from God is the goal of Christian politics.

View of mankind – Central in the view of mankind is the recognition of the individual responsibility of the human person. Man is free. Free to do the right thing, but also free to fail. And exactly because of these options is also responsible for this. This responsibility is not subject to a social system, or appropriated by politics, but comes forth from humanity itself. Christian Democracy therefore rejects every totalitarian approach of mankind and opposes this with human dignity and integrity. Every person is firstly a unique being. Everyone counts – and has always counted, "the name written in the palm of God's hand"(Isaiah ...). But mankind is not only unique. She or he is also equivalent to every other person. Equivalent, not equal. People differ in gifts and talents. They supplement each other. That is why they are shown to advantage in their relations towards others. People need to be called to account regarding this involvement with each other. Christian politics rejects an approach that regards people solely as separate individuals. It opposes a politics that encroaches upon such mutual involvement and instead offers a politics of human solidarity.

View of society – People develop their talents in different areas of social life.

Society consists of different sectors: business, family life, education and the sciences, health care, church life, the world of sport and recreation, the world of politics, the media, art and culture and so on. Christian Democracy regards this diversity of sectors as a possibility to develop different talents. A society flourishes if a great diversity of talents can develop relatively independently. At the same time all these sectors are related to each other. They provide goods and services that are necessary back and forth. In this sense the sectors are also dependent on each other. Without proper education and health care there is no successful business sector. Without a good business sector there are insufficient means to fund social causes. And so forth. What counts is that every sector can develop according to their own norms and values, that none dominates the other, so that all can contribute to the general interest.

Values – An important task of politics is to weigh justified sub interests against each other, so that a general interest arises. To be able to weigh this, certain criteria are necessary. To this extent, politics with a Christian foundation bases itself on four central values: public justice, spread responsibility, stewardship and solidarity. It is the simultaneous application of these four values that attributes the rightful place to the different social interests.

Striving for *public justice* is the contribution that the government has to make to the flourishing of Biblical justice in society. This means that the government has to create the circumstances under which people and their social organizations and communities can develop their own responsibility. There are different sides to this task, which each supplement and strengthen each other. In the first place, the government must recognize, respect and legally guarantee this experience of responsibility in individual organizations and communities. The government must therefore uphold the legal order and aid in developing the international legal order. Secondly, the government must harmonize conflicts according to the standards of the law if there are clashes of interests between different sectors of society, for example the clash between economics and the environment, or between a good family life and the demands of the labour market. This harmonization means that each individual will in a fair manner be shown to advantage. The government thereby ensures that civilians and social organizations as much as possible include the consequences of their actions for their fellow man and for the natural environment in their behavior. In the third place, the government must protect a basic standard of living in a financial and physical sense, so that citizens and their organizations can develop as responsible participants in social life. This physical protection also entails the dikes, defense and the infrastructure. By providing such guarantees,

harmonizing conflicts of interest and protecting a basic standard of living, the government creates public conditions to live together in justice.

Solidarity means that one can expect from the strong that they look after the weaker. Look after in the sense of care and money. This mission in the first place applies to the citizens and their social organizations and communities. Solidarity shows that people are concerned with each other. The solidarity inspired by the Biblical love for one's neighbor transcends borders, both of one's own social group as of one's own country. It is there for the benefit of the other. The government applies the principle of solidarity from its own task: it ins taxes and premiums in accordance with the means of the people for the benefit of a basic standard of living for everyone. In addition, it calls on civilians and social organizations to add what they can to this. Solidarity must be organized. Not by collective structures that are felt as anonymous, but as a matter of inter human relationships.

Stewardship implies that man must carefully handle that which was given him as a means of life by the Creator. This applies to the natural environment, but also to the gifts and talents in the areas of science, technology, labour and culture. Stewardship points to the responsibility for preserving the environment and all its inhabitants: people, animals and plants. Nature and all its natural resources were given to man to enjoy, to live off its fruits in such a way that others can also share in this, but to keep the fruit bearing capacity intact and to keep it for further generations. The government shares in this assignment of stewardship. It must ensure that the fruits of nature are for the benefit of all. It promotes that people act as good stewards. And it protects the natural environment against exhaustion, damage and over cropping.

Spread responsibility points to the fact that the government is not the only power in society. In different areas, citizens experience in their social organizations an individual responsibility for the affairs in those areas. The government is associated with this insofar as it looks after the law, but the primary responsibility in these areas lies with the organized society itself. Spread responsibility implies that people and their social organizations can, as described above under 'view of society', develop according to their intent: that they can love and raise children in the family; that they can contribute to building the business at work; that they can acquire knowledge and pass it on in their own schools; that they can play sports in their own clubs; that they can celebrate the faith in church; Thus, people should be shown to advantage in their responsible relations to their fellow man, to society as a whole and to the natural environment. In sectors where norms and values

are passed on, such as education and the media, this also means that pedagogical ideals and idealistic views on society respectively should color that which is provided, without falling back into the strong social control of compartmentalization.

These four values are each recognizable as core concepts inspired by the Gospel. The source, the view of mankind, the view of society and the four values together form a Christian political conviction. On the basis of these convictions, every four years election programs are written.

Historical development of the Christian political conviction

The school funding controversy – The school funding controversy was the political problem that gave cause to the founding of Christian political parties in our country. Whereas education in the Republic of the United Netherlands (from before the French time) was still in the hands of the church, since the French time it came into the hands of the government. As a result of this the question rose which religion would be taught in the schools. The liberal and conservative politicians that were dominant in the nineteenth century supported a vague sort of Protestantism – 'Christian and social virtues' as it was called by the law. They certainly did not wish to go any further. The orthodox Reformed and the Roman Catholics were not satisfied with this. Initially the reformed leader Groen van Prinsterer entertained the thought of different public schools for the Reformed, Catholics and Jews. Since 1857 the Lower Education Law also made special schools possible, provided that these were entirely privately funded. This possibility was used, while at the same time the granting of equal financial rights to public and special education was pursued, which was accomplished in 1917.

The school funding controversy under the slogan 'freedom of education' revealed and developed several fundamental Christian Democratic characteristics. To start with abandoning a theocratic political system. Christian Democrats do not strive to impose the Christian faith on all the citizens through the government, not even if they hold the majority. In their eyes this is not what the government is intended for. The government's role is to do justice to all the citizens. Christian Democrats are supporters of the constitutional state. But this means equal rights for everybody: not only for supporters of public education, but also for all groups in society. Christian Democrats are supporters of special education, also for non-Christian groups. They regard this as the most free, and therefore liberal, system, which however had to be won from the liberals. The granting of equal rights that accompanies this is a current issue in the modern multicultural society, which in some aspects seems to show a repetition of what took place in

the nineteenth century: at that time, Roman Catholics had to prove that they were real Dutchmen and not in the first place subjects of Vatican City, now Muslims are criticized that they pledge allegiance to foreign Arab countries. Then and now there should however be freedom of education.

The school funding controversy also taught Christian Democrats the broader sense of the meaning of what was then called 'sovereignty within one's own circle' or 'subsidiarity' and is now referred to as 'spread responsibility': citizens themselves take responsibility for the governance of the organizations that carry out tasks in the general interest. This principle of 'spread responsibility' is not only of importance to ideological activities, but also more generally to numerous tasks that are in the general interest. Such tasks are currently being privatized to commercial enterprises. The question is whether these enterprises are sufficiently capable of looking after these interests. This is not to say that the government should therefore continue to look after these tasks itself. Sometimes organizations of citizens that are not primarily aimed at making a profit - such as cooperatives, mutual trust companies, associations or foundations – are the most suitable organizational type for such tasks. This is the broader lesson that can be drawn from the school funding controversy and that was found applicable to the social issue.

The social issue At the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, the impoverishment of the proletariat under the influence of the Industrial Revolution was the most important political and social problem. The Christian political leaders in Europe became deeply aware of the fact that this problem could not be solved only with private charity and churchly deaconate. It required a reform of society and therefore of government laws. With these laws they at the same time they did not want to regard the solution of the matter as a government task, but they also wanted to actively involve social organizations of employers and workers. They did not regard such organizations only as interest groups that were sharply opposed to each other in the class struggle. They were of the opinion that such conflicts of interest could be overcome by charity based on solidarity. In the twentieth century therefore the name 'people's party' became popular amongst Christian Democratic parties in Europe, of which the CDA is one. It is often thought that this name was an attempt to attract people of different beliefs in secularized times. This is however not the case. The name 'people's party' reminds of the motives of the first Christian Democrats during the time of the French Revolution: they stood up for the people and thereby even chose sides against the leadership of the church. Later also a too close relationship between the church and the state, for example in Portugal and Spain, was a reason to choose the name 'people's party'. Other

than a reason to show that one was not a party that was subject to churchly political power, the term 'people's party' also expressed that from a perspective of Christian charity people did not wish to accede to a social division as was presented by the socialistic and communistic class struggle on the one hand and the liberal capitalism on the other hand. It was thought that this division could fundamentally be overcome and that it was not desirable to base oneself upon it as a political party. On the contrary, the term 'people's party' was an attempt to express that labour and capital could be reconciled. In both cases – not being a subject of the churches and not accepting the consequences of the class struggle – the name 'people's party' expresses an authentic notion of the Gospel.

Christian politics means that solidarity with the poor should also be looked after by employers and workers. The expression 'social partners' was derived from this. Thus Christian Politics takes a position in the debate about freedom and equality between liberals and socialists. On the one hand, in the capacity of justice, it underlines the social task of the government to protect citizens from poverty by guaranteeing all people an equal level of a basic standard of living. On the other hand, in the capacity of spread responsibility, it supports the corporative economy with its links between wages and social security benefits and with the calling in of employer's organizations and trade unions in the shaping and implementation of social security. Spread responsibility for the benefit of social solidarity was the driving principle for the predecessor of what is currently called the 'polder model'. It is thereby of great importance to continue to recognize that the consensus between government, employers and workers that was aimed at, may not restrict itself to an exchange of interests, but must be characterized by a common ambition to truly solve social problems and to this extent to sacrifice some own interest if necessary.

The environmental problem – In the 70's of the twentieth century, thanks to the actions of social organizations and responsible scientists, politics became aware of the exhaustion, damage and over cropping of the natural environment of mankind. Because they had all taken and carried a responsibility for the industrial reconstruction after the Second World War that had caused this problem, all large political parties had to find an answer to this problem. Under the influence of professor B. Goudzwaard, Christian Democracy then developed the term 'stewardship' as the value that needed to be included in governmental policy. The example shows that political convictions are not stagnant views, but are dynamic by nature. Parties use it to voice their moral experiences with political issues.

As became clear with the social issue, the solution of the ecological matter could not come from the government only. Business itself and the citizens

needed to act as good stewards. As with the social issue a link between spread responsibility and solidarity had developed, now the link between spread responsibility and stewardship grew. On the one hand, on the basis of these values a system of legal norms for the protection of the environment against exhaustion, damage and over cropping was developed under the cabinets that were led by the Christian Democrat Lubbers. On the other hand a system of agreements (covenants) developed with sectors of business that carried the greatest responsibility for this environmental pressure. These agreements proved successful. At the beginning of the twenty-first century the large international corporations show a strong readiness to hold themselves responsible, not only for profit for the benefit of the shareholders, but also for accomplishments in social and ecological areas. In their annual reports the threefold people, planet, profit can clearly be found and for this they let themselves be checked by accountants and organizations such as the World Wildlife Fund. Here again the Christian political conviction shows itself as especially current.

These three examples of political issues in which Christian politics has progressively developed its political conviction – the school funding controversy, the social issue and the environmental problem – can easily be supplemented with others. One can think of the problem of family policy, the distribution of care and labour between men and women, the matter of norms and values and the senseless violence on the streets, the development of the European Union (to an important extent a Christian Democratic initiative from the conviction that people need to show internationally solidarity so that world wars can be banned our), development aid that must bring about actual justice and solidarity with the most poor, the willingness to intervene militarily if the human rights are fundamentally violated and so forth. In all these cases a politics that lets itself be inspired by the Gospel, shows itself as a politics that brings forth solutions that are not only interesting for Christians, but for all people.

Differences between the parties that base themselves on the Christian faith

It seems somewhat strange that different parties present themselves to the voter, all of which say that they base themselves on the Christian faith. Does the Bible allow you to go in different directions? The answer is: not all directions, but in the course of history differences have risen between Christian politicians, differences which have led to the founding of new parties. One can regret this, but it is a fact that this phenomenon has also taken place in other political streams: in our country there are two political parties that present themselves as liberal (VVD and D66) en socialism also has different

parties (PvdA and Socialistische Partij; in the past also the PSP). In these cases we are dealing with parts of a stream that consider certain elements of the body of thought, which they deem to be neglected by others, so important that they are even willing to found a new party for this. What are these differences between the political parties that base themselves on the Christian faith?

Theocracy

The differences concern on the one hand the subject matter of the positions that are taken in and on the other hand the willingness to compromise and to accept as members of the party those with no or with different beliefs. These three points relate to each other and can be brought back to the tension between theocracy and democracy. In our country the theocratic political conviction bases itself on the phrase from article 36 of the Dutch Confession of Faith, that it is the task of the government "to keep out and to eradicate all idolatry and false religion, to bring down the realm of the antichrist [the devil – cjk]". This confession of faith was drawn up in 1561 by Guido de Brès. His ideas should be placed in the context of the struggle between the Spanish absolutism and the protestant motive of freedom. As someone from the late Middle Ages he was used to the convergence of religion and the state. In this context it is not surprising that De Brès demanded a protestant theocracy against the Roman Catholic theocracy. Although his view did differ from the then Roman Catholic theocracy because it respected the freedom of conscience, it does however concern a very limited view on freedom, which is continued to be legitimized by the desired unity of religion and state in public life. The freedom of religion that a government which bases itself on article 36 offers its subjects limits itself to the freedom of conscience within one's own house. Theocratic views will exercise an inhibiting influence on the public expressions of religion, culture and philosophies of life that are reprehensible from a theocratic point of view. There would, for example, be no freedom of education under a theocratic government.

Christian Democratic leaders such as Abraham Kuyper and his Roman Catholic colleagues interpreted God's will differently than De Brès. They too wanted the people to become Christian, however not by means of governmental coercion, but by means of the path of the free effect of God's World with regard to other convictions, which also required freedom to become truly convinced. They did not regard it as the government's duty to promote the Christian faith specifically, but to promote public justice. This means that they wanted to promote the experience of the different religions on equal footing, and only within this the Christian religion as well. For examp-

le by means of the freedom of education and broadcasting corporations, which should make it possible for every group of citizens with their own convictions to found schools or broadcasting corporations. Or by means of the equal funding of every type of spiritual care in hospitals, the army and prisons. It was only after the Second World War that the Christian Democrats for the first time acknowledged that the humanistic philosophies of life thereby needed to be treated equal to religious convictions. The government thus needs to make people capable of determining for themselves how they wish to live in communities with others, without this freedom being limited to the private life in a theocratic sense. With this view on public justice Kuyper did indeed exercise a Christian view on the tasks of the government, but a different one than the theocratic SGP. The political convictions of the CDA thus create room for everyone to live according to their own convictions, while the SGP does not want any interference of the government to this purpose. The ChristenUnie lies in between these two. One can especially find 'theocracy' with the SGP, to a lesser extent with the ChristenUnie and not at all with the CDA.

The compromise
Up until now the ChristenUnie and the SGP have never taken part in a government. They greatly value the purity of their own viewpoints and are quick to make unreasonable demands to other parties with regard to participating in a government, for example the demand that a preamble must be included in the Constitution which states that the Netherlands is ruled as a protestant nation. However much they emphasize that this demand does not have to result in a restriction of the democratic freedoms, it has been clearly shown that such theocratic demands prohibit the forming of a coalition with secular parties. In this respect the CDA clearly differs from the other two parties with a Christian foundation, a difference which is unjustly perceived as a willingness to make one's hands dirty for the benefit of power. This discussion points to the fact that the compromise is looked at in an unfavorable manner. It is easily associated with 'making your hands dirty', with compromising yourself. This risk is indeed present, but what is too easily overlooked is the fact every person makes many compromises on a daily basis. Life would be intolerable if we did not do this. It is therefore important to realize that 'making your hands dirty' is not the most important characteristic of the compromise and may not become this either. It is only so for people who claim to hold the truth and claim to know it all. In the first place however, it is the question whether people can know everything. In the second place, it matters how a compromise can be made without 'getting your hands dirty'. This last element requires exercise.

As do the SGP and the ChristenUnie, the CDA regards the inspiration from the Gospel as a decisive message for the political life. You can be deeply convinced of this. But does this also mean that you can compare yourself with he from who this joyful message originates? This is not the case. God's wisdom exceeds those of man. You have to experience his message in actual practice and to give it shape in a human manner. The Bible thereby warns against taking on God's will: 'one regarded the other more outstanding than himself' the student of Jesus impresses on the faithful. The CDA carefully expresses this in its program of principles when it says that it wants to continuously search for the meaning of God's Word for human society. It does not want to lead to pretensions, but acts from a certain intent (purpose). This is not false modesty, but a confident trust in God. This attitude also determines the willingness of the CDA to make compromises with those that hold different views, in order to bring about just laws together. One cannot exclude in advance that those with different views might have something valuable to say about the public justice. At the same time the CDA does not want to be pushed in the corner by those who think that the Christian faith is of no importance to politics. It knows better and wants to stand up for this.

The making of compromises from a fundamental attitude certainly does not mean that one, by definition, gets one's hands dirty. A good compromise is based on accepting the other party as they are. If one does not do this, the agreement will not hold out for long. This conflicts with the interest that laws must be enduring if the country is to be governed properly. You must be able to rely on it as a citizen. This means that the law should not be changed continuously. The law must express that which is right, which can be recognized by many. Herein lies the value of the compromise. A good compromise for example comes about if both parties come to a better understanding of justice while negotiating, even if this deviates somewhat from their original viewpoints. This can certainly be the case. A good compromise can also be made with remaining differences, by focusing it on intermediate goals that can be agreed upon, or by phasing it in time, giving the opportunity to further contemplate the end goals or the times at which one wishes to reach these. A good compromise means that one does not force the other party to give up its principles. Only if this is the case does one start to get one's hands dirty.

Those with different and no beliefs

In the CDA, those with different and no beliefs can also be a member of the party and represent it in parliament. The general rule is that everyone who

feels drawn to the political convictions is welcome and can consequently be called to account on them. Christian Democratic political parties do not investigate their members with regard to the question whether they adhere to the Christian faith. This is not regarded as a competence of the political party. What matters in politics is the question whether one wishes to account for the political conviction that is formulated as an answer to the appeal of the Bible. If people apply to become a member of the party, they are considered to subscribe to this political conviction. What is said against this formal viewpoint is that it must seem very difficult that people with a faith different than the Christian one, such as Muslims and Hindus, can subscribe to these political convictions. This is however not as difficult as it may seem. In the past it has never been stated that Jewish citizens, who do acknowledge the First but not the Second Testament, could not become a member of a Christian Democratic party. This they were indeed. The source of inspiration of a great part of the Christian Democratic political conviction is already present in the First Testament: one can think of the justice of which is already spoken in the psalms (Psalm 82); of the love of one's neighbor as the foundation of the principle of solidarity; of the story of creation as inspiration for stewardship, as the Ten Commandments. Well now, Muslims – who have descended from Abraham – consider the First Testament as a predecessor of the Koran. And the Islamic concept 'kalifaat' expresses something that is comparable to the principle of stewardship. The solidarity with the poor can also be fully found in the Islam. The conclusion is therefore that those with different beliefs can sometimes be so close to the political conviction of the CDA, that the refusal of the membership – if that were possible – would come down to a theological dispute, which does not belong in a political party.

22

Politics and morality

Although they reject theocracy, Christian Democratic politicians are sometimes also criticized that they wish to impose their Christian morality upon those with different beliefs by means of the government. This criticism is primarily aimed at policy regarding moral issues such as abortion, euthanasia, cloning, fertilization clinics, genetic technology and equal treatment of homosexuals. In essence, this criticism is aimed at every politics with a moral stake, about which different thoughts exist in society. It is therefore important to discuss these separately. Strictly speaking there is of course no enforcement in a democratic constitutional state. One can only realize one's political ideals through legitimate means, by argumentatively convincing a majority of the voters in full freedom or by freely making a compromise

with another party. You can for example try to attract voters for abortion or euthanasia laws that are based on Christian respect for human dignity which thus does not accept the death of a person as an obvious technical 'solution' for a problem of life. This does not enforce anything on the voters. Or you can make a compromise with another party, which can regard this point of view as acceptable for entirely different reasons. That it results from a political conviction inspired by Christianity is not a reason to make the reproach that those with different views are thus being imposed a Christian morality. This is simply not the case.

It is better to also honestly regard the autonomous portrayal of mankind of liberals and social-democrats as a view, which can no longer be substantiated logically. The faith in human reason can after all not found itself with an appeal to that same reason. This leaves us with a circular argument. This is to say that this faith is also a quasi-religious supposition, just like the religious supposition that God created mankind. The struggle for the definitive truth of these suppositions cannot be settled in politics, because otherwise politics would become a theological debate and would assume theocratic characteristics. This is certainly not what it is for in the eyes of the Christian Democrats. Politics is about agreeing on laws with which the country can be justly ruled. Different political streams can thankfully often closely agree on this on the basis of different 'suppositions' regarding the views on mankind and society held by them. Politics has the characteristic of a practical overlapping consensus between streams that can be entirely different in their principles. Overlapping consensus, compromise and sometimes the acceptance of inevitable dissensus are important and therefore highly valuable instruments in keeping an ideologically varied country governable.

Christian politicians thus strive to convince others of the significance of their views on mankind and society by means of a democratic way. Within the democratic process of trying to convince each other with arguments and attracting voters for this, they regard their viewpoints as not only of importance to Christian believers, but to all people. One cannot see why liberals or social-democrats should be allowed to do this with their views that can equally be regarded as moral, and Christian politicians should not. What is sometimes said against this is that liberal politics, with its emphasis on individual freedom, does not force religious people to perform deeds that they would not deem in accordance with their beliefs, while Christian politics reversely does limit the possibilities of people to act in accordance with their own judgment. However, this argument does not solve the problem.

In the first place it does not because liberal politics does indeed influence

the possibilities of actions of people, by forcing them to decide on matters such as for example prenatal diagnostics, in which religious people, in their faith in God, did not think they had a choice. If one really wishes to speak of freedom of choice, then society will have to financially support people in the care 'that they have taken on themselves' in their 'choice', based on religious reasons, to accept a handicapped life. This is not to say that Christian politics forbids every form of abortion, this is certainly not the case. The law that was passed under the responsibility of the CDA allows for abortion in emergency situations. What we are dealing with is the liberal argumentation.

In the second place the liberal argument does not solve the problem, because it not only concerns the individual freedom to do or not do something, but also the quality of the society of which one should be able to be a full citizen. In the same way that a liberal feels called to political activity when the society of which he is a part restricts his ideal of the free individual, regardless of whether this concerns himself or not, in the same way a Christian politician will rise up if in that same society his ideal of human dignity is affected, regardless of whether this concerns himself or not. What is said here of the Christian politician mutatis mutandis applies to every politics that supports a moral ideal. For example, a follower of 'green' environmental politics will not accept that he or she is individually allowed to live as a vegetarian and in peace with nature, as long as he or she does not demand the same of others. Such issues will remain and cannot be defined away from the political agenda with an appeal to the individual freedom. Politics will also always be about the good life.

Conclusion

Politics based on the Christian faith does not regard man as a detached individual, who has to decide entirely by himself how he wishes to live and who has to realize his preferences through purchasing power on the free market. It sees man as a responsible person who shapes himself and society by being a part of different relations, communities and business engagements, which need to hold a certain moral quality. The state is also such a, publicly organized, community. In the state both government and citizens are together responsible for a development of society that is inspired by values such as public justice, spread responsibility, solidarity and stewardship. The government can call citizens to account on this and the citizens can expect from the government that it realizes these values. "Let's form a political community that wants to realize these values", is how Christian parties invite voters.

This attitude has consequences for the distribution of tasks between the government and citizens and their organizations. Sometimes the market is the most suitable decision-making mechanism to express preferences of citizens, but it can also very well be the case that certain decisions need to be withdrawn from the market mechanism. Especially where spiritual freedom (justice), care for the weaker (solidarity) and damage to the natural environment (stewardship) come into play, it can be that organizations of citizens that are not aimed at profits are the right form in which these tasks need to be carried out. Or that commercial organizations bind themselves to agreements to not leave certain decisions up to competition. Most Christian politicians would like to give these organizations the opportunity to take on these tasks in full freedom and responsibility, by means of legal protection and if necessary funding. They see the general interest as a combined action between the government on the one hand and citizens and their civic organizations on the other hand and reject the liberal contrast between the public (the government) and the private (the individual citizen). Both – government, civilians and civic organizations, are, each within their own competencies, individually responsible for the application of the norms and values that are at issue. Christian politics wants to appeal to this experience of norms and values and to promote it, because it is convinced that the development of society fundamentally has to do with the moral choices that people and their organizations make.

Prof. Dr C.J. Klop studied sociology and public administration at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and received his doctorate in Leiden with a thesis on "The cultural political paradox. Necessity and undesirability of government influence on norms and values" (Kampen: Kok 1993). He also wrote "Power and authority" (Kampen: Kok 1996) and "Imagination of the word" (Nijmegen: Valkhof Pers 1999). He currently holds a named professorship for political ethics at the Faculty of Philosophy / the Centre for Ethics of the Catholic University Nijmegen and is chairman of the NCRV in The Netherlands

Against the current

Prof. dr. H.M. Voom

Christian social organizations are experiencing difficult times in a society in which secularization and liberalism have penetrated into all corners. The identity relevance dilemma has sharpened: he who solely upholds the Christian identity loses relevance for the outside world, on the other hand he who wishes to be relevant for everything, loses his identity and thereby the right to exist. Many Christian institutions have become diluted because of this. Vroom shows how the tide can be turned and why this is necessary.

As a reaction to the contrast between the various sociopolitical groups, the past thirty years there has been a tendency amongst Christians to not blow one's own trumpet, to emphasize the value of that which those with others views do and to often elabourately describe the misdeeds from one's own tradition. The individuality of Christian organizations was not accentuated. Many Christian organizations merged into general organizations for the sake of filled generality: it was said that we are general but we cherish the ideals from various elements, we will not forget each other's beliefs, different beliefs and disbelief, speak about it, 'bring it forward' and ensure that our organization does not become something vague and neutral: 'filled generality' it was called twenty years ago. Filling these general organizations though, was like with a filled cookie in the hand of a growing boy: soon there was nothing left of it. What remained were so-called neutral organizations. A little later we learned to call this secularization; amongst others it implies that religion has less influence in society. Many stakes were placed on the general, on cooperation with others and discussion about new issues. This was also much the case with ethics, where people learned to speak in terms of narrow and broad morality. Everyone is bound to the minimal morality; the broad morality is free: that is what everyone is willing to do extra. The cause, taken by itself good, was to accept everyone as they were: everyone can decide for themselves. The bishop, the synod and even the minister of Justice cannot tell us what our ideals should be – we can decide this for ourselves. This is how Kuitert pleaded for the narrow morality, especially for politics. Politics is carried out with the general arguments of the narrow, shared morality and not with the large private ideals of the broad moral traditions, such as the Christian faith or humanism.

Politics must be very withdrawn:
The indisputable fact is there that the more you put in the 'common good', the less space remains for me to be reformed in my way, for you to be Catholic in your way or for him to be humanist in his way and so forth.[1]
This is why some people plead for a narrow common morality, with complete freedom for all people to do more than the minimum requirements – not

a complete idea of good life but a necessary minimum that leaves everyone's autonomy and responsibility intact. Let the common morality remain close to the Ten Commandments – where it concerns the non-religious commandments anyway.[2]

This is also the way we find it with the liberals, who often dominate the political arena after the fall of the communist dictatorships. Because philosophies of life divide people, it must be kept outside of the public and general domain. Faith implies universal claims to the truth and these set people against each other – this is what he claims anyway. This is why respect for the convictions of others demands that people remain silent about it in the public domain.

The supposition in this liberal view is that the common life of people can do without the inspiration of philosophies of life and religion. That is why this does not concern 'the politics', but also the quality norms for hospitals, the approach to social work, the view on unemployment, the final attainment level of education and the effectiveness of newspapers and broadcasting corporations. Laws after all regulate what we together deem necessary. After twenty years of narrow public morality, the question is current in our 'multicultural' society whether the public morality hasn't become too narrow. Does the economy dominate because the broader ideals of the good life and the virtues have been wedged away? How can one steer and control economic motives if the ideals of 'good life and coexistence' remain undiscussed?

Because Christian organizations hardly present themselves with their Christian identity and because institutions are being judged more and more by their results, many Christian institutions have become diluted. In addition to this is the lapse of churchgoing, so that many employees of Christian institutions are now non-practicing or lapsed churchgoers. If I see matters correctly, for the churches this means that they cannot be too harsh on institutions that have to deal with non-practicing membership of the church; this would be like the pot calling the kettle black.

Christians that want to make a contribution to the society as a whole, can follow more strategies, the salt model and the lamp model. The salt model (thy art the salt of the earth) is that Christians work within general organizations, like Christians that are active within Amnesty International, the Red Cross or such. The disadvantage is that the Christian inspiration is not explicitly propagated (so that the Church is shoved the lamp function and quite often feels maneuvered into making public statements, which do not have so much political influence). That is why others choose for the lamp

model (do not put your lamp under the corn measure / a city on a mountain will not remain hidden); Christian organizations thus came about, giving shape to the Christian inspiration in different sectors of society. At the same time these organizations served to organize the life per sector of the population as much as possible within the various sociopolitical groups. The sociopolitical groups have been pried open. Nevertheless many Christians value Christian organizations in the civil society.[3] The government can, after all, not regulate everything; here lies the right of the narrow morality. The government is characterized by compromises and reserve. You cannot however motivate people with narrow compromises and reserve. The neutral government lacks the capacity to inspire people. The school can only be regulated by school boards and the care sector by experts with a vision on people, solidarity, education and care – 'sovereignty within one's own circles'. A neutral civil society is difficult to imagine (apart from one issue organizations). For their ideals, neutral social organizations are dependent on the input of their members based on their philosophies of life. There is little else other than pragmatism for them. 'Filled generality' is unavoidable, but, as stated earlier, the filling disappears like a filled cookie in a schoolboy.

Organizations of citizens can only exist by the grace of the motivation of citizens. Why are parents members of school boards, do volunteers work in hospitals and refugee centers and do people take responsibility for all these boards? Why else than the fact that they hope to be able to realize something of their ideals in this way? An active civil society is dependent on people with a high level of motivation.

On the liberal and socialist side, people are betting on neutrality and general organizations. "Can't we forget about compartmentalization along sociopolitical lines by now in this country and suffice with general schools?" This of course does not only apply to education but also to social institutions, the union and the media. Philosophy of life is pushed to the edge of common existence as private. Plurality requires neutral public sectors, the argument goes. Out of embarrassment and for financial reasons many Christian organizations are hesitant to emphasize their identity – this only lies differently in the right flank of Protestantism, but people there usually revert to 'small is beautiful'.

Below I will discuss the first liberal argumentation. After this an example will follow of an organization that has lost its Christian identity in many countries because of the pressure of the general culture. The example may be unexpected, it is the 'theological faculty'. A discussion has risen about

this internationally and specifically about the task and the attitude of theology in the general culture, exactly our subject. I will limit myself to the general outline. After this the meaning of faith for social choices will shortly be dealt with and finally the position of Christian organizations in the (real) pluralistic society and the difficult choices that we face.

The liberal process
First the liberal strategy:
1. declare every man benevolent, decent and social by nature,
2. label every doubt of this principle as gloomy and narrow-minded ("Do you really think that we are not good people?" or, harsher: "do you think Christians (Muslims etc.) are better people? (but don't you know that)",
3. label the liberal view of mankind and society as 'general',
4. declare all views of 'good life and coexistence' as private convictions (besides the general and the common),
5. in this way declare religious organizations redundant within the public, common sector – such that the public domain is free for the competition between autonomous citizens.

In this way, philosophies of life are banished from the public domain.

Much can be said about this process. But first let me point to a logical error. 'The liberal' thinks that his view of mankind is the right one. This is a belief with an absolute claim to the truth that the liberal tries to impose on others. It is however a religion: every man is by nature benevolent, is autonomous, can decide over himself, is prepared to look up other people – and if everyone looks carefully for himself, then society will prosper as much as it can (solving all problems is of course impossible). This is more or less the confession of faith of our liberal brothers and sisters. I will get back to this, it is about the logical error. This is that this liberal confession of faith is declared generally applicable in the public domain.

In the meanwhile, pluralism is a fact. People think differently about 'good life and coexistence'. How can we deal with this? You would think that the solution is in principle simple: see how many similarities you can discover. The question 'How much do agnostics and atheists, humanists and all sorts of Christians, Muslims and Hindus have in common?' leads to discussion and study. This seems a logical procedure, but this is apparently not the case. To give an example, in the discussion about the so-called 'multicultural society', the question of what people have in common is not branded as the

core question. Wittgenstein's maxim for philosophy was: 'look and see'. Well then: ask and hear, look and see: what do you believe, and what do you believe and to what extent do you agree with that?

A good example of the liberal way of thinking can be found in the philosophy of the religion(s) in the so-called pluralism thesis. This expression, pluralism thesis, refers to religious theories such as those of John Hick who says that all representations of the divine are as many images of the one Real, that the one answer to the Real is just as good as the other and that the design of life and society of the various religions and cultures are equal because one cannot make a rational choice in the midst of these evident differences.[4] Meanwhile Hick does not imply that national-socialistic heathenism is just as good as the Quakers; he of course also has a lower limit for what is acceptable. The problem of this vision lies in the following paradox: Hick wants to make room to accept the different religions as they are by recognizing them as equal, but he accomplishes that the differences no longer matter; the differences are explained from a sociological ("you are Catholic because you were born in Rome") or psychological ("judging by your character, Mennonite might be something for you") perspective. The inner contradiction in the pluralism thesis is that people wish to respect the views of other people, but consequently avoid the discussion (and thus do not respect people). You can no longer ask: is God a person or not, is God love or not?, does God want justice for the oppressed and poor or not? The pluralism thesis accepts the pluralism by ignoring it.

The common cannot be proclaimed, ex cathedra, from liberal heights; it must be found. To make this very clear: what do you think of a philosopher who says that despite all the differences, Aristotle, Plato, Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Wittgenstein in the deepest sense all did give an answer to the same reality, that their visions are deeply, fundamentally equivalent, but are private and not of importance to the public domain? Would you not say: read it and prove that they have the liberal fundamental values in common? More so, would we not say: pay attention to the differences and try to learn from it! The pluralism thesis makes discussion redundant. This is also the case in ethics. In the contemplation of religious pluralism, the common ethics of the world religions are also discussed in this way. Famous is the praiseworthy 'Projekt Weltethos' of Hans Küng. Where Küng cautiously tries to find the commonalities, others have simply declared that the ethics of the world religions display large similarities. Are they not all in favour of honesty and equality of people? However, people then forget to ask themselves whether the honesty only applies to one's own circle of friends or

whether it does so in general. People overlook the fact that in past class ridden societies, people were also called equal, and that the concept equality needs an interpretation before it can actually mean something.[5] Reading, studying and questioning we can ascertain that religions have all sorts of overlap.[6] But what these are we can only track down. The liberal culture accepts the pluralism, says "together we have the public morality" and in fact brushes it aside.[7]

A case: theology as science of religion

Lately the consequences of the dominating culture on theology have been brought under discussion. One can express the developments as follows: theology is increasingly becoming the science of religion; this is to say that courses such as biblical clarification and church history are studied in a more distant way, from a general perspective. Adriaanse c.s. have defended the view that theology is not a science; science of religion is a science, theology isn't – although they certainly do wish to keep confessional theology in the university. The paradigm for good science is hereby what all can recognize. Public knowing is neutral and controlled; confessional elements thus do not play a role.[8] Gavin D'Costa, a British expert in the area of religious pluralism, rejects this 'becoming scientific of religion', of theology under the influence of a more or less positivistic scientific concept and the ruling cultural climate.[9] 'Theologians' study the bible like classicists study Homer. The academic world initially objected when it was demanded that candidates be Christian for a vacancy for practical theology.[10] In the past, theology was about the story of creation, history and completion and the world was given a place in the biblical story; nowadays it is exactly the other way around, the bible gets a place in the big story of our culture:[11] the Enlightenment and the Progress. D'Costa writes that a theologian who, during his lectures in the Christian theology to students who will go to work in the church, gives evidence of his faith or assumes that he presupposes faith with his students, embarrasses people.[12] Theology has slowly but surely been replaced by religious studies. You describe the faith of others as if you have nothing to do with it and as if you have never asked yourself the question whether it could possibly be true. D'Costa hereby refers to the methodological starting point of the epochè, which says that you have to put your own faith between brackets to be able to get to know that of others. One wants to describe objectively without judging. However, D'Costa says, let every theological faculty state where it stands and what it wants: Anglican, Catholic, Methodist, Ecumenical, Islamic theology or religious science. Separate religious science and theology and let people be part of a tradition – and especially let them react to each other. In this way you will accomplish more

openness than when you demand distance and neutrality of the university (and, I add to this, in the public domain). "... [T]he cultivation of such tradition-specific departments will therefore actually facilitate a richer pluralism and a deeper engagement between different traditions."[13]
The Heidelberg professor Gottfried Seebass has described and criticized similar developments at the German theological faculty, especially the irritations in the academic senate when the relation between theology and church are at any time brought forward. He pleads for a clear relation between churches and faculties and a solid position for theology at the university, such that the religious reflection will not be brought into a churchly ghetto.[14] In our country this discussion is current with regard to the education for imams. In a report for the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sciences, N. Landman concludes that a Dutch imam training is desirable and that the government can subsidize it, but that the religious color of such an institution cannot be influenced by the government.[15] The initiative must come from Islamic groups. When these groups submit a request in the nearby future, the government can help realize an imam training. Landman is of the opinion that the so-called duplex ordo structure of theology at the state universities offers a good basis: four years public education and a two year course within Islamic theology. But the problem hereby is also that learning to read the Koran in Arabic is not a neutral preliminary study for Islamic education. There is but little neutral territory; furthermore the elements of the transfer of a broad, complicated religious tradition is ignored. The intellectual does not rise above the parties. Detached reading of the Koran forfeits its subject: the Koran claims to be the revelation of God. A study program of six, seven years cannot be separated in public and religious courses. What would this actually mean for the personal education of the students? This is why a potential imam training at or with a Dutch university will have to be a Muslim institution, whereby the government will set the quality standard requirements and the Muslim community has a contract with the university regarding the Islamic identity, the content of the training and the appointment policy of the scientific staff. Real acceptance of plurality requires confessional education. In all questions that deal with philosophies of life and with 'good life and coexistence', there is no neutrality, but there is critical reflection on traditions and dialogue between traditions.

One of the famous North American books about the contribution of Christian thinking (concentrated on theology) in the pluralist culture is Unapologetic Theology of William Placher. He distinguishes two tactics in North American theology, which more or less run parallel with cultural

streams: the revisionists and the post-liberals.[16]

The revisionists try to give theology a place in the public culture; they strive for public theology.[17] They think that the Christian thinking has to make a contribution to the general culture and thus prove its worth; to this extent it must search for subjects that are understandable and provide insight for everyone.

Placher rejects this approach, because the public theology means an adaptation of what everyone thinks and thus people have nothing new to contribute. In the meantime Placher appreciates that people are engaging in a public debate.

The post-liberals rightly say that there is no such thing as 'general human thinking'. Placher himself shares this opinion. From the perspective of epistemology and cultural anthropology he shows that science is not without prejudices, that an objective assessment of cultures is impossible, that general human values do not naturally exist and that the ethics around the whole world do not come down to the same thing. (With an example that I have used before: one can lovingly translate agapè and mahakaroema but this alone does not make them identical.) That it all comes down to the same thing, was the claim of the modernistic, liberal culture; this is why we speak of post-modernism and post-liberal thinking.[18] Thus far Placher agrees with the post-liberals. Liberalism is a faith next to other faiths and not a common basis of all cultures. There are only people that are shaped by cultures and traditions. The post-liberal streams derives its right to consciously count itself as a tradition from this. One sets oneself the task of contemplating what good Christian thinking is: Let Christians make sure that they have their own tradition straight and that they draw from their own sources of spirituality for the modern problems. Placher may agree with this, but he wants more. The church, and, so we can add: the Christian organizations, may not end up in a ghetto.

This is why Placher pleads for a middle course. With the post-liberals he thinks that the Christian contribution must be authentically Christian, and with the revisionists he thinks that it must be a contribution to the public debate. His ground rule for the debate between people of different backgrounds regarding their philosophies of life is that you must be conscious of the fact that you speak from a Christian (or other) perspective; do not act as if you can abandon it.[19] He has three thumb rules for Christian organizations:

1. By their deeds Christian organizations bear witness of how they think things should be done. Amongst the Christians with the biggest public influence in the United States are Reinhold Niebuhr and Martin Luther King:

they did not adapt, but they said and did what they thought Christians should say and do. 'Unapologetically': without caring about whether they were acceptable to those who thought differently.

2. For branches of work Christians can find allies: with Jews and Marxists for example for work among the homeless.

3. Do not try to find a generally accepted narrow morality, because before you know it, you will lose your Christian contribution (and you will tempt others to disregard their sources and inspiration).[20]

For the Christian theology this means that Placher is on the same track as D'Costa and Seebass. The ideals of 'the academic world' and the standards for 'generally acceptable knowledge' and the criteria for 'scientific verification' are chopping knives with which the reflection on the expressiveness of one's own tradition are chopped away. Traditions should not be chopped away, but should be trimmed.

These lines of thought – as far as I am concerned they are observations – lead to the following conclusion: Real pluralism exists in the activation of the different traditions, in challenging each other to show the best of your tradition, in asking critical questions and in truly learning from each other. Real pluralism does not mean giving minorities in our country the space to eat couscous, to listen to Arab music and to possibly wear a veil – while the Islam is for the rest ignored or regarded as a difficult incidental circumstance. Real pluralism exists in accepting the plurality of opinions, plurality of organizations and plurality of ideals of 'good life and coexistence'.[21]

35

The meaning of faith for social choices

In what way does faith have meaning for the determination of one's position for Christians? The Bible is not a book of recipes. Some commandments are clear – thy shalt not kill -, but much can be said about its application in special situations. Religious traditions are very complex, dynamic 'units' with all sorts of sub streams that explain life and coexistence from the perspective of the faith. Faith offers a framework within which this indication of elements takes place. This way we can understand that the Gospel offers the horizon within which Christian organizations do their work and that it is not a book of recipes. The 'Christian' element lies in orientation and inspiration, in atmosphere and inspiration and not in technical actions. As far as the elementary schools are concerned, not in tests but in the general

framework of the upbringing and education, within which much more is 'passed on' to children than is made insightful in nationwide, general examination requirements. The identity lies much more in that with which we wish to identify ourselves than in that which is quantified nationwide. Without explicit transfer of the stories of Christianity, no Christian institution can in the long run exist, because it is from these stories that we derive our inspiration. The stories themselves are stories about regular life, but as Walter Brueggeman has expressed, also 'counterstories', contrary stories about injustices and obstructionists.[22] Jesus' message and course of life was not a happy addition to what everyone already knows, but a prophetic protest against human miscalculations. Values are passed on in these stories. At the same time a hierarchy is made of the values. In a course in Budapest we once compared the liberal, communist and Christian values. I asked the participants to name values which people strive after. We compiled a list of about fifteen values, such as honesty, health, solidarity, freedom and so forth. First we asked ourselves whether someone would call these values into question. Answer: no. We then examined which two or three values would be at the top of the wish list of liberals, communists and Christians. Freedom and autonomy scored high with the liberals, solidarity and work with the communists and solidarity and justice with Christians. In practice such differences of accents have led to entirely different types of societies. Are Christians therefore opposed to freedom? Certainly not, but the interpretation of freedom differs essentially. Traditions have very subtle and complicated histories of being passed on as far as values and norms are concerned, or rather: ideals and views of good life and coexistence.

Christian faith is intended to impregnate the whole of life; this is expressed in the images of salt and leaven (sourdough): it penetrates life like leaven a bread. This is why Christians have founded Christian institutions in a number of (formerly) Christian countries, to give shape to charity, poor relief, healthcare, education. Christian schools are still very popular in India; the reason for this not only lies in the fact they have more opportunities because of support from the West, but especially because Christians care for children and want to help them develop. It is said that Christian hospitals were very popular in the GDR; hospitals in a tradition that highly regards charity, preaches it and (with ups and downs) practices it.

Attitude of Christian organizations
In certain parts of 'Religie als ziel van cultuur' (1996) [Religion as the soul of culture] the subject from the previous paragraph has been further elaborated on. At the end of the previous paragraph I tried to summarize my findings as far as it concerned Christian organizations. It cannot be the aim to

repeat the last pages of that booklet here. After an examination of the post-liberal culture, it is called for to remember that this is at the same time a post-Christian culture. All sorts of Christian values have become common good (whereby we must also note that Christians in their turn have learned much from others). But nobody can guarantee that central Christian values will continue to be a part of the general culture without the effort of Christians. History shows that cultures come and go and that they experience radical changes. It would be most naïve to think that Christian values that are part of the post-Christian culture will automatically be a part of this. When people use the same words, they still do not have to attach the same meaning to it. The Gospel deals with how far charity and solidarity extend ('Master, who is my neighbor?', that is: how far does it extend?). This has consequences for the level of social security benefits, for what people are willing to give for the care of people that cannot help themselves, for the distribution of labour, for the way in which one wishes to distribute wealth, and so much more. He who uses the same words can mean something entirely different. Cultures can quickly change, as national socialism and the murders in Rwanda have shown. A caring culture demands much care: cultura.

Christian organizations can thus only be internally Christian and externally act as Christian organizations in the public domain, if they preserve and care for their Christian identity. At the same time they wish to show their relevance in and for society; it is not about the restoration of the old socio-political groups. That is why Christian education opens its doors for all sorts of pupils and students. At the same time financial considerations, competition and power factors play a role. A labour union without members cannot get much done, a newspaper with too few readers will go bankrupt. In policy, not only the ideals but also the hard preconditions play a role.

Twenty-five years ago people spoke about the identity-relevance dilemma, which corresponds to the contrast that Pacher makes between revisionists and post-liberals in theology. The dilemma is as follows: he who exclusively maintains the Christian identity, loses his relevance for the outside world; on the other hand, he who wishes to be relevant for everything and wishes to take part in general terms, loses that identity and therefore the right to exist. This dilemma has sharpened because of the increasing secularization. Because churches have lost many members and the Christian institutions have not fired these people (did not want to and could not), the secularization has also progressed within the Christian institutions. Besides this: the church is the last organization to be able to blame these institutions of this. As far as Christian institutions are concerned, it is often not

about the 'relevance and (or: opposed to this) identity', but also about the continued existence of the organizations as such. That is why the policy of open Christian institutions is at the very edge: on the basis of one's own inspiration and motivation one wants to reach readers, patients, listeners, pupils and members and to pass something on to them, but at the same time one is financially dependent on the fact that the people keep coming. The 'identity-relevance dilemma' thus acquires its own urgency for Christian institutions. Where the larger churches apparently seem to deal with this crumbling away in a resigned manner, the old Christian organizations are fighting for their 'market share'. A hospital and a university cannot continue without new instruments, a broadcasting corporation cannot do without listeners and viewers, a newspaper cannot do without subscribers. In this situation one cannot escape the fact that new paths must be taken to confront the three challenges (identity, relevance/input/ sufficient magnitude). The church also – and especially the 'broad center' of the church – soon cannot escape from having to worry (deeply) about this.

The way in which Christian organizations will deal with these dilemma's will differ. What is clear though is that whoever does not cherish one's own identity (and thus consciously gives it an organizational place), will not survive as Christian organization. If 'the Christian' becomes diluted, one not only forfeits the sympathy of the Christian supporters, but also the respect of the non-churchly sympathizers of Christian schools, hospitals and broadcasting corporations. Furthermore the reasons for one's independence in the public domain will decline; this cannot remain without consequences in the subsidized sector. If the people at the fringes of the church and outside of that cannot be attracted, one becomes small and the organization is in danger of not surviving. That is why the observer on the shore – the place where the best captains apparently always are – sees the larger Christian organizations maneuvering between emphasizing their Christian identity (ideals, members), demonstrating the relevance of their Christian input (ideals, influence, survival) and reaching 'zapping' groups that may vote for you tomorrow but on someone else the day after (influence, survival).

The public culture does not change rapidly. It is being dominated more and more by the media. Through computers and the internet the individualization will increase. For the broadcasting corporations this means that people will switch through channels, for the schools it means that the parents will easily switch to a school at another location, for a newspaper it means that the readers will no longer be loyal. The flipside of the individualization is however that people will search for communities in which they are welcome. This offers good opportunities for organizations in the civil society, although they will have to prove themselves year in, year out. Creativity is a

first demand. The obvious nature and the loyalty of the supporters is almost gone. I think this not only applies to the newspaper and the broadcasting corporations, but also to the school and soon also to the church. One has to prove the identity, the relevance and the quality of the organization. In this way one can try to safeguard the magnitude.

My first thesis is that whoever loses sight of these three criteria will perish – because one 'becomes generalized', loses quality or becomes too small to survive. My second thesis is that the larger Christian organizations are currently in the surf, but that the larger churches will soon be in the same predicament (and in the larger cities are actually already in this situation). In the third place, for Christian democracy it means that it, if it lets the Christian identity become diluted, will be crushed between liberals, pragmatists and socialists, that it will not attract new votes if it cannot prove its relevance and that it does not have a chance of survival without renewal and quality.

The acceptance of real pluralism is a large societal interest. The liberal and pragmatic denial of real pluralism can have as a result that one stimulates fundamentalist streams. Fundamentalism has several causes, but one of them is the resistance against secularization and against the liberal monoculture.

The acceptance of real pluralism in the individualistic culture means that the obvious nature will cease to exist and that one has to continuously demonstrate the relevance of the Christian organizations.

Prof. Dr. H.M. Voom is professor of religious philosophy at the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam.

Notes

1. H.M. Kuitert, Autonomie: een lastige laatkomer in de ethiek, farewell lecture, (Amsterdam: VU-Uitgeverij 1989), 25v. Cf. Idem, Alles is politiek maar politiek is niet alles (Baarn: Ten Have 1985).
2. Kuitert, Autonomie, 27.
3. The socialist economist A. Van der Zwan used to be opposed to the civil society, because in his point of view general competencies belonged to the government, but he has converted, at least regarding this point. He says that the fact that the government can take over the tasks of the civil society 'has been proven in theory. Reality shows that if you tear down the civil society, the influence and meaning of it does not revert to the state, but just evaporates.' He poses that the government is simply going in an economic direction (Trouw, 1 March 1997).
4. John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion (Macmillan 1989); Idem, 'The Non-Absoluteness of Christianity' in: J. Hick and P.F. Knitter, The Myth of Christian Uniqueness (Orbis Books 1987), 16-36.
5. Read the essays in the compilation: R. Kranenborg – W. Stoker (ed.) Religies en (on)gelijkheid in een plurale samenleving (Apeldoorn: Garant 1995).
6. For example see my Geen andere goden. Christelijk geloof in gesprek met boeddhisme, hindoeïsme en islam (Kampen: Kok 1993).
7. Also see C. Klop, Bestaat er publieke moraal?, (Nijmegen: KUN 1997), inaugural speech.
8. H.J. Adriaanse, H.A. Krop, L. Leertouwer, Het verschinsel theologie (Meppel 1987). A discussion has arisen about this vision which I cannot document here.
9. G. D'Costa, 'The End of 'Theology' and 'Religious Studies', Theology (1996) 338-351.
10. D'Costa, 'The End', 341.
11. D'Costa, 'The End', 341.
12. D'Costa, 'The End', 341.
13. D'Costa, 'The End', 347f.
14. Theology must not be exercised exclusively at church schools of higher education. 'Damit aber würde eine Trennung der Theologie vom univer-sitären Gesamtzusammenhang vollzogen, die nicht nur der Tradition abendländischer Universitäten wilderspricht, sondern auch die Theologie in einer gefährlichen Weise isolieren würde. Hinzu kommt, dass auch dem Staat un der Gesellschaft daran gelegen sein muss, die Ausbildung der immer noch einen grossen Teil der Bevölkerung erreichenden kirchlichen Amsträger nich dem Ghetoo kirchlichen Binnenlebens zu überlassen', G. Seebass, 'Zur Situation der theologischen Fakultäten an der Universitat', Communio Viatorum 37 (1995), 225.

15. N. Landman, Imamopleiding in Nederland: kansen en knelpunten (Final report of an exploration under the authority of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sciences) (Zoetermeer: OC&W 1996), 71, 73.
16. William C. Placher, Unapologetic Theology. A Christian Voice in a Pluralistic Conversation (Wesminster: John Knox Press 1989), 154-174.
17. Cf. works of David Tracy, Gordon Kaufman et al.
18. Placher points to the works of people such as Kuhn and Lakatos in epistemology, MacIntyre and Hauerwas in ethics, and Frei and Lindbeck in theology. Cf. hereby as far as religions are concerned Mark. S. Heim, Salvations. Truth and Differences in Religion (Orbis Books 1995).
19. Placher, 147.
20. Placher, 167v.
21. S. Griffioen and R. Mouw, Pluralism and Horizons (Grand Rapids 1993), 15-19.
22. W. Brueggeman, Texts under Negotiation. The Bible and Postmodern Imagination (Minneapolis: Fortress Press 1993).

Public responsibility in a post-modern society

Dr. A. Klink

Introduction

The debate about (public) morality is running rampant; in scientific circles, in politics but no less with the owners of bars, disco's or soccer clubs. For a long time there was a taboo on involving morality, the sense of public responsibility in social issues.

Religion and the stamina of the sense of public responsibility
Much has appeared in the past decennium, both nationally as well as internationally, about 'citizenship' and the sense of public responsibility, about 'shared norms' and about an 'emotional democracy'. The central issue thereby is often how a postmodern society, in which the large, coherent stories of olden days have disappeared, relates to ethics. This question can be seen as the hinge that many well known publications deal with. To illustrate this I will mention the sizeable study of Charles Taylor 'Sources of the self' and the well known 'After virtue' of Aladair MacIntyre. This selection is actually too one-sided. It is exactly these two authors that question the stamina of the sense of public responsibility in a postmodern era. Taylor regularly indicates that he questions whether the modern morality can survive without an active involvement in Jewish-Christian tradition, which in the end is its testator. Something similar applies to MacIntyre, although he also includes the Aristotelian line in the history of (public) morality.

Opposite this are many others. Others, who hold a diametrically opposed view. I will introduce them as if I were their spokesman. They identify the Jewish-Christian tradition (in its more orthodox form) with a massive big story. Massive also in the sense that they brought the patriarchal ties and strict rules of decency with them. Massive because they work(ed) with fixed and rigid answers, while people are in fact 'doomed' to live with uncertainties. It is thus a gain that postmodern people recognize this. The fact is that their conscious is much more difficult to tune to unequivocal rules of conduct. It is a gain because it benefits the moral purity and spontaneity when 'ideological armors' are taken off. Kundera already stated that where nobody holds the claim to the truth, everyone has the right to be understood. It strikingly expresses that from which the postmodern culture wishes to derive its superiority. Big stories with their rules of conduct create too little room for 'the strange', for the stranger, for people who 'think differently of it' and who may follow their somewhat unusual disposition. Van Stokkom expresses this concisely: the ethics of the authenticity and the capacity for human empathy are gaining territory. Tolerance would grow, less souls would suffer under a yoke of closed ethical systems. The more the authenti-

43

city grows, the more the resentment would decrease. In a climate of tolerance, within which binding and squeezing 'higher values' have been gotten rid of, there is more room for self respect, for the individual emotional life and thereby for self confidence. This confidence is in fact pre-eminently the basis for mutual communication, mutual respect, human empathic behavior, in short for citizenship. Life is accepted and lived to its full extent, in its unending variation. Van Stokkom states that a civilizing and regulating effect results from the emotional life. The number of crippled souls is decreasing. Looked at in this way, the sense of public responsibility has much to gain with the marginalization of religion and the morality related with it. Besides Van Stokkom, many authors also voice similar (supposed) relations in their own way.

I share the view of Charles Taylor that in this sketch, certain culture determining fault lines manifest themselves. The Jewish-Christian tradition is thrown the gauntlet (notably by a cultural embranchment of its own basic notions). On the other hand the postmodern culture can in fact be asked whether the 'capacity for human empathy' without metaphysical source is resistant against threats that present themselves in many areas (hardening of social life, commercialization, no nonsense culture). Taylor also asks this question. Von Stokkom also realizes that the 'ethics of the authenticity and of empathy' cannot lead an unthreatened existence. On the contrary, the thread in his recent book is the struggle between 'soft and hard forces' in our culture, whereby the human empathic engagement represent the first model and the businesslike captains of industry represent the second model. Furthermore: is the negative sketch of the Jewish-Christian tradition correct? Does it not fixate on the distortions that have been made here and there of the Christian faith? I will return to both subjects at a later time.

Institutions hanging in the balance: no food for intellectuals

Firstly I would like to point out that the debate is not exclusive food for several intellectuals. The above does indeed illustrate a culturally decisive debate with a social impact that is not petty. This can be easily illustrated. For example the stiff prohibition morality is especially identified by postmodern authors with those institutions whose genesis dates back to the time of compartmentalization along sociopolitical groups. That this sentiment for a large part belongs to the present day cultural baggage, is shown by the fact that there is quite some present day distrust of exactly those institutions 'that wish to palm off convictions' (for example church, political party). This distrust has not been without consequences.

This observation corresponds with that of the sociologist A. Zijderveld and of the former Dutch minister of Justice Hirsch Ballin. The first states in his *De staccato-cultuur. Flexibele mattschappij en verzorgende staat* [The stacca-to culture. Flexible society and caring state] that 'the sociopolitical groups as organizational structures are still standing but that their cultural con-tent – their specific values, norms and meanings – their ideological level, has evaporated.' They have vanished into a culture fluid. He still sees the structures standing firmly though. This was about ten years ago. The hair cracks have however increased, amongst others because the institutions sometimes had little idealistic resistance against the developments in their environment. (Budget cutting operations, decentralization of planning competencies and professionalization have for example contributed to the scale increase and mergers in education, in healthcare and the care for the elderly, and in the world of 'welfare and happiness' from the beginning of the eighties up until today. Increases in scale in general lead to the neutrali-zation of idealistic profiles. In the media the dual order has been principal-ly accepted as the basic assumption of government policy, with all the leve-ling dynamics that are a part of it.)

There is however not only the matter of the structures. Hirsch Ballin stated: 'The ideological organizations are not only ideologically incapable of exerci-sing socializing functions, but often also miss the inner conviction for this. Even if the youth were to open up to for example the influence of the church, one would often not know what to say'.

'One would often not know what to say.' Indeed, it is not difficult to offer good examples for this embarrassment. Prominent scientists for example point to the fact that values and norms have been placed in the background in educational theory. This is a reason why the empirical educational theo-ry looks down on its like-minded counterpart. Its normative orientation is regarded as speculative. Children should not be burdened with personal opinions. Methodology and didactics are still open for discussion. In the message that has to be transferred, this is apparently much more difficult. Hub Zwart critically points to something similar in the area of medical ethics and care. Ethics in this area maintain as mutual code 'the willing-ness to not block the discussion with references to unverifiable intuitions and improbable convictions based on philosophies of life'. As is not possible with taste, philosophies of life can after all not be disputed. In the area of politics similar developments can be perceived, even if the reviving debate about norms and values needs to be discounted. Behind an often establish-ed technicalization of politics lies a certain hesitance to go into social issues in a normative manner. There are for example politicians who were quick to keep the abortion practices that were exposed by Zembla several years ago

away from the political agenda. I also point to a growing need to involve advisory committees and consultancy firms with important issues. Politics is thus in danger of becoming predominantly management. There is the threat of an atmosphere creeping into the democracy whereby ethical criteria as debating technique, TV-personality and the eternal smile of Den Haag Vandaag become decisive for the self confidence of political parties and – partly – the voting behavior of the citizens. Normative orientations are being pushed away by taste, style or attitudes.

Philosophical notes

To get some more insight into the dilemma's that relate to that which was mentioned above, I would first like to run through some philosophical backgrounds. The main point thereby is the question of how notions of freedom and affirmation of existence have developed in our culture and how they relate to religion, morality and the aesthetic developments that I was discussing. I will thereby dwell upon the threesome Nietzsche, Heidegger and de Rorty. In my opinion they have – the first ones unwillingly though – contributed to the change that I mentioned just before: the increasingly pushing away of normative orientations by aesthetics, by taste and by style. I will try to show that this was already foreseen in the nineteenth century by Dostoyevsky and Kierkegaard, two – what I will conveniently call – Christian thinkers. After this exercise I will delve deeper into the social context of this change. I will thereby – as indicated – argue that the becoming aesthetic is threatening to become closer to commerce. These will strengthen each other back and forth. They can strengthen each other so much that the 'civilizing and regulating effect of the emotional life' will have too little resilience to offer resistance against the pragmatization. Thus openings are formed for a culture in which the market quickly advances too far, threatens to commercialize relations and extends the borders of trade (men who offer sperm and women who offer their womb, the market of contemporary burials, etc.). The space for normativity and idealistic multiformity then quickly becomes more narrow. I therefore agree with Taylor that the Jewish-Christian sources in the end have more to offer: in as far as they are alluded to in an authentic manner anyway.

Scratching each other's eyes out with morality

It is well known that Friedrich Nietzsche strongly engaged in a polemic against Christianity. To state it concisely, he thought of the Christian faith as well as morality as an invention of cowardly people. Cowardly people that

are not really a match for life and feel insignificant. Insignificant especially towards the stronger, those who are filled with a zest for living, courage to live and if necessary contempt for death. But see there, the cowardly man thinks of a ruse: a very ingenious counterstrategy. That of morality, that of good and evil. With this morality they turn the world upside down. At once they were superior and the true heroes. Courage to live was called roughness by them, superior power became abuse of power. Cowardliness and carefulness thereupon became expressions of noblesse and good taste. It's all in the game. Through morality the roles were switched. But... a certain price did have to be paid for this. In the first place by the so-called moral man himself. After all, also this, what I will call cowardly human, has passions, desires, hate and such. The same ones as the strong person. Only he is too afraid to give expression to them, but they are certainly there. Especially considering his own morality, his defense strategy, he cannot give in to them with proper decency. He must suppress his passions. This whole process creates crippled and twisted, narrow-minded people. Nietzsche rants against these dismal creatures, who 'scratch each other's eyes out with their morality'. He wishes to face the full life. Christians do not have the courage to do this.

Yes, and this full life may be vigorous according to Nietzsche, but it is not pretty. On the contrary, it has its fine, pretty sides, but also its ugly and repulsive ones, and these are completely mixed. That is why it provokes lust and distaste at the same time. It thus also has a crisscross of effects and certainly does not have any meaning, cohesion or purpose. No meaning and cohesion: Nietzsche applies all his ironic and parodying capabilities to break these down. The thinking focuses on the thinking itself, to eventually result in nothing. With reference to H. Oosterling I would like to point out that Nietzsche was certainly aware of the abysmal nature of his thinking. The experience that there is no cohesion, meaning or purpose, is staggering. Oosterling writes in this context: 'Considering that the dizziness that associates this experience would paralyze our actions on the spot, we must purposefully move within the horizon of a perspective'. In other words, a shelter is still necessary, but in such a way that we are aware of its appearance (and perspective). This is why Oosterling states that this thinking 'can only develop in the self-undermining realization that the fixations, however insurmountable, are nevertheless in a temporariness that will come to nothing'. The perspectives on life are under the realization of relativity. Our orientations on life are condensations, and we know this. We also need to know it. Nietzsche was prepared to see the 'infinite abyss' of the total transience. This brought a certain grandeur along with it. 'For he can love; he can endure; he can perish without terror.' Probably his most

important motive thereby lay in the wish to embrace and affirm life to its fullest extent. Moral judgments and metaphysical constructions prevent us from doing so. They make a separation between good and evil, pretty and ugly, meaningful and meaningless, suffering and happiness and thereby places life in a dark light. These are also reasons why he inflates these and other distinctions as it where while thinking, to create room for the full life. Reasons why 'courageous and creative people never perceive lust and suffering as last value questions – they are additional situations: one has to want both if one wishes to accomplish something. Something tiresome and sickly is expressed by the metaphysicists in the fact that they wish to see the problems of lust and suffering in the forefront. Morality also only has so much importance to them, which they regard as an essential precondition with regard to the abolishment of suffering'. It can be clear that this heroic acceptance of life, this suffering of the abundant fullness of life and this rejection of the morality that always derives from the weariness of life certainly was not accompanied by any sympathy for utilitarianism and his utility thinking (consumerism). He did lay an important foundation for distrust with regard to morality. Especially insofar it is related to religion. Also the notion of freedom as a possibility to design life in an artistic manner and to experiment with it was given an impulse by him.

Demolition work

Lines of Nietzsche's thoughts can also be seen in Heidegger. Of course there are many differences. I can obviously only touch on a single aspect of the thinking of Heidegger, with all the risks that this brings for that matter. Nevertheless: Heidegger's thinking is also in the theme of the contingency, the coincidental. Mankind is mortal, temporary, relative and he experiences this in the fear. Here again it applies that people cannot handle this thought. They look for the safe shelter of a philosophy of life or of technology and civilization. The stronger on the other hand open up for the temporariness of the Being, for the realization of the transitory. This is for that matter rewarded. Rewarded with the realization that all sorts of relations in which mankind lives do not have an eternal value. They can only be traced back to coincidences. Mankind is therefore also free. He is a self-creating being. Even though this is painfully combined with letting go of alleged certainties and of rooted habits, one still needs to choose for this freedom, to be able to live authentically and determined. Philosophy is therefore not an institution you can come to for moral information. It is more demolition work. Demolition work to break open mankind for the Being. The Being that, for Heidegger, predominantly consisted of the notion of freedom in the

twenties. Of freedom and the related realization that our choices and interpretation of life will always remain relative. At a later stage a certain turning takes place with Heidegger. He increasingly emphasizes that the Being is due to mankind and can light up for him, if he opens up to it with receptiveness and resignation. A precondition for this receptiveness remains that one refrains from self-willed attempts to control the Being (be it through philosophy or through technology). This receptiveness, but also the authenticity explicitly ask for an emancipation of mankind from the so-called 'Man'. The escape route to massiveness, the 'civilizational precautions', must be left behind by a person, awakened by the frightening insight in the contingency, to become authentic. There is no room for utilitarianism. There is room for the notion of authenticity and freeing the individual from metaphysical systems (and their modern embranchments in science and technology).

Moral power-freaks

The third thinker whom I wish to dwell upon is Richard Rorty, currently professor in Virginia. His starting point is also that there is no grip in life that transcends the coincidence of our language and culture. Our deepest convictions, our most intimate desires have been determined by the coincidental time and place in which we live. It is no different for science and morality. It is with pleasure that Rorty treats philosophers that like to work with fixed criteria, want the essence of things, or assume a fixed human nature with the demolition hammer of Nietzsche and Heidegger. In his terminology, metaphysicists are veiled power-freaks that wish to get reality in their grasp. With a large dose of irony and parody this can be brought to light. The irony defeats the dogmatism. It isn't that Rorty wishes to put the history of philosophy in the corner in an over-simplified manner. On the contrary, as long as thinkers show that they realize that their points of view are but metaphors or poetic constructions, nothing is the matter. They should however not claim validity for all times and places. The crust of conventions must be made fluid again, for the benefit of human freedom, playfulness, poetry and tolerance.
It is with this freedom that Rorty is primarily concerned. The radical relativity opens a free space for the human existence. With an infectious enthusiasm he opens the prospects of the relativism. Life becomes an adventure with an open end, incredibly varied and exciting. Nietzsche's wish to become an artist of one's own life, to experiment tidily with life, comes within everyone's reach. This does not take away from the fact that in two respects quite some distance has been taken from Nietzsche. In the first place, this

enthusiasm has little more to do with the heroic acceptance of life, including the suffering, of Nietzsche. Not even with the individualizing fear of Heidegger. It is more so that Rorty gives a consumentalitstic turning to the thinking of the relativity. He even does so explicitly when he puts aside Heidegger as a sort of ascetic priest. 'Ascetic priests have no patience with people who think that happiness (mere happiness) and the relief of pain can compensate for Seinsvergessenheit', he for example writes in his essay 'Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens'. Moreover; different from what Heidegger assumed, Rorty thinks that the social preconditions for authentic life have never been as large as now. We are continuously reminded of cultural innovations; avant-gardism is the leading factor in the arts; scientific and technological revolutions are stumbling across each other and bring the world within one's reach.

There is also a deviation from Nietzsche in another respect. This requires some explanation. It is generally recognized that there are some tensions in the arguments of Rorty. One of the most recognized is that irony and freedom perceived as self-creation is not easily compatible with public spirit. After all, for the ironic isn't the other readily an element in his or her own unique story? Why would this other need to get a proportional space in the creation of himself? Irony is especially the view of life of the person who frees himself from his immediate environment and searches for and finds self-respect in distance. (This is the reason why Hegel and to a certain extent also Kierkegaard have called it unendingly negative.) This solidarity is however of great importance to Rorty. So great that he does place limits on the personal development. His argument is that in the private area the freedom can reign supreme, but that certain limits must be imposed on this in the public space. In the private area the irony applies, in the public space the solidarity. These moral boundaries are not rooted in structures of thinking or of the language, or in a religion. Nor are they about moral catalogues, but about a sentiment. What is central here is not theoretical discussions, but the abolishment of suffering as this has been given a clear face and a clear impulse in the books of amongst others Dickens or Proust. The question is of course whether this feeling, this sentiment isn't dependent on all sorts of coincidences. At this point Rorty however supposes that all this is a matter of common sense. He delves deeper into this at another time. He then sees it as the result of a commonly carried fate. He then approaches Bentham, who supposed that a universe that is deprived of a God opens up reservoirs of benevolence and goodness. In terms of mutual help one can only gain from this loss. As with Nietzsche, the affirmation of life has the loss of religion (and a rigid morality) as a precondition. But here lies the second difference with Nietzsche: with Rorty this affirmation is given a

moral charge in terms of emotional ethics, of empathy and human sympathy (cf. Van Stokkom), while with Nietzsche such empathy often suffers a judgment as harsh as religion.

Christian antipodes: sanctification and polarization

The famous author F.M. Dostoyevsky also dealt with the question whether the loss of religion is a precondition for empathy. I quote the passage from the book 'The Adolescent' in which a certain Wersilow states that 'he can never imagine the people as ungrateful and dulled. The people that were left behind lonely as orphans would immediately start with joining with each other in a more close and lovingly way; they would grab each other's hands because they would understand that they now only had each other! The large idea of the immortality would disappear and one would have to replace it by something else; and the whole great surplus of the past love towards Him who was the Immortal himself would in everyone turn towards nature, the world, the people, the smallest blade of glass. They would love the earth and life and more so as they became aware of their own mortality and finiteness.'

Dostoyevsky immediately questions the viability of this foundation for morality. He has Wersilow himself already say that he had to conclude his dream with an image of Christ in one way or another. 'I couldn't manage without Him, I had to finally imagine how He appears in the midst of the lonely people'. The implicit message of this is that the solidarity between people can in the end not make do without the original Jewish-Christian notion of the agape. God's affirming love for this world (John 3:16) is the source of this. 'There is something beyond morality, as it were, viz, participation in God's affirming power.' This is the main theme in the most important novels of the Russian author. In al these novels people appear who in the crisscross of life, with its sometimes laughable, then repulsive or its beautiful sides embody this agape. The Christian Sofja from the novel Crime and punishment can serve as an example. She is a young, skinny whore, who has to earn her poor wages this way to help the down and out family with young brothers and sisters, a sickly mother and a drinking father. In a setting surrounded by banalities, in a shabby back room, she meets the not so distinguished Raskolnikow. Not so distinguished because he had robbed an old loan shark of her life with megalomania, to acquire money in this way for 'large', world loving plans. Raskolnikow, who is very drawn to her, calls Sofja a sinner, and one who 'ruins herself for nothing'. The fact is that the situation of the penniless family is completely without prospects. 'Do finally tell me how such humiliation and lowness can go

together with entirely different, holy feelings? It would after all be more just, a thousand times more just and wiser to just throw yourself in the water straight away and make an end to it', he asks here. 'And what will then happen to them?, Sonja asks weakly, while she looks at him in pain'. (She had in fact considered this many times) (...) 'What was it that is keeping her on her feet, Raskolnikow asks himself? It can't be the decay? All this despicability apparently only touched her mechanically: not a drop of true decay had penetrated into her heart.' She can go in three directions, Raskolnikow thought. She can throw herself in the canal. She can end up in a mental institution or she can truly throw herself into the decay and petrify her heart. None of these three happen, she maintains her faith, does not turn sour and does not harden. Raskolnikow is in the end arrested and exiled to Siberia. Sonja does not leave him to his fate. 'In the beginning of the exile he thought that she would lecture him about the faith, would continuously talk about the Gospel and would force books on him. But to his utter amazement she didn't start about these even once.' At one time he himself asked her for a copy, and read the story about the resurrection of Lazarus...'

What is noticeable is that Sonja does not lose her faith, does not blacken the world, become cynical or despondent, but instead fully accepts the man – also considering his backgrounds – behind the evil (Raskolnikow), and from there keeps sight of the higher plan, of the good in reality, also in a moral sense. Evil remains evil, but is not heartlessly judged, especially not, but eventually God does not judge us in this way, but approaches us forgivingly in the Gospels. Affirmation here is simultaneous, or better: aims for exaltation by any means. Sonja is actually drawn into the evil, but on the other hand can withdraw herself from it through her faith. There is thus absolutely no case of an armored moral rigorousness, of closed ethical systems and of a crippling rigidity. In its purest form the Christian faith has nothing, absolutely nothing to do with this. The moral attitude to life that it inspires in fact goes hand in hand with affirmation and the confirmation of life, of ourselves and of the other (also of the suffering and of evil, without identifying itself with these last). In accordance with Taylor one may have to speak of the 'sanctification' of life in this context. She returns with prince Mysjkin in The idiot and with Aljosja in The brothers Karamazow. Different from what Nietzsche thought, their involvement and morality does not stem from a rejection of life, a weariness of life or resignation. They in fact activate. Both, affirmation and virtue in fact suppose each other with Dostoyevsky. Without faith the affirmation is frenetically heroic and eventually without perspective (Nietzsche) or at its best incomplete (Rorty) because it does still reach the suppression or soothing of the suffering, but does not know how

to deal with the unmistakable painful existence of it.

It is also vulnerable in this last – Rorty's – case for a number of different reasons. The social and moral rationalist Iwan for example would gladly give back his ticket to life, if this life must necessarily be paired with one heartbreaking tear of a child, and his brother Dimitri 'seizes the day' because the finite life doesn't have much to offer anyway. In this way a polarization between mankind and the world and a drifting apart of people quickly come into being, in the end because a transcendent affirmation of life is missing. A polarization that Dostoyevsky also sees taking place in materialism. Freedom is then identified with financial security. 'I have money and can therefore do whatever I want; I have money and will therefore not perish and do not have to ask anyone for help.'

Irony and varying moods

As said, Van Stokkom also sees this commercialization as a threat to the human empathic capacity in our society. He consciously places himself in this field of tension, but considering the introduction to this plea, he of course does so from the presupposition that transcendent notions have little to offer here, or can even only do harm. In his point of view, what does lead to results is the irony, the moral sting. With irony, delusions can be pricked through and self-conceit and arrogation can be kept under control. Irony is a remedy against all sorts of arrogance and omnipotence that keep enforcing themselves in the postmodern society: 'the faith in the technological miracles, the megalomania of media-tycoons and captains of industry, but also the inflated facades of romantic tyrants such as Michael Jackson or Jeff Koon'. Ironic people focus the attention on things that are truly important and that make life enjoyable: friendship, helping each other, peacefulness, creativity and humor. This controlled irony apparently contains weapons against the commercialization and the hedonism.
The term 'controlled irony' is derived from the dissertation of the young and the then strongly Hegelian thinking S.A. Kierkegaard. It is one of the forms of irony that he deals with in the book. He distinguishes this form of an ironic attitude that exposes all that is given to a radical doubt. The aim with this last version is little different from the experience of freedom itself. The endless possibilities, the reserve funds of life variations arouse an infectious enthusiasm with this ironic. If there are no ties then a wealth of possible interpretations of life opens up. According to Kierkegaard the ironic person especially wants a poetic life. Poetic life, your life as a work of art, seeing it as self-design, is the motto. These forms of irony strongly

remind us of Rorty and his: points of view are games of language, visions are metaphors and the individual design of life is an 'act of poetry'. This artistic, aesthetic life, which does not easily bear external ties, quickly lapses into an – to say it in a modern way –urge to consume with a narcissistic touch. On the other side of this irony Kierkegaard does not see solidarity, but a restless search for stimuli, for originality, for sensation and curiosities. Many postmodernists legitimize this more or less explicitly. What then takes shape is an existence that becomes more aesthetic.

Van Stokkom however sets course for the controlled irony as an important guarantee for the investing in the truly valuable things of life: friendship and helping each other for example. The controlled form of irony appeals to me much more than the aesthetic, which is a fruit of the negative enjoyment of freedom. Negative in the sense that the subject is free of commitments, that 'consciously keeps itself enthralled by the endless possibilities' and which commits itself as long as the supply of the pleasurable feeling that accompanies it lasts. Van Stokkom's 'valuable matters' on the other hand hold relations that in a certain sense have a binding nature.

It is exactly this that receives a strong focus in the later publications of Kierkegaard. He then no longer speaks of controlled irony, but of ethics as a guarantee for what is truly valuable in life. Now the reaction of the postmodernists and authors focused on emotional ties such as Vattimo and Van Stokkom will be that this is a step in the wrong direction. Galling bonds after all make people emotionally cripple; they obstruct the communication, the authenticity, etc. It is exactly this that is the theme of Kierkegaard's first great work that consists of two parts: Enten/eller (Or/or). In the first part, a range of aesthetics who let the duration and character of their relations depend on the feeling that it produces for others, are given the floor. In the second part a person who propagates aesthetics is brought to the stage. For those who put down Kierkegaard as a conservative thinker, it can be surprising that he initially does not write about the moral meaning of marriage, but about the aesthetic right of marriage. How do you keep your relation beautiful and full of emotions? How do you ensure that the hundredth kiss is exactly like the first? The answer may be unexpected. Kierkegaard states that it is in fact ethics, morality and duty that guarantee this. Ethics is the guardian of aesthetics. On the one hand it is so that without affection a good relationship is impossible. Marital fidelity is a banality without emotional value. And a marriage of convenience is therefore unethical. On the other hand it applies that love can only persevere and renew itself if the precarious first infatuation is nourished by a moral choice, by loyalty. The controlled irony can then possibly open the way for what is valuable, because it does indeed place everything that is coincidental and

artificial in a corner with fitting ridicule, but 'valuable matters such as helping each other, types of society etc.' must be based on more than on varying moods. Ethics is the guardian of the sustainability of these moods, Kierkegaard says. The ironic who does not make this choice, almost by definition lapses into narcissism according to Kierkegaard, either in the form of frivolity or in a more hypochondriac way. Two matters have thereby been addressed. In the first place that the 'emotional democracy' of Van Stokkom needs a moral basis to be able to be sustainable and to be able to defend itself against the threats that he outlines himself. Emotions and feelings by themselves are too unsettled to be able to base relationships on. This also applies to the public domain. In the second place that the postmodern view on ethics (related to Christianity) is much too rigorous. Both Kierkegaard and Dostoyevsky on the other hand indicate that feelings, the emotion, is essential. So essential that it in fact needs ethics to be able to continue to do justice to it. (Now that I have placed these two thinkers next to each other in such a brotherly fashion anyway, I immediately add to this that Kierkegaard also saw a precondition for ethics in religion and in the Christian faith. I will not delve further into this at this time.)

Hedonistic offshoots?

I sketched a line that ran from Nietzsche through Heidegger to Rorty. It has become clear that this is not exactly a linear line. Nietzsche was primarily concerned with accepting reality, even in its abysmal nature, its capriciousness that both attracts and repulses. Accepting it in such a way that you would want to eternally experience every moment, including the times of suffering and pain, again through an unending cycle. In his search for truth and reality, in his acceptance of the abysmal nature, lay a heroism. With Heidegger these notions of heroism are no less. Facing one's own death and bringing it to the forefront, not locking up the fear, but letting it do its scorching work in a controlled manner, such that you are conscious of coincidences and freedom and become filled with an expecting resignation: from this all a pessimistic heroism manifests itself. Not much of this mentality can be found with for example Rorty, who by the way is tributary to both regarding the elements of contingency and freedom. In a certain sense he endorses the Anglo-Saxon utilitarian tradition more. Rorty cum suis give a, I would say, consumerist spin to this thinking of relativity. Rorty does so in his Essays on Heidegger and others, amongst others when he puts Heidegger aside as a sort of ascetic priest who has no patience with people who think that happiness (mere happiness) and the relief of pain can compensate for Seinsvergessenheit. The question that then presents

itself is whether the heroism and the irony of olden days will, through a detour of consumerism and commercialization, result in exactly the pragmatization that, according to the views of thinkers who join the romantic (such as Van Stokkom), is so fatal for the emotional democracy and the culture of authenticity. It is the other side of the – as far as I am concerned equally rhetoric – question whether ethics and the Christian faith eventually do not offer more guarantees against a pragmatization of existence in favour of the 'emotional democracy' that these 'romantics' presuppose. I am thus strongly inclined to answer these questions with yes, and would like to illustrate this with a single sketch.

Social implications: a house of correction?

I already stated that Rorty's view that exactly our society has a tambala of lifestyles to offer, is correct. The market, I add to it now – is flourishing as never before. In this context I cannot refrain from mentioning the term Wahlverwantschaft from Max Weber. Wahlverwantschaft alludes to a selective affinity, a relationship between a certain cultural stream and economic processes. One thing can be clear now: between the becoming aesthetic on the one hand and the global liberal market economy on the other one can indeed speak of such a selective affinity. Dorien Pessers is close with her proposition that in this 'over the edge world', with its unending variety of lifestyles, commerce is given full opportunities. Her examples may (still) be far-fetched, but they are appealing: a twin, one white and the other black on the front page of the Parool, children that are being offered for sale on the Internet, women who make their wombs available for money, legal professionals who manipulate hurt people and continuously demand higher claims, brochures and advertisements about contemporary forms of burial and cremation. Apart from the somewhat polemical style which after all suits (bundled) columns, it does in any case make one thing clear: namely that the becoming aesthetic or liberalization is directly followed by commercialization. A commerce that sees new markets in every new variety or lifestyle. The fragmentation, flexibility and changeability are after all pre-eminently the characteristics that are suited for strategic marketing behavior of corporations. In this way the becoming aesthetic and the market thinking drive each other up. The outlines of a postmodern society are thereby drawn. The scholar of public administration Frissen speaks of a social fragmentation, decentralization of power and horizontalization of social relations in his book De virtuele staat [The virtual state]. Connections come about, virtually or not, as briefly as they are broken. The existence of cultural traditions, styles and forms besides each other makes an endless range of

combinations possible. The result will – in his terms – be an anarchic network of kaleidoscopic connections.

Yes, and then politics. Yes, this politics must according to Frissen adapt to the horizontally and anarchically structured society. In a pluralistic network structure the political power will lose its central position and normative function. In my opinion quite some things can be said against this proposition. But the fact remains that politics does not have anything to offer in exchange yet. Perhaps because its normative orientation is also caving in. Van Asperen pointed to the fact that mainly problems of distribution fill the political agendas. The loss of 'Big stories' and the fetching of a narrow morality have led to an impoverishment. Value orientations have quite often come to fall outside the public discourse. She writes: 'a very clear example is the environmental problem. The view that the non-human nature could have a value different than that of a natural resource is not widely spread in our society'. In health care it is no different. 'The common vocabulary within which we can speak about the finiteness of existence and what this means for life is missing and this is why we are talking about problems of distribution'.

This is why much falls outside of the horizon of politics, which does however belong there. In light of the aforementioned commercialization this is for example a vision on the normative diversity in the society. This diversity is definitely coming under increasing pressure. I have already pointed to the media. The commercialization has made Hilversum into the problem child of the government. But as with many problem children, the worry becomes over-anxiousness, with the risk that independent associations are crushed against the chest. Multiformity will thereupon especially be a matter of lifestyles, the way MTV has a slightly different approach than The Music Factory. Then the family: the economic discipline that gradually manifests itself is not small. A house of correction model presents itself according to Dorien Pessers.

The other side of this is for example that the care of the sick and elderly in their homes is becoming a big market opportunity. Here too the commercialization has arrived at the front door. Furthermore, the lack of investments and the increase in scale in education and care have often come forth from the wish to cut costs and to save public funds. Funds which have mostly been converted into generic tax relief, to consequently be spent consumptively. That the increase of scale consequently restricts the possibilities for social initiative can be clear. (For that matter I hereby expressly state that I have nothing against economic growth, prosperity or an economic recovery policy, on the contrary. It is however important that the economic sector does not become dominant and does not place all sorts of domains of

life under the regime of the statement of profits.)

Conclusion

In short, I am not confident that the postmodern cultural climate, with its emphasis on authenticity and variety will be able to show the inner defensiveness against the pragmatization of the (personal and social) life. Different from the famous sociologist Daniel Bell, I do not necessarily see more contradictions coming about in the world of effectiveness and that of expressiveness, but more a certain union. A union in which the becoming aesthetic goes hand in hand with commerce. These will strengthen each other back and forth. The space for normativity (and idealistic multiformity) then becomes more narrow. This can have consequences for the authenticity of people and for the emotional democracy.

Dr. A. Klink is C.O.B. of the Research Institute for the CDA in The Netherlands.

Is christian democracy conservative?

Drs. P.W. Tetteroo

Conservatives and Christian Democrats can sometimes be each other's allies in their objectives, but the underlying motive is different. There are after all differences in their portrayal of mankind, their views on society and their vision on institutions. One can label the defense of certain fixed values by Christian Democracy as value conservatism, but this has nothing to do with conservatism as political ideological concept because Christian Democrats search for new paths on the basis of fixed values.

In the discussion about the strategic course of the christian democracy, the notion 'conservative' arises more often. In The Netherlands some people urge the CDA to make a choice. Christian social or Christian conservative. The CDA must really bring clarity about target groups and strategic choices in the coming time. One of the two groups will be disappointed, but you cannot escape from this. Clarity must be given.[1] On the other hand there are those in the party and the faction that characterize the (desirable) course and positioning of Dutch Christian Democracy as 'social conservative', like the member of the Lower House of the Dutch parliament Hillen: "The CDA is on the one hand a social party that stands up for social justice and solidarity. On the other hand we are a civil party that attach value to decency and values and norms. I would dare call standing up for and defending these values 'conservative', in the sense of value conservatism. But this does not make the CDA a conservative party like the British conservatives, because Christian Democrats are continuously looking for a dynamic interpretation of the social role of citizens and their connections in society, what is also called the 'new civil society'. Conservatives only want to defend the existing institutions, on the basis of their historic developments. Christian Democracy distinguishes itself from social democracy and liberalism with the principles of spread responsibility, sovereignty within one's own circle and subsidiarity. Reflecting on these principles and continuously giving new meaning to them, what the faction in the Lower House of parliament is busy doing, is thus of great importance for the positioning of the CDA."[2] Lubbers* also made a connection between 'conservative' and 'progressive' elements in the 'political message of the CDA'.[3] The contradiction between 'social' and 'conservative' suggested by some is apparently less absolute than it would initially appear.

The question that is raised here is how Christian Democracy relates to conservatism. That Christian social thinking has been a very important source of inspiration for Christian Democracy and still is hardly requires any explanation. From the end of the nineteenth century Christian Democratic politicians have made an important contribution to the improvement of the socio-economic and social positions of the elderly, the unemployed, the dis-

* *The former Prime minister of The Netherlands*

abled and workers and their families. Inspired by the Christian social doctrine, Christian Democrats were at the cradle of the social legislation in our country. The answer to the question how Christian Democracy relates to 'conservatism' in its political meaning on the other hand is more complex and not undisputed. Nevertheless the attitude of the CDA towards conservatism is relevant and current. Not only because of the discussion about the strategic course of the party, but also as far as it concerns the position of Christian Democracy in the EPP, which was recently expanded with parties that can be called 'conservative'. As of recently the EPP faction in the European Parliament is officially denoted as 'Christian Democratic and conservative faction'.[4] Before we go deeper into the content, meaning and backgrounds of conservatism, it is important to take notice of the negative connotation of the concept 'conservatism'. Already in the nineteenth century this term quickly became discredited and conservatism obtained a negative connotation of 'retarded', 'narrow-minded', and 'old-fashioned'.[5] Except in Great Britain and several other countries, conservative groups are very anxious to admit to their conservatism.

Conservatism

Many people have made attempts to describe the conservative body of thought in its structural characteristics and historical explorations have been done into the intellectual tradition from which conservatism has come forth, which according to some even goes back to the sixteenth and seventeenth century.[6] Here we however have to limit ourselves to a few general remarks. As political ideological conception and movement, conservatism is a phenomenon that can appear within all societies and forms of culture. Only in a period of unrest, revolution or crisis – in which the static nature of a society is put to the test or is even (threatened to be) broken apart – does this conservatism manifest itself. Conservatism is by definition reactive: it can only start to exist if there is another social movement that is not conservative. Conservatism as outspoken political movement with a cohesive philosophical body of thought thus only dates back to the French Revolution, as final piece of a process in which the static agricultural society was broken apart by a new view of the world and the character of an era which assumed the idea that the world could still to a large degree be shaped.

In accordance with Mannheim we can distinguish three forms of conservatism: recovery conservatism, preservation conservatism and reformist conservatism.[7] Recovery conservatives, also called contra-revolutionaries, pursue the goal of recovering a situation from the past. J. de Maistre (1754-

1821), L. de Bonald (1754-1840) and F. de Lamenais (1782-1854) are the most important representatives of this stream.[8] With preservation conservatism the existing situation is accepted, but a change of the status quo is counteracted. Reformist conservatives fully recognize the inevitability of changes and also deem the existing situation susceptible to improvements, but they wish to prevent a rupture with the existing situation through reforms in the spirit of traditional values and forms. The most important representative of the 'dynamic' or 'reformist' conservatism was Edmund Burke (1729-1797).[9] Because of the fact that a recovery of the pre-Revolutionary order also appeared impossible after 1815 and the citizenry gave preference to parliamentary forms of government on the basis of democratic liberal ideas, in most Western countries conservative parties formed as the important countermovement against revolution and liberalism. In the table below, the most important suppositions and views of conservatism have been listed, as rendered by the Dutch historian H.W. von der Dunk as well as by J.Z. Muller, professor of history at the Catholic University of America in Washington D.C., and authority on the conservative body of thought.

According to Von der Dunk	According to Muller
1. Pessimistic view of mankind as incomplete being.	1. Human imperfection (biological, emotional and cognitive). Mankind is dependent on his fellow species and from there follow his dependence on institutions that give direction and a course. Skeptical with regard to unlimited freedom and autonomy of the individual.
2. Focus on the past, from which social standards for the present are derived.	2. Human knowledge is limited especially regarding social and political matters. Society is too complex to simplify it theoretically and on the basis of this reform it institutionally.
3. Resistance against radical social and political changes.	3. Emphasis on the value of institutions, as social forms of society with its own rules, values, rewards and sanctions. The human society cannot flourish without institutions. They are necessary to canalize and temper human passions. Among conservatives there is usually an affinity with the existing situation (status quo).
4. Search for political compromises in order to maintain as much as possible that which currently	4. Importance of habits, prejudices and experience. Human rules of behavior do not necessarily need to be founded on rational considerations, but are a product of historical expe-

exists.	rience and tradition.
5. Organic view of society.	5. Many valuable institutions came into being through historical developments and not by something like natural law, universal human inclinations or an explicit contract. The more societies and their historic developments differ, the more institutions will differ from each other. Institutions that are strange to another society cannot (just) be introduced.
6. Rejection of abstract rationalistic theories regarding society.	6. Emphasis on non-voluntary obligations, commitments and loyalty. The individual does not have the right to withdraw himself from the commitment to or the membership of the state.
7. Great admiration for the thinking that is focused on actual perceivable phenomena.	7. The social value of religion. Although there is no direct link between conservatism and religion or faith, conservatives do see the social value (social utility) of religion.
Source: H.W. von der Dunk, Conservatisme, Bussum 1976, p. 140-141 Quoted by H.E.S. Woldring, De christen-democratie. Een kritisch onderzoek naar haar politieke filosofie, Utrecht 1996, p. 145.	*Source: Jerry Z. Muller (Ed.) Conservatism. An anthology of social and political thought from David Hume to the present, Princeton/New Jersey 1997, p. 9-14.*

Below the relation between the Christian Democratic body of thought and conservatism is discussed. Thereby a choice has been made for a comparison of Christian Democracy with the suppositions and views of conservatism as shown in the table above.

1. View of mankind
Conservatives have a pessimistic view of mankind as an imperfect being. Mankind is amongst others imperfect because he often has no control of his passions, impulses, emotions and instincts. That is why institutional frameworks are necessary that give direction to and exercise control of man. This is why conservatism is anxious about an unlimited freedom and autonomy of the individual.

The Christian Democratic view of mankind is different than the conservative one. Christian Democracy assumes a more dynamic view of mankind with a positive assignment: the responsible human as the carrier of the image of God, who has been called to give meaning and shape to a vision of the 'good life'. Here lies a relation with the Roman Catholic tradition of personalism, but also with Protestant thinkers such as S.A. Kierkegaard. This is of course not to say that mankind has no shortcomings or that he cannot develop in an evil sense, but it is exactly responsibilities and institutions that appeal to the 'better I'. That is why Christian Democracy is a supporter of spread responsibility, in which people and social organizations can independently give meaning to certain responsibilities and tasks (sovereignty within one's own circles), which are perceived as the ordination of the Creation, in accordance with the nature of the circle within which one moves: the connecting affection in the family, the pedagogic responsibilities in the school and so forth (sovereignty and normatativity within one's own circles which only thrives if the state recognizes and respects this fundamental latitude). Not the imperfection of mankind underlies the fact that people organize themselves in associations, organizations and communities, but because human existence is expressed in inter-human relations. Man is a social being, who gives meaning to his existence in his relation with his fellow man. Institutions come forth from mankind and give expression to inter-human involvement, the willingness to carry responsibility for each other together.

The aforementioned of course does not pass over the notion that people are inclined to the 'evil', but in the first place protestant leaders have especially taken this up religiously (without denying the relation with the moral dimension for that matter, see also under point 4) and in the second place it concerns the other side of the human freedom. In the Christian Democratic body of thought also lies the notion that the relative freedom of the individual follows naturally from and is a result of the carrying of responsibilities.

2. Abstract rationalistic theories
Conservatives reject abstract rationalistic theories as a foundation for the ordination of society, because human knowledge is too limited to oversee the complexity of society. One should not venture to a theoretical simplification of the ordination of society and one should take a reserved position where it concerns radical institutional and political reforms.
Christian Democrats also do not believe in theoretical blueprints for the organization of society, but for less pragmatic reasons that conservatism. Christian Democracy pre-eminently thinks that it is the responsibility of people and associations themselves to give meaning and shape to society.

Also in the area of the government nobody can make claims to a complete or infallible insight into the purpose of the law as standard for concrete actions.[10] This is why broad participation of as many as possible citizens and social organizations in decision-making is desirable. Exactly because of the normativity that lies within reality, Christian Democracy criticizes the existing unjust situation by confronting it with principles derived from the Gospel. This is why Christian Democrats are open to institutional and social reforms.

3. Institutions and organic view of society

Conservatism strongly emphasizes the utility of institutions. Society cannot thrive without the existence of social forms of society. Institutions such as the church, the family and marriage, are 'useful' because they give direction and course to human passions and emotions.[11] G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831) distinguished between three moral communities: the state, the civilian society (including classes, corporations and guilds) and the family.[12] According to Hegel the state embodies society as an organic whole, in which different parts (organs) can be distinguished that fulfill different functions. This is also called an organic view of society.

Christian Democracy equally emphasizes the importance of institutions, social community associations. Gradually non-stately, sovereign circles came into being in the constitutional state. Society consists of a conglomerate of realms of life, which each individually have their own mandate, but which are mutually strongly interwoven.[13] The meaning and place of institutions need to be understood from the principles of sovereignty within one's own circle and subsidiarity (see above). Christian Democrats have in common with Hegel the notion that institutions are the social fabric of a society, which can be affected when individuals withdraw from social relations and pursue the individual self-interest. Citizens are therefore not a part of their communities in a noncommittal way. But other than for example Hegel, J. Stahl and J.R. Thorbecke, Christian Democrats have no organic view of society in the sense that the state embodies society in the ultimate sense. When Christian Democrats speak of social fabric, this is moreover not just from the notion that people are social beings who should feel at home somewhere. Christian Democrats reason normatively: not every social fabric can withstand the test of criticism.

4. Habit and experience

According to conservatism, human rules of conduct are not based on rational considerations, but on historically grown values, experiences, habits and traditions. In traditions, the experiences and insights of many generations

have accumulated, which by far exceeds the individual mind. Reality should not be understood by metaphysical representations and explanations, but on the basis of perceivable appearances. It is not about an individual gifted with reason or about an abstract citizen of the state equipped with rights, but about the actual person as he lives in a home, family, city or village, people and nation.

Here it also applies that grown institutions cannot make claims to respect on the basis of reasons of cultural rights as such. The reality of experience should be understood from God's purpose with creation. Here a transcendental aspect opens up in the history of reality: the creation may be affected by sin and evil, but because of the redemption, mankind is able to work on the good of the creation in order to mend what was broken.

5. Historicism

Conservatism clearly makes a connection between the importance of institutions and their historic development. Institutions were not created through natural law, universal human inclinations or an explicit contract.

Other than for conservatives, the meaning of institutions is not of importance to Christian Democracy because they grew historically, but more so because they are based on certain universal values. The family as institution for example is not important to Christian Democrats because the family as a form of life simply came about this way in the past centuries, but because the family is founded on important values such as love, loyalty and the taking of responsibility by parents for the care of growing children. It must however be noted here that especially in the Christian historic stream there was great admiration for the 'historically grown', but this does not however mean that people placed 'Scripture and History' on one line: history is also subject to the criticism of the Word of God. W. Aalders expressed this idea following Groen van Prinsterer.[14]

A second difference between conservatives and Christian Democrats is that the latter assume a dynamic view of society. Because institutions come forth from man, Christian Democrats do not give a negative meaning to the fact that institutions sometimes disappear and are replaced by new ones. This is inherent to the dynamics of social democracy. Christian Democracy has in common with conservatism that they both reject the contract theory as raison d'être and source of legitimization of the state (and its institutions).

6. Obligations and commitments

Conservatives emphasize that people have involuntary obligations and commitments against each other and the community of the state from which they cannot withdraw themselves. Christian Democrats also think that peop-

le have obligations and commitments against each other and against the community of the state and the community of the law. Christian Democracy does not so much want to enforce this from the top, but appeals to the sense of responsibility of people to take responsibility for each other and against the community of the state of which it cannot be a part in a noncommittal way.

7. Value of religion
Although there is no direct connection between conservatism and religion, many conservatives see a positive value for religion, in terms of social utility. For Christian Democrats the Gospel, the Christian faith is the source of inspiration for the actions of man. In a more general sense the CDA recognizes the importance of all religions in a multiform society, as long as the values and norms that originate in these religions do not contravene fundamental principles of law.

Conclusions

There are a number of clear differences between conservatism and Christian Democracy. The view of mankind is not the same in both streams, Christian Democracy does not have an unregulated organic view on society and it also has different ideas on the meaning of religion. Another important difference is that Christian Democracy assumes a dynamic view of society whereby the existing situation can be subject to criticism if there is reason for this. Different from conservatives, Christian Democrats do not adhere to institutions because of the fact that they grew that way historically, but because they are based on certain values. When conservatives and Christian Democrats defend certain institutions – such as the family, marriage, the monarchy or the constitutional order – they do so for different reasons. In their objectives conservatives and Christian Democrats can sometimes be each other's allies, but the underlying motive is different. Conservatives judge and defend institutions from the existing, historically grown situation; Christian Democrats do so because they find the values that these institutions fulfill important.
One can characterize the defense of certain fixed values by Christian Democracy as 'value conservatism', but then as an expression of criticism of the fact that society is increasingly being shaped along liberal economic principles, out of discontent with the adverse effect on the social constitution such as that which came about through Christian Democrats also. The 'value conservatism' has little to do with the conservatism as political ideological concept, because Christian Democracy searches for new paths on the

basis of fixed values. This is why former Prime minister Lubbers can write that with the CDA on 'the one hand the conviction [exists] that it is necessary to better examine the role of the government and the relation between government and society in the light of what is valuable for society. An answer is thereby provided for modern developments and the fear of messing about. In this sense the message seems conservative. But it is in fact progressive in passing on possibilities to be able to experience values in a strongly changing world, also in a technological sense." (...) "The CDA could [thereby] become too social for the liberals in the protection of the weak and the weaker, and too old-fashioned for the socialists in the emphasis on home- and family relations and the rejection of the tolerance in the drugs policy."[15] Finally some words about the role of Christian Democracy in the EPP. The debate about the relations of the Dutch Christian Democrats to conservatism cannot be seen independent from the developments that Christian Democratic parties in the EPP are experiencing. If it is true what Lucardie and Ten Napel state, that the Christian Democratic parties are developing from 'closed 'anti-modern' confessional[16] parties to open, 'modern' conservative-liberal parties' and that the CDA (and the CVP) are only behind in their pace of development but are unmistakably following the same path, this demands serious reflection on the position of Christian Democracy in the EPP.[17] Before this we concluded that Christian Democracy and conservatism are sometimes similar in their goals, but not in their underlying values. When goals sometimes coincide, this will sooner lead to coalitions than to common party formation. The EPP after all wants to be a 'party of values'! If conservatives want to belong there, then a process will need to be started within conservative parties, which will result in their subscribing to these values.

Drs. P.W. Tetteroo is a staff member of the Raad Openbaar Bestuur

Notes

1. CDA-Magazine, 5/11 March 2000, p. 14. Cursive PT.
2. 'Het CDA wordt door angst en angstgevoelens geregeerd', de Volkskrant, April 28, 2000, cursive PT.
3. Telephone interview with drs. J.S.L. Hillen dd. May 10, 2000.
4. Ruud Lubbers, Geloof in de samenleving. Christen-democratie in drie generaties: Ruijs, Klompé, Lubbers, Nijmegen 1998, p. 134.
5. See for an explanation: A.M. Oostlander, 'Conservatieven in de EVP. Machtsverdwazing in de Europese fractie', CD/Actueel, August 14, 1999, p. 28-29.
6. S.W. Couwenberg, De strijd tussen progressiviteit en conservatisme.

Sociologische en cultuurhistorische belichting van een veelomstreden tegenstelling, The Hague 1959 (2nd edition), p. 17.

7. Cf. E.H. Kossman, 'Over conservatisme' (1980), included in: idem. Politieke theorie en geschiedenis. Verspreide opstellen en voordrachten, Amsterdam 1987, p. 22; J.C. den Hollander, 'Conservatisme en historisme', Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden, 102 (1987), p. 391.

8. K. Mannheim, Das conservative Denken. Soziologische Beiträge zum Werden des politisch-historischen Denkens in Deutschland, 1927. Cf. S.W. Couwenberg, op.cit., p. 82.

9. Also see Woldring, op.cit., p. 144-147.

10. Scientific Institute for the CDA, Publieke gerechtigheid, Houten 1990, p. 259.

11. One can see the influence of especially David Hume here, who strongly emphasized the controlling of passions. See D. Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*. Book II. Of the Passions (London 1739), edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge, second edition, Oxford 1987, p. 275 et seq.

12. Cf. Herman van Erp, Het politieke belang. Over de politieke orde in een pluralistische samenleving, Amsterdam 1994. p. 30 et seq.

13. Scientific Institute for the CDA, Publieke gerechtigheid, p. 134.

14. W. Aalders , Theocratie of ideologie, The Hague 1977.

15. See note 4. Cursive P.T.

16. Lucardie and Ten Napel erroneously speak about Christian Democratic parties as 'confessional' parties in this context. A confession is a churchly confirmation. The CDA is not a churchly party that is based on a certain creed as the foundation for the party (like the GPV).

17. A.P.M. Lucardie and Ten Napel erroneously speak about Christian Democratic parties as 'confessional' parties in this context. A confession is a churchly confirmation. The CDA is not a churchly party that is based on a certain creed as the foundation for the party (like the GPV).

The social enterprise in healthcare

Prof. mr. dr. Balkenende

& G. Dolsma

A sustainable, future resistant system characterized by solidarity that provides everyone the care that is necessary. This is only possible if the uniformity and central planning is broken up. Then there will be room for creativity and for new initiatives for tailor-made care. Social enterprises can play an important role in this. This means a withdrawal by the government as far as it concerns planning and direct funding. But it also means the restoration of the multiformity and the freedom of choice and a decrease in the dependency on bureaucracy and availability.

The Netherlands is experiencing a time of economic prosperity. The windfalls on the national budget run into the billions. Most households are also financially well off. The economic growth is so high that vacancies remain open for a long time or cannot be fulfilled. One of the characteristics of the current economy is globalization, accelerated by information- and communication technology. Companies operate more and more on an international market. Economies of different countries are interwoven with each other; financial interests have become global.

Within this social and economic environment we see that the government in the Netherlands on the one hand chooses for privatization and commercialization of (formerly) state companies or government services. Thus different parts of the utility sector (gas, telecom, electricity) have been converted into or sold to private commercial companies. On the other hand the government is strengthening its grip on sectors that were previously private and non commercial. The industrial associations first became implementation organizations and are now being nationalized. The health care, still for the largest part private organizations, is for a large part planned, regulated and budgeted by the government. The housing corporations are threatened by a strengthening of the grip of the government. For some products or services the mature citizen can thus choose between different commercial companies. For other products or services there is no longer a freedom of choice, because one can only go to a governmental organizations carrying out these tasks. Exactly this last development, the claim of the government on care, leads to the current problem. Scarceness, waiting lists and bureaucracy have as a result that commercial alternatives come into being for those people that can afford it.

Both these developments – growth of spending with commercial companies as a result of the economic growth and government policy and an expansion of the public domain – are at the expense of the private, non-commercial social institutions, the public initiative. If this is what remains, social life will grow poorer. The image of uniformity, in which people individually and with others have less to say about their environment, then looms ahead for

the Netherlands. This is an undesirable development. In this contribution an alternative is proposed which means a strengthening of (the quality and the primacy) of society.

In short this alternative can be described as the creation of room for the autonomous and independent functioning of social enterprises. In itself the phenomenon of social enterprises is not new. It is however an element of discussion what position this social enterprise takes. Is it a hybrid organization, an organization to carry out a public task, or on the other hand entirely private? What is the definition of a social enterprise and what position does it take in the civil society? These and other questions will be dealt with shortly in this contribution.

Restoration of the primacy of society

The basic assumption of a reconsideration of the distribution of responsibilities in society is that the demands of citizens (again) become the main focus. Not the care about the survival of a company and for shareholders the profit yielding capacity of a company or institution, or the government planning, but a multiform supply that anticipates the demand of citizens is what it is all about. In the areas of education, care and housing people have wanted to give shape to the service from their own ideals. Especially in these areas people have wanted to found their own organizations – associations and foundations – from idealistic motives to 'produce' goods and services, matters that were deemed to be a social interest. It is also about tasks of which people believed that they could not be left completely to the commercial market or to the government. 'The market', in the sense of commercial initiatives, is not sanctifying here. A purely commercial approach of goods and services, in care and education for example, is not a desirable situation. Values and norms and questions on giving meaning play an important role here, which cannot be fulfilled sufficiently by commercial companies. For them after all the profit motive is in the first place. The government also cannot provide multicolored and multiform services, that are based on values and norms from the individual identity of (groups) of people. On the other hand 'state care' can lead to bureaucratic implementation with in the end the risk of a level of service that is too gloomy. Commercial 'production' or government care is therefore a choice that is too one-sided and leads to uniformity.

Social enterprises on the other hand are better capable of living up to the multiform demand of people. This does however require a reconsideration of the role of the government.

72

How far does the duty to provide care of the government reach?
The government has a duty to care in the areas of the social constitutional rights. In our view this explicitly does not mean that the implementation of for example care, housing, education or social security also must be taken up by the government itself. They have thereby not yet become public tasks, such as police, justice and defense are. Precisely in these areas that have to do with the normative choices that people make in their lives, the restraint of the government is in place as far as it concerns the actual implementation. The starting point should thereby be the creation of preconditions for a multiform implementation and a multicolored supply. The public interest can then be described as the care for the quality and the financial and geographical accessibility which is guaranteed by the government through recognition, effective protection of rights and sometimes funding.
With this last element, the social enterprises in the areas of care, housing etc. have not become a part of the public domain. They are not organizations that carry out a public task, but organizations that carry out civil or social goals defined by themselves.

In many of the areas in which social enterprises are active, work is being done with public means (subsidies, premiums or levies). The enterprise (home care institution, school, broadcasting corporation) is financed by these means. Through this direct funding the government has also created a say in and control of the enterprise for itself, which is laid down in laws and regulations. This say in and control at the moment de facto lead to the fact that social enterprises primarily focus on the government to secure their funding. The risk is large that they thus become organizations that carry out government policy. Formally speaking, social enterprises are private, but materially speaking they are now controlled by the government too much. The discussion about whether the government has a say about the fortunes of national health services and schools is very illustrative in this respect. Creativity and renewal are not stimulated in this way. For a long time already in this context one speaks of the "stately civil society". Criticism of the functioning of these organizations has thereby become criticism of government policy.
Solutions that are brought forward to improve the functioning of the social enterprises are amongst others output financing instead of input financing, or a change in culture with the management of social enterprises in order to arrive at a more customer friendly way of working. These solutions are valuable for government services and activities. The introduction of the Fund Work and income is an example of stimulating municipalities to conduct a more active exit policy in social security. One can however expect

more from a social enterprise. The power of social enterprises after all lies in the ability to independently shape their own social goals, aimed at the demand and wishes of citizens. A direct funding by or through the government therefore does not fit here. The consequence of this reasoning is then that the 'public' means should be placed back in the hands of the users. The citizen can then choose with which enterprise or institutions he or she spends these means. Logically the enterprises should then charge the cost price. The duty to provide care of the government with regard to the financial accessibility then no longer takes place through subsidies, budgeting or planning of the supply, but through demand financing. The government can thereby no longer make all sorts of demands to these enterprises on the basis of direct subsidy to enterprises and institutions. The internal way of operation is then a matter of the social enterprise itself. To guarantee the quality, there will have to be a quality law in every area, as we now also have a quality law for private education, a Housing law, Quality law care etc. In these laws, quality demands can be included which the offered services or products have to live up to.

Certain characteristics of a social enterprise

In our vision a social enterprise is thus a normal enterprise with a private legal form which sells goods and services on the market. The goods and services that the social enterprise 'produces' are not public tasks. Social enterprises therefore fall under the scope of the Law of Economic Competition because they are not public bodies that carry out tasks under the authority of the state. Seen in this way the social enterprise is not a hybrid organization between the domains of the market and the state, but operates on the market. The social enterprise can function under special or limiting conditions because of its legal form or legal conditions.

The social enterprise is also a professional organization in the market besides commercial enterprises and (in as far as they are present) state companies. The social enterprise is also not a volunteer organization. (For that matter this does not exclude that volunteers can be involved in the work of the social enterprise.) It is not an alternative for the functioning of the market and privatization, but it is an alternative for commercialization. It raises objections against the unilateral capitalization by the market of these goods and services. Commercial enterprises have to make a profit for the shareholders or for third parties. Social enterprises can make sharper calculations (without a profit margin) and thereby keep the prices in the market under pressure. The fact of the matter is that they have to invest the profits that they make within the social goal.

The legal form of social enterprises is the foundation or association. In the case of social housing for example a choice was also made to privatize the municipal housing companies and to convert them into foundations. Associations and foundations are used for many purposes. At the moment there is no alternative legal form for professionally governed social enterprises, which encompasses the social goal without the distribution of profit. It is worth researching whether there is an alternative for this specific type of enterprise, for example the 'social partnership'.

The traditional civil society consists of a multitude of private organizations and institutions. Besides social enterprises there are interest organizations, consumer organizations and volunteer organizations, sport clubs, etc. The social enterprises distinguishes itself in this area because of the production of goods or services for the market.

This vision on the social enterprise builds on the approach of the responsible society. The social enterprise is thus the name that is given to the initiatives of citizens to, from a social goal, provide goods and services where commercial 'production' or government care is insufficient to provide for the needs of people. This means that private enterprises are enterprises that are not aimed at making a profit. Creating room for social enterprises means creating room for new initiatives, creative solutions and multiformity. Through the introduction of demand control this means a restoration of the freedom of choice of citizens. Through the social enterprise, a 'bottom-up' approach can be used to work at the vitalization of a responsible, involved society.

The social enterprise in health care

In healthcare there are of old many social enterprises active: in the care for the elderly, the care for the disabled, family care, but also health insurance. Along the way these initiatives were drawn by the government to them and brought under a legal regime. Planning, budgeting and direct financing led to a bureaucratization and rigidity of the organizations. There is hardly any room for new initiatives, also for example because of compartments in funding. Scarcity in the supply (waiting lists), insufficient harmonization with the demand and impoverishment of the care are the consequences that are desired by nobody. Besides the care planned by the government, a private, commercial circuit comes into being that is not financed by premiums or subsidies. People who can afford to do so, pay it themselves, which brings the risk that slowly the basis for solidarity is disappearing. These developments are recognized by many and are seen as undesirable.

A fundamental choice is needed. Some choose for a further nationalization of the insurance system and of care provision. The CDA on the other hand should make a strong case for a choice for society. A sustainable, future resistant system characterized by solidarity that offers everyone the care that is necessary. This can only be done if the uniformity and central planning is broken up. Then there will be room for creativity and new initiatives for tailor-made care. Social enterprises can play an important role in this. This means a withdrawal of the government as far as it concerns planning and direct funding. But it also means a restoration of the multiformity and freedom of choice and a reduction of the dependence on bureaucracy and availability.

Through direct income support of households in the costs of care, a financially accessible care characterized by solidarity can be guaranteed. Home care institutions, hospitals, nursing homes are forced to focus on the demand for care of their clients as social enterprises, because they carry the financing that is linked to the demand. People can thereby choose at which institution they wish to buy their 'care'. There is thus a situation of competition. The care budget can also be spent with commercial providers. Extra luxury is then charged to the one demanding the care. Social enterprises have the competitive advantage in this market that they can work without profit margins. Their social goal can take different shapes. Thus new initiatives of a smaller scale can come about that provide tailor-made care: multiformity that can neither be realized by the commercial market or by the government.

This redefinition of responsibilities also has consequences for the insurance system. National health services become independent social insurance organizations in this respect, next to commercial insurance organizations. The difference is the profit motive. Additionally there is the possibility for the government to support the social goal of these social insurance organizations by granting them fiscal exemption, as it currently applies for the housing corporations. This exemption is then subject to the condition of premiums independent of age and the acceptance obligation (up to a certain limit). The main point is that social enterprises fulfill a social function.

This fundamental change of the perspective in health care cannot be realized from one day to the next. The necessity to make a start however is becoming more urgent. The government is already being overtaken by developments in Europe and by commercial initiatives. The social enterprise will

strengthen the civil society in care, offer people new perspectives to get a grip on their life and to exceed the unsatisfactory scheme of bureaucracy or commerce. In this way uniformity is broken up.

Jan Peter Balkenende is political leader of the CDA and a member of the House of the Dutch Parliament for the CDA and Guusje Dolsma is policy advisor for the CDA in the area of Social Services and Employment.

The balance between the individual and the community: a new golden rule?

Prof. J.S. Reinders

The sociologist Etzioni is one of the most passionate representatives of communitarianism. In his communitaristic program there is a clear case of a primacy of the civil society, the order of politics is in the second place. The Christian Democracy can thus regard communitarianism as a natural ally. Before looking for the centre of power, one would be wise to reflect on the suppositions of a social theory about that centerfield, also in light of the communitaristic movement. An analysis of Etzioni's book 'The new golden rule: community and morality in a democratic order'.

Without exaggeration one can state that Western thinking at the end of the second millennium was predominantly characterized by skepticism. Whether it is about religious, about ethical or about political issues, the realization of missing certainties is unmistakably present. Sociologists speak of the 'risk society' in which the individual has to determine his own identity in the midst of forces and codecs competing with each other.[1] The faith that human history has a purpose is waning, whereby it even applies for religious people that God only figures as the Great Unknown at the edge of their daily experience of reality. The consciousness of good and evil also seems to be adrift – at least no longer anchored in ultimate values that give existence meaning and direction. In social respect furthermore, the faith in the steering capacity of political institutions seems to be crumbling away. It seems in fact that only in the area of the economy there is nothing wrong. There all the figures are booming – at this moment anyway – and records are being broken. According to some the economic success is in fact the cause of the prevailing feeling of 'spiritual' emptiness that characterizes the existence in the postmodern society. Real skeptics will thus be inclined to sooner interpret the reviving interest in the 'higher' as a sign of boredom, than as a serious expression of concern about the future of culture.
In this cultural climate the rise of movements that are driven by a new cultural and social zest is more than welcome. In the area of political thinking the so-called communitarianism is without a doubt such a movement. Within this movement – which is especially of influence in America – the sociologist Etzioni is certainly one of the most passionate. Whoever reads his book The New Golden Rule, senses a mixture of on the one hand sharp criticism of the prevailing individualism in it, but on the other hand also a deeply rooted faith in the values that the Western society has brought forth.[2] Etzioni distinguishes himself as sociologist through a strong interest for the combining of critical analysis and practical political synthesis. This applied to his earlier work in which he sided with the opposition of the nuclear armament race and in which he searched for alternative security strategies. It certainly also applies to his work in the communitarian move-

ment as co-founder of the Communitarian Platform and as editor of the magazine The Responsive Community. Etzioni does not so much see communitarianism as a political philosophy, but more as a social movement which aims at a different society.[3] In his opinion this movement turns against the downfall of the faith in the public cause – the Common Good – and against the relativism and individualism that determines the present day thinking about society. Although he himself does not speak of a social movement and as a sociologist is especially interested in the question how institutions shape and influence the behavior and views of people, Etzioni is still more a social than a political thinker. In his communitaristic program there is clearly a primacy of civil society, whereby the order of politics only comes in second place.

In this article I would like to bring forward this aspect of his thinking through an analysis of his book The New Golden Rule: community and morality in a democratic society. My aim is to show where both the power and weakness of Etzioni's communitaristic theory lie. The themes and issues that thereby come up are in my opinion of importance for the course of Christian Democracy which can consider communitarianism as a natural ally because of its attention for the importance of the 'civil society'. Before again searching for the centre of power, one would be wise to reflect on the necessary suppositions of a so-called theory about that centerfield, also in the light of the communitaristic movement. The second aim of this article is to make a contribution to this reflection.

The thesis: a moral order on the basis of voluntariness

The increased uncertainty about the validity of norms and values that were passed on has brought about a strong degree of liberalization in Western society. Individual freedom can however only prosper in a society that is characterized by sufficient social cohesion. Only when the members of a society share 'common purposes' with each other and invest time and energy in it, is a social order in which freedom can exist possible.[4] Without such an order society will atomize, the communities from which it has come forth will fall apart and its members will become an amorphous mass of individuals. The assignment that results from this is the (re)discovery of a balance between social order and individual autonomy. The balance that is sought cannot however be found again through the curtailment of individual freedoms. Restriction of freedom not only leads to an authoritarian society, but also places too many competencies with the state and thereby a much too large emphasis on the steering capacity of the law. The redisco-

very of a balance between autonomy and social order will only succeed when it is about a moral order, this is to say: an order that is not enforced, but which is rooted in shared values. This is in short the program that is for-mularized in Etzioni's 'new golden rule':

The new golden rule requires that the tension between one's preferences and one's social commitments be reduced by increasing the realm of duties one affirms as social responsibilities – not the realm of duties that are forci-bly imposed but the real of responsibilities one believes one should dischar-ge and that one believes one is fairly called upon to assume. *The New Golden Rule, 12.*[5]

In the analysis of this program I am forced to pass by certain important aspects of Etzioni's work. I will for example not pay any attention to an issue that dominates the philosophical debate about communitarianism, namely whether the insistence on the cultural and traditional foundation of morali-ty leaves sufficient room to criticize the norms and values that apply within a certain community. 'Are individuals not being made subordinate to the community from which they come forth?' the continuously returning question goes.[6] Hence the continuing discussion about universal criteria to which moral traditions and communities can be tested. Etzioni wants to guard communitarianism from internal reticence and therefore only exami-nes a number of proposals and alternatives for 'extra-community criteria' in order to finally satisfy himself with a form of ethical institutionalism.[7]

A second issue that I will only mention in the passing, concerns the sociolo-gical theory of the functionalism that determines his thinking. Etzioni's ver-sion of this theory sums society up as a system that is subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces between which a balance needs to be found. A balan-ced society remains in between 'order' and 'autonomy'; if this balance is dis-rupted then anomalies will appear. The communitarian society is searching for a balance between totalitarianism (too much 'order') and anarchy (too much 'autonomy').[8] This theory leads to the description of the development in Western society since the sixties in terms of a 'pendulum swing'. While the social order was for the most part intact in the fifties but was weighed down by too much social control, it was consequently broken up for the benefit of more personal freedom in the sixties and thereafter.[9] This move-ment however gets stuck in itself in the nineties and needs to be steered in the right direction through a new balance. Etzioni does speak about a dyna-mic functionalism in the sense that both central forces – 'order' and 'auto-nomy' – can never work together in harmony, but the theoretical model remains fairly static.[10] Because of this Etzioni's functionalistic analyses turn

out rather schematic. For example hardly any attention is paid to the remaining influence of economic growth and technological developments. However this may be, the reference to Etzioni's sociological method makes it clear that his thesis regarding society as a moral order is not inspired by social conservatism.[11] On the contrary, while many a communitarian author turns against the established liberal thinking, Etzioni in fact points his arrows at conservatives who think that individual freedom in Western society should be limited for the benefit of traditional values. His position is in fact that in this respect conservatives are caught in the presuppositions of the modern liberals whom they say they in fact dispute. Both positions assume a dualism between a moralistic government versus the free, unbound individual. The opposition is that between 'force' or 'freedom'. This is the dualism that must be conquered according to Etzioni.[12] The mediation between both must be thought of in terms of the moral order as a community that is rooted in voluntariness ('a matter of belief rather than force').[13] It is on this proposition on which I will further focus my analysis.

Moral order: a matter of conviction instead of coercion

The social order that communitarians support, differ from the liberal view in the sense that it encompasses more than the coordination between individual life projects.

The main point to the discussion here is that while libertarians and liberal individualists do not ignore the need for social order, they not only champion a thin order but seek to limit the social order to one that is derived from and legitimated by individuals acting as free agents. In contrast, communitarians see a need for social order that contains a set of shared values, to which individuals are taught they are obligated. (*The New Golden Rule*, 21)

In the liberal vision that Etzioni disputes, the most important assignment of society is seen to be the coordination of individual interests. An appeal to shared values, other than the values that are expressed in the liberal order itself, is not only unnecessary in this view, but also undesirable. Substantial values that give meaning to existence need to be kept outside the justification of public measures. Liberals, according to Etzioni, fear 'social formulations of the common good'.[14] Communitarists consider the necessity of shared values as given. The argument for this relies on the proposition of classical social thinkers such as Tocqueville, Durkheim and Weber: a society that is not supported by shared values, runs the danger of collapsing due to a lack of social cohesion.[15] A procedural view of the democratic order which liberals such as Rawls are dedicated to, cannot sufficiently regulate conflicts of interest according to Etzioni, as recent 'culture wars' – for example

the struggle over abortus provocatus – has shown.[16] Without a set of 'shared core values' every society is in the end defenseless against the superior strength of either centripetal forces (the voices that ask for a strengthening of the moral authority of society), or centrifugal forces (the voices that do not want any moral authority above that of the individuals). Filling up the moral vacuum by means of the conservative alternative – which according to Etzioni is predominantly supported by the religious fundamentalists in America[17] - cannot however succeed either. An enforced social identity only leads to forms of unacceptable suppression, as blacks and women have frequently experienced. A path back to the fifties is for this reason not desirable.

It is thus important to further determine in which sense one can speak of 'shared core values' and under what conditions these can exist. In answering these questions, Etzioni sets out in a series of discussions that are dealt with extensively in the present-day morality philosophy. A moral order distinguishes itself from a social order through shared values – elsewhere Etzioni speaks of 'a shared set of definitions' – which are accepted within a society and which are embodied by 'societal formations'.[18] These values are thus not the result of an agreement, they do not form the outcome of a negotiation process, but give expression to moral convictions.

The good society must rely largely on its members' realization that the ways they are expected to conduct themselves are in line with values in which they believe, rather than because they fear public authorities or are driven by economic incentives. *The New Golden Rule, 86*

To put it differently, the 'core values' to which the members of society are committed, are not at conflict with their individual life project, but form an integral part of it. 'A good society requires an order that is aligned with the moral commitments of its members'.[19] Such an order therefore supposes a 'commitment to virtue'. This is what communitarists are after according to Etzioni. Breaking up the social order of the fifties has however led to a situation in which individuals are increasingly less called to account on their social behavior, other than by means of legal rules. In the nineties it is about the 'regeneration of virtue': making the 'moral voice' heard again, through which individuals and communities can give expression to their moral convictions. 'Virtue' hereby stands for a quality of people that are loyal to their convictions and accordingly to life. In this point Etzioni can clarify in what respect the communitaristic position differs from the conservative.

A major difference between social conservatives and communitarians exists in their views regarding the legitimate ways to sustain virtue. While com-

munitarians basically have faith in faith and seek to convince people of the value of their position, relying on the moral voice of the community, education, persuasion, and exhortation, social conservatives are much more inclined to rely on the law to promote the values in which they believe. The New Golden Rule, 16.

In this point the reason becomes clear why I would rather call Etzioni a social rather than a political thinker. In his view the moral order is not a political order, is also not mediated by the political order, but precedes it. He criticizes liberal individualists and social conservatives because they do not observe the balance between both. He sees the first as 'virtue-avoiders', the second as 'virtue-monopolizers'.[20] Conservatives in fact let the political order merge into the moral order by using the law for 'the enforcement of morals'. Liberals forfeit the balance in the opposite direction by letting the moral order coincide with the public realm. What falls outside of it, belongs to the private realm in which matters of good and evil can be left up to individuals themselves.[21] In both rejected positions the moral order as an independent social order is lacking. It is this moral order that is mediated by what is called in the Netherlands the 'civil society', consisting of community founding institutions such as the family, the neighborhood, the school, the club and the church.

For this reason Etzioni is reserved regarding the present-day pleas for the revitalization of 'civic order' when what is meant with this is the necessity of a peaceful society in which individuals respect each other. One is then in fact talking about 'civility' – the duty of each citizen to respect certain, especially procedural, borders towards others – but the matter of 'moral substance' is avoided.[22] Such pleas invariably lead to an emphasis on the importance of 'deliberation' and 'deliberative democracy', which calls forth the image of the coming together of individuals who reach a consensus through reasonable discussion, about the norms and values that they want to see respected in their society. Etzioni sees the influence of the Enlightenment ideal in this, which sees society especially in procedural terms.[23] Instead of this communitarists place the importance of 'values talk', a dialogue about the values by which people are bound and by which people are motivated, which reaches further than the exchange of reasonable arguments about public measures that must be taken. At the background of this plea for 'values talk' lies the thought that the struggle against the excrescences of individualism cannot be won in the public realm, but in the social realm.

The main social body is not the state (or even the polity) and the main actors

are not citizens, but the body is the society (as a community of communities) and the actors are members in it. Social action, such as that which occurs in and among family members, neighborhoods, voluntary associations, and communities has priority over political action. The New Golden Rule, 141.

The primacy of social action above political decision-making is rooted in a thesis which has brought about one of the most famous discussions between communitarians and liberals, namely the thesis of the social foundation of the individual. Liberalism assumes the image of independent individuals with their own norms and values, who deliberate with each other in the public realm about the way in which society can be designed in such a way that every one of them is offered the largest possible freedom and equal opportunities to realize their own life projects. Communitarians criticize this view with the proposition that liberal thinking passes over the socialization and moral formation that individuals undergo before they meet each other in the public realm.

The social foundation of individuals

The thesis of the social foundation of the individual is also brought forward by Etzioni.[24] The independent individuals that populate society in the liberal thinking do not exist. Individuals are 'socially constituted'. Individual identity is always social identity that is bedded in cultural and social relations. By neglecting these relations people do not become more free, but become more isolated, which makes the development of a social identity more difficult.
While it is possible to think abstractly about individuals apart from a community, it must be noted that if individuals are actually deprived of the stable and positive affective attachments communities best provide, they exhibit very few of the attributes commonly associated with the notion of a free-standing person presumed by the individualist paradigm. The New Golden Rule, 25.

This thesis of the 'social constitution of the self' has been the subject of much debate for the past years and has led to the conclusion that prominent liberal thinkers such as John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin are hardly touched by communitarian criticism. The image of the independent individual represents a normative ideal, it does not describe sociological reality. The Canadian philosopher Will Kymlicka has for example shown that especially Rawls affirms the necessity of social and cultural foundation as a precondi-

tion for moral development.[25] The political liberalism that Rawls and Dworkin defend, is therefore by no means bound to a denial of the importance of this foundation for moral development. It only denies that the communities and traditions in which individuals gain their identity should in itself have a moral standing. Individuals should at all times have the right of an 'exit-option': they should have the freedom to leave the community and to renounce traditional values in order to convert to other values if they want to do so. The central meaning of individual rights in liberalism is motivated by the protection of individuals against the pressure to conform to traditional communities. This liberalism is therefore not a theory about the social genesis of individual identity but about the moral appreciation of this identity. As such liberalism is not condemned to the 'atomistic' social ontology that is criticized by Sandel and Taylor. Considering that one can hardly find a communitarian who denies the importance of this 'exit-option' – even Etzioni continuously speaks about 'autonomy as a core value' – the antithesis between both philosophical positions seems to have largely lost its edge. Communitarians do not deny the importance of 'liberal purposes'[26] and neither do the liberals deny the importance of the social genesis of the individual, such that the question rises whether the difference between the two is at all substantial.

At this point Etzioni however carries out a highly interesting maneuver. At the beginning of his book he underlines that the 'social constitution of the self' is a socio-scientific thesis.[27] Through this it has in fact already been acknowledged that the criticism of political liberalism as a normative theory by authors such as Sandel and Taylor is not very effective. Etzioni sees through this coherence, but says he wants to take it a step further than both these authors.

86

The extra step one needs to undertake is to note that not only are human beings social by nature but also that their sociability enhances their human and moral potential. Social thinking has to cease viewing communal attachments as cannonballs chained to inmates' legs (....) The self is enriched and, as we shall see, ennobled by being social, it is the social self that is held back by the lack of positive multiple attachments. The New Golden Rule, 27. The extra step that is taken here is that 'sociability' as a normative idea is introduced. The social foundation of the individual does not only concern his genesis but also his telos. It is not only about origin, but also about destination. Living communally is not only a precondition if people want to be able to develop themselves, it is also a goal that enriches the human existence. In other words: Etzioni makes 'sociability' into a fundamental part of the good life. Whoever denies this part, thereby disowns the true nature of human existence.

Through this maneuver the discussion again gains weight given that liberal individualists cannot execute this step. In the liberal vision every interpretation of the good life is only tested to one criteria, namely that it answers to the own choice of the person involved.[28] The essence of the liberal vision – one could state – is the moral meaning of the relation that I have with myself, not the relation that I have with others.[29] The second relation is a necessary condition, not a goal. Etzioni goes further with exactly this point and takes the relation towards others – 'community' – up as 'core value' in his understanding of the good life next to autonomy. It is however of importance to note that the communitarian position of Etzioni hereby becomes dependent on the question to what extent people in the individualized society share this view of the good life. That we are dealing with a 'moral cause' that is 'self-evident', as Etzioni wants us to believe in his book, seems highly unlikely to me.[30] If communitarianism as a movement wants to have a chance at succeeding, then there must be people to whom the 'new golden rule' is indeed evident: people for who 'community' is indeed an equally indispensable part of a meaningful existence as the freedom to make their own choices; people for who social engagement and the acceptance of responsibility is a loss of oneself and therefore also not a sacrifice, but a fulfillment.

A certain 'type' of people: the problem of moral motivation
The question is now whether individuals in our society can be sufficiently motivated by a life in which 'community' represents a core value. In other words: how do we get the people that want to carry the ideal of community? Etzioni asks this question – justly so – as a problem of motivation. We find his answer in a chapter that carries the title 'The Moral Voice', in my opinion the most crucial chapter in his book. His starting point is the sociological fact that values do not maintain themselves, just as norms are not automatically followed. A moral motivation applies here. Etzioni expresses this with the concept of the 'moral voice'. The moral voice is a peculiar form of motivation: it encourages people to adhere to values to which they subscribe. It is peculiar because, unlike typical motivations, it is not a quest for physiological or psychological release (like the quenching of thirst by drinking water) or based on a pleasure principle. The sense of affirmation people have when they abide by values is fundamentally different. The New Golden Rule, 120.

In his explanation about how the 'moral voice' motivates, Etzioni distinguishes an internal and an external aspect. I would like to go deeper into that which Etzioni especially says about the first aspect. We could call it the

'inner voice', that is to say: the moral subject – the 'I' – as motivating instance. The way in which Etzioni explains this inner aspect, is remarkable. He writes:

The inner voice, emanating from the acting self, addressing that self, urges a person to abide by his or her values and to refrain from behavior that violates these values. Most of us need not consult a sociological or psychological study to know what this inner voice is: we have firsthand experience of its call. Typically the voice's call or claim takes the form of statements that contain "I ought to" as a distinct from "I would like to". The New Golden Rule, 121.

The inner voice is thus a moral voice and not the voice of a desire or a wish that I have. This means however that the moral subject motivates himself. Etzioni confirms this by adding that the inner voice brings forth moral behavior through a 'special sense of affirmation', of which I become aware when I act in accordance with my conviction. What is the 'special sense of affirmation'?

I am hard put to find terms that capture what a person "feels" or "senses" (incorrect terms, because they invoke the leisure principle) when the person abides by a value in which he or she believes. It is not akin to the satisfaction that results from eating a fine steak or having a "great" sexual experience. The person who gave a large contribution (by his or her standards) to the poor, the parents who ran into a burning building to save their child, the person who fasted to indicate her religious commitment, are not "satisfied" but ennobled by what I call, lacking a better term, value affirmation. The New Golden Rule, 121.

What is remarkable of this explanation is the fact that Etzioni sides with a philosopher with whom we would not expect him to do so, namely Immanuel Kant. One can conclude this from the emphasis he places on the difference between 1) being motivated by the pleasure that I get in the doing of a certain deed – 'satisfaction' – and 2) being motivated by the realization that I affirm myself as a moral subject by fulfilling my duty. Just like Etzioni, Kant also learned that morality has nothing to do with the satisfaction of wishes and desires ('I would like to'), but everything with duty ('I ought to'). Just like Etzioni, Kant answers the question what motivates someone to do his duty with the appreciation that one has for oneself as a moral subject. In Etzioni's example what makes the deed of the parents to rescue their child from that burning building into a moral deed? Not the fact that they are torn apart by fear or the dread for the horrible death that their child will die, because those are after all motives that are inspired by 'desire', namely the desire to rescue their child. Not compassion or being moved

make this deed into a moral deed, but self-respect. These parents are not 'ennobled' by the feelings that they cherish for their child, but by the fact that they are loyal to their 'values'.

Etzioni's explanation of moral motivation is therefore remarkable because it seems to unsettle his whole theory of the ´new golden rule'. In this theory it is after all about abolishing the tension between desire and duty, 'the tension between one's preference and one's social commitments' as Etzioni formulates it himself.[31] By in fact placing our wishes and desires outside the realm of morality – again following Kant – he only further increases the tension, such that morality in his theory seems to become what it also was with Kant, namely the obligation to do that which one does not feel for. ´Have to' instead of 'want to' becomes the dominant characteristic of morality. This interpretation of Etzioni's theory is affirmed by what he later says about 'human nature' from a communitarian perspective.

The communitarian person is thus one who is continuously conflicted between the calls of nature (as modulated by society's culture) and the moral voice, a person "doomed" to a struggle between a lower and a higher (a debased and nobler) self. The New Golden Rule, 170.

Understandably this image of mankind whose inner is the stage of a relentless struggle between good and bad – 'between Satan and God'[32] – leads to the placing into perspective of the moral demands that can be made to individuals. The view of mankind of Kant corresponds with the view of what was called the 'akratic man' by Aristotle. The akratic person is the one who continuously has to overcome his own unwillingness to do that of which he knows that he should do it. Aristotle explains what is lacking with this person: his wishes and desires, passions and emotions have been insufficiently shaped. The akratic person needs what Martha Nussbaum called a 'therapy of desire'.[33] One could say that he misses inner civilization.

Etzioni's version of the Kantian theory rests on the implicit acceptance of the view of man who must be kept under control by external authority. The only thing is that this external authority is moved inside: we are our own police officers. If this does not pay attention, then we are the victim of our own inclinations, as apparently happens with people who fall victim to these strange aberrations of violence and aggression when they 'go out' on a certain night. It is remarkable that Etzioni has not recognized that the akratic person is exactly the person who fits in the liberal individualism that he opposes. The individualist that he describes is also someone who does not gladly live up to the norms of 'community' as a 'moral order'.

The reason for making much of the problem of moral motivation has – I hope – become clear with this. Etzioni's 'new golden rule' supposes an enti-

rely different view of mankind than the Kantian view of mankind he shows us. The communitarian movement as he explains it, has to resort to individuals for who social responsibility does not belong to the assignments they would rather get away from, or who are only prepared to take on these responsibilities when they are rewarded for them. 'Sociability' is for them part of what they see as a meaningful and valuable existence, as we have seen. For such individuals the English saying 'virtue is its own reward' applies.

The task of the community

The 'moral voice' however does not only have an internal but also an external aspect. According to Etzioni this external aspect is mediated by the social communities in its different sections: the family, the school, the neighborhood, the club, the church. It now seems the task of these social institutions to support individuals in their inner struggle between 'want to' and 'have to'.
Communities have a moral voice that is external to the ego's own voice, that serves to reinforce the inner voice of the members. While the inner moral voice and that of the community may sing from the same page, there often is at least some difference in the pitch, the words each voice intones, and the exact notes each strikes. The New Golden Rule, 126.

The effectiveness of communities in fulfilling this task according to Etzioni depends on the extent to which they are formed by individuals who share a certain social identity and the norms and values that are associated with it. They are successful the more their moral infrastructure is intact so that they contribute to the formation of character.
A major sociological function of the community, as a building block of the moral infrastructure, is to reinforce the character of individuals. We have seen how this can be achieved by the moral voice, built into a web of informal affect-laden relationships, which are a constitutive element of communities. In general, the weaker the community – because the population turnover is high, there are few shared values, heterogeneity is very high, or some other reasons – the thinner the social web and the slacker the moral voice. The New Golden Rule, 187.

Considering that the community founding institutions that Etzioni sketches are subject to a loss of function – also pointed out by himself – then, more so the question rises about the chance of success for the communitarian movement. However one deems such a chance, I think one con-

clusion follows indisputably from the above analysis. If it is indeed true that the different community levels in which individuals in our society are socialized are subject to erosion, then this chance of success for a large part comes down to the availability of a certain 'type' of people: people for whom engagement and responsibility are not a 'burden' but a 'delight'. The availability of such people is the necessary supposition of every movement that aims at the revitalization of the civil society. That many such people can be found in our society is without a doubt for me, only the prevailing ideology which sees the individual fulfillment mostly as economic success, makes such people almost invisible. The underlying thought here is that it is not true that modern people are individualists, but that the ideology of the liberal individualism burdens us with a very limited self-image which has little similarity with the way in which we actually live.[34] To say it differently: the economic success of the national polder model that is cheered everywhere, is embodied by different 'role models' than those which are necessary for the revitalization of the civil society. This observation should guard a Christian Democratic movement that wants to go a different direction with society, from searching for the centre of power as quickly as possible, as long as economic success still rules there.

Prof. J.S. Reinders is professor of ethics at the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam. At this university he also holds the Willem van den Bergh-chair for ethics, in particular normative aspects of care for the benefit of people with a mental handicap.

Notes

1. Ulrich Beck, Risikogesellschaft: Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1985; A'. Giddens, Modernity and Self-identity. Cambridge, Polity Press, 1992.
2. A. Etzioni, The New Golden Rule. Community and Morality in a Democratic Society. New York: Basic Books, 1996.
3. See A. Etzioni, Rights and the Common Good. The Communitarian Perspective. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995, especially the preface titled 'We, the Communitarians' (pp. iii-vi).
4. Etzionio, op.cit., p.10.
5. A short formulation of the new Golden Rule is as follows: 'Respect and uphold society's moral order as you would have society respect and uphold your autonomy', Etzioni, op.cit., p. xciii (also see p. 4, 27, 47, 244, 251, 257).
6. See e.g. A. Gutman, 'Communitarian critics of liberalism', Philosophy Public Affairs, Vol. 14-15 (1985), pp. 308-322; W. Kymlicka, 'Liberalism and communitarianism', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 18 (1988), pp. 181-204; F. Cunningham, 'Community, democracy and socialism', Praxis International, vol. 11 (1991), pp. 310-326.
7. 'Ethical intuitionism' stands for the view that moral standards cannot be justified by anything but themselves. See Etzioni, op.lit., p. 241: 'In searching a final touchstone, I draw on the observation that certain concepts present themselves to us as morally compelling in and for themselves'. The author acknowledges the problem that the appeal to 'self-evident concepts' makes his argumentation circular, but he does not see another solution: 'Although I am aware, of course, of the controversial nature of the position I follow, and of the ambiguities it entails, for the reasons I have discussed, I see no other position that is more compelling and which, pragmatically speaking, enables one to construct a more sound communitarian paradigm'(Op.lit., p. 243). It seems to me that this concession comes down to the acknowledgement that the project of a universal foundation of morality will on balance not succeed, considering that such a foundation in fact wants to show that moral standards rely on foundations that in a rational perspective are enforcing.
8. The functionalistic thought framework thus works with two 'parameters' – social order and individual freedom – which make it possible to describe the processes which push a society in one direction or another (Etzioni, op.lit., pp.45-46.) Individual autonomy thus does not so much apply as a characteristic of individuals but more so as that of society. It is a 'societal attribute' (pp.23-24).
9. Harry Kunneman characterizes this development in the title of his book, Van Theemutscultuur naar walkman-ego. Contouren van postmoderne indi-

vidualiteit. Amsterdam/Meppel: Boom, 1996.

10. 'For societies to be stable, they must be metastable, that is, to keep the over-arching pattern, they must continue to remake themselves' (op.lit. p.23). The author points out that his terminology (e.g. speaking about 'centripe-tal' and 'centrifugal forces') is sooner scientific than historic, but that the sociologist is not interested in the development, but in the functioning of society (op.lit. p.46).

11. This is the suspicion that Kunneman harbors against the 'community thin-king'. In this thinking the positive possibilities of individual autonomy are neglected (op.lit., p. 8-9).

12. 'Before I can proceed I must reluctantly suggest a redrawing of the intellec-tual-political map. In the process, I support the claim that communitarian thinking leapfrogs the old debate between left-wing and right-wing thin-king and suggests a third social philosophy. The basic reason this rearrange-ment is required is that the old map centers around the role of the gover-nment versus that of the private sector, and the authority of the state ver-sus that of the individual.' (op.lit., p.7).

13. Etzioni, op.lit. p. 13.

14. 'Most important, many libertarians and liberal individualists are troubled by social formulations of the common good that are a core part of thick social orders. They argue that each person should formulate his or her own virtue, and that public policies and mores should reflect only agreements that individuals voluntarily form' (op. lit. p. 11).

15. Especially the work of De Tocqueville is an important source of inspiration for American communitarianism. Etzioni op.lit. p. 187. Also see Robert N. Bellah, 'The Quest for the Self', in Etzioni 'The New Golden Rule', pp. 45-47. See further the work of Bellah and his research group of which a report is given in Habits of the Heart, Individualism and Commitment in American Life. New York, Harper & Row, 1985, and The Good Society, New York, Vintage Books, 1992.

16. 'Mores and values cannot be worked out on an ad hoc basis at every turn, nor can they draw on prearranged contracts. If a society tried to follow this course then half the society would be lawyers drafting contracts (or trying to wriggle out of them). It is not accidental that the most individualistic society, American society, is also the one that is most litigious. In effect, for a society to function, it must draw on culture and traditions and shared values they entail. Only these values can provide the normative criteria nee-ded to proceed without constant haggling and to work out differences even when negotiations do take place.' (op.lit. p. 94).

17. 'Another indicator of the vacuum left by the thinning of shared values, and the yearning to have the vacuum refilled, is the rise of strong religious fun-damentalist movements in many parts of the world. (Op.lit., p. 89).

93

18. Etzionio, Op.lit. p. 12, pp. 85-87.

19. Etzionio, Op.lit. p. 12.

20. Etzionio, Op.lit. p. 17.

21. 'Individualist, to the extent that they recognize the need for a common good, tend to seek to limit its reach to the public realm and oppose it in the private realm' (Op.lit., p. 92)

22. 'To argue, as I do, that to have a civic society is insufficient, that a virtuous society requires a core of shared values, is not to dismiss civic order. It is a necessary, but far from sufficient, element of the social order a good society needs'. (Op.lit. pp. 95-96). Etzioni approvingly quotes Gertrud Himmelfarb: 'It is not enough, then, to revitalize civil society. The more urgent, and difficult, task is to remoralize civil society.'

23. The discussion about the restrictions of a procedural view of democracy as 'mechanism' for the coordination of individual interests is especially held in terms of 'thick' and 'thin'. A 'thick social order' is an order that rests on shared values that go beyond the shared values of the liberal individualism. This as opposed to a 'thin order' which solely rests on procedural values (fundamental freedoms, equality before the law, equal opportunities, e.g.). For a thematic approach to this distinction see Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin. Moral Argument Home and Abroad. Notre Dame: university of Notre Dame Press, 1994, Etzioni conceives communitarianism as a plea for a 'thick social order'. (Op.lit. pp. 10-13; p. 88, p. 91).

24. The most famous advocates of this thesis are Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982 and Charles Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979. Also see Taylor's essays collected in Philosophical Arguments, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1995.

25. See for example W. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991, pp. 47-100.

26. See the book with the same name by William Galston, Liberal Purposes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

27. 'While the discussion draws on political theory and social philosophy, these are not the main foundations of the argument. The sociological and empirical nature of my approach is similar to earlier statements by communitarians who pointed to the unrealistic assumptions made by libertarians (and those whom political theorists call 'liberals') about the nature of the individual' (Op.lit. pp. 5-6).

28. See Kymlicka, Op.lit., pp.53-53: 'What is central to the liberal view is (...) that we understand ourselves to be prior to our ends, in the sense that no end or goal is exempt from possible re-examination. For re-examination to be meaningfully conducted I must be able to envisage my self encumbered with different motivations than I now have in order that I have some reason to choo-

se one over another as more valuable for me.'

29. Elsewhere I have shown that this vision has its roots in the Christian anth-ropology of the Church Father Augustine. See J.S. Reinders, 'Wat niets kan worden, stelt niets voor', people with a serious mental handicap in the light of the present-day health care ethics – a critical explanation. Amersfoort: Monografieën s' Heeren Loo, nr. 15, 1996.

30. See note above, 7.

31. 'The new golden rule requires that the tension between one's preference and one's social commitments be reduced by increasing the realm of duties one affirms as social responsibilities – not the realm of duties that are forci-bly imposed but the realm of responsibilities one believes one should dis-charge and that one believes one is fairly called upon to assume.' (Op.lit. p. 12)

32. Etzioni, Op.lit., p. 170.

33. Martha C. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire. Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.

34. See Bellah, The Quest for the Self, p. 50. For a philosophical analysis of the modern thinking in the same spirit see G.A. van der Wal, De omkering van de wereld. Achtergronden van de milieucrisis en het zinloosheidsbesef, Baarn. Ambo, 1996.

Catholic Social Thought on Citizenship: no Place for Exclusion

Prof. dr. E.M.H. Hirsch Ballin &

Mr. drs. R.A.J. Steenvoorde

Introduction

The concept of citizenship has many faces. It is about rights and obligations, about responsibility and solidarity, about the state and the person. Nonetheless, the concept lacks the ethical dimension necessary in today's world. "Citizenship" has a positive appeal and denotes identity, responsibility, and political as well as social participation. Because of the apparently exclusive relation between citizenship and the state (or another political entity), citizenship can easily be used to separate groups of people from each other according to their "citizenship". Enjoying their own recognition as "citizens", people may involuntary or intentionally get into a situation where their neighbors suffer exclusion with the legalistic justification that the latter are no citizens of the same community or state.

The effects of globalization in particular have made us aware that our traditional concepts of citizenship are barely adequate to cover the still growing gap between the included and the excluded, the rich and poor. Borderlines rapidly loose their effectiveness, but a really borderless world in which people were permitted to move freely from one community to the other, remains beyond imagination. Can solidarity be achieved in an interdependent but in many respects imbalanced world? In a world in which the individual increasingly wants to determine his own destiny, we are confronted with the fact of a growing interdependence. There is a conflict between the people and institutions that have the power to force us, punish us, and tax us, and the longing of man to be independent and untouchable. And while man longs for power and order to be protected, he turns away from it whenever there is a possibility.[1] These developments influence our concept of citizenship and the way we deal with exclusion.

The current notion of citizenship has been greatly influenced by the work of T.H. Marshall and his distinction between civil, political, and social citizenship. Other distinctions have also been developed, including the concepts of cultural citizenship and neo-republican citizenship.[2] Most of them define citizenship in relation to a nation state. The role of the centrally organized nation state seems to be becoming less important with the advent of globalization and the rise of regionalism. The importance of the nation state is being affected by the shift of attention to two other levels: upwards to the international level and downwards to the regional level. New regional parliaments (Wales and Scotland) as well as new regional conflicts – in the former republic of Yugoslavia or in the Republic of Indonesia - are proof of that development. People who had been citizens of the United Kingdom for years claimed the right to special representation on the basis of their special (Scottish, Welsh) identity. People who had been living together relatively peacefully for years excluded each other from society on the basis of ethnic

intolerance. Exclusion can be based on social, political, and economic arguments. And in the most extreme cases, the basis for exclusion will be found in racism, ethnic hatred, etc.

The concept of citizenship is not a static- but a rather dynamic concept. Marshall's definition is based on juridical, social-ethical, and political norms. A citizen is a person who is a socially and politically recognized bearer of rights. Citizenship is thus related to the idea of a constitutional state in two ways: a citizen is a person entitled to rights and a subject of social participation and of democratic decision-making. The fact that there exists such a thing as a universal right to a nationality[3] (and thus to citizenship) makes clear the generally shared feeling that social relations make man complete. The diminishing role of the state and the fact that we can no longer call for a common identity within countries because of regionalist (and other) tendencies makes us look for new theories. We face many questions like:

How can we construct a common identity in a country where people not only belong to separate political communities but also belong in different ways – that is, some are incorporated as individuals and others through membership in a group?[4]

It is not the purpose of the present chapter to present a new theory to deal with the question of pluralism and multiculturalism. Rather, we will look at the process of social in- and exclusion, because citizenship and exclusion are two sides of the same coin.[5] This is an important relation because most of the time citizenship is described as entailing rights and duties in a participatory national bond (with the nation state as the purest form), founded within a shared culture. But we are now faced by developments that make a reference to a participatory bond based on the nation state a less likely point to start the debate on citizenship and exclusion. In this chapter, we want to look at the historical development of Catholic Social Thinking on citizenship and exclusion. Catholic Social Thought is based on the recognition of intermediate associations and therefore is not troubled by the notions of "the declining nation state" or "globalization". Thinking in terms of intermediate associations when dealing with citizenship and exclusion might prove a fruitful way forward in the discussion on citizenship and exclusion in this new century.

Catholic Social Thought (henceforth: CST) has developed in the interaction between the official teachings of the Catholic Church and academic thinkers since the 1890s. It has taken a long time for CST to accept the notion of citizenship in accordance with Marshallian criteria. But when it did accept Marshal's definition, CST went beyond it and formulated ideals and moral dimensions of good citizenship. One of those ideals is the ideal of solidarity.

After being abused by communist and fascist regimes it looked as if the concept would be dropped. Changing events in the church and the world gave it a new impulse and now the concept of solidarity has become one of the pillars of CST. We will give a historical overview of the development of CST thinking on good citizenship. We will then further explore the notion of solidarity and CST's preferential option for the poor and what it can mean in today's world to all people of good will.

The troubled relation between church and state 1881- 1945

What are the origins of Catholic Social Thinking on matters of the state and the citizen? The original view on citizenship was quite conservative and anti-modern. In order to understand present day CST, it is necessary to look back to the historic Catholic view on the origins of civil power and what it meant for Catholics to be citizens until the major changes of the Second Vatican Council in the 1960s. In 1881, Pope Leo XIII published the encyclical Diuturnum on the origin of civil power. This was after the battle for Italian Unity and the Pope of Rome had lost considerable land (and influence) to the new Italian State. Catholicism was trying to come to grips with this new situation in which it was no longer affiliated to a worldly state but to a worldwide spiritual society. Pope Leo XIII started from the premises that nature wills that man should live in a civil society in which some should rule the multitude. However, the Pope did not endorse Rousseau's theory of the Social Contract. He criticized it fiercely:

...it is a great error not to see, what is manifest, that men, as they are not a nomad race, have been created, without their own free will, for a natural community of a life. It is plain, moreover, that the pact which they allege is openly a falsehood and a fiction, and that it has no authority to confer on political power such great force, dignity, and firmness as the safety of the State and the Common Good of the citizens require.[6]

The Pope stressed the importance of men not obeying anything that demanded of them action against natural or divine law. At the same time, justice should be of the highest importance to those who rule the state:

...those who rule States should understand that political power was not created for the advantage of any private individual; and that the administration of the State must be carried on the profit of those who have been committed to their care, not the profit of those to whom it has been committed.

This attitude was founded on the experiences of the Catholic Church in France where the doctrines of Rousseau and other writers had produced a fierce anti-clerical movement against the church and religion because of their affiliation to the ancien régime and the Papal State. Part of this anti-Catholic movement had been the choice of allegiance that citizens had to make between church and state, sometimes paying with their life if they preferred the former. Linking citizenship together with extreme nationalism has, even until today, led to great disasters.

How were Christians to act within the state? This question was answered in the 1890 Encyclical Sapientiae Christiana. This encyclical starts with a statement about church and state:

...if we would judge aright, the supernatural love for the Church and the natural love of our own country proceed from the same eternal principle, since God Himself is their Author and originating Cause. Consequently, it follows that between the duties they respectively enjoin, neither can come into collision with the other.

In this doctrine, the Church and the State both possess individual sovereignty. In the carrying out of public affairs, neither obeys the other. By stressing this point, the Pope was taking a stand against the nationalization of religion, which meant that religion could only be tolerated when it was subservient to the interests of the state. This explains why there is "an option out" in this doctrine:

"No one can, however, without risk to faith, foster any doubt as to the Church alone having been invested with such power of governing souls as to exclude the civil authority. In truth, it was not to Caesar but to Peter that Jesus Christ entrusted the keys of the Kingdom of heaven."

The governing powers of the State are wholly free to carry out the business of the State. But the Church stood (and stands) above all because religion was not to support any political movement and was to be accepted by all as holy and inviolate. This meant that Catholic citizens could be loyal to the state, but that they had a duty to oppose the State when it acted against natural or divine law:

"No better citizen is there, whether in time of peace and war, than the Christian who is mindful of his duty; but such a one should be ready to suffer all things, even death itself, rather than abandon the cause of God or of the Church."

A very critical attitude towards the modern nation state can be found in both encyclicals. The experiences of the Church in France (or the unification of Italy for that matter) can explain this. It was in this mindset that the

first social encyclical was published in 1891: Rerum Novarum meaning Of New Things. It speaks about many (in Marshallian terms) aspects of civil and social citizenship. Quadragesimo Anno of Pope Pius XI (ghost-writer was Oswald Von Nell-Breuning) followed in 1931. However 19th century theories on political citizenship and democracy were not accepted until after the Second World War. In the next section we will look at the work of Jacques Maritain which paved the way for accepting the modern notions of citizenship and which still influences modern Catholic Social Thinking.

Paving the way

The work of Jacques Maritain greatly influenced the way in which academic Catholics think about citizenship today.[11] He was born in 1882 and died in 1973. In 1904 Maritain married to Raïsa Oumançoff, who was of Jewish-Russian origin. In 1906, despite hefty opposition from their relatives, they converted to Catholicism. Maritain searched for a place for the church in modern society, looking for ways to think about the primacy of the eternal without making any concession to the autonomy of temporal understanding that comes with the demands of the times we live in. When it appeared war was imminent, the couple fled to the United States. His book *Man and the State*[12] was published shortly after the Second World War and can be seen as a reaction to late 19th century CST, the misuse of corporatism by the Fascists and Nazis, and the bitter experiences of the Second World War. In his first chapter, Maritain establishes the relation between people and the state. The state, he argues, is that part of the body politic that is concerned with the maintenance of law, the promotion of the common welfare and public order, and the administration of public affairs.[13] He rejects Hegel's thesis that the state is the supreme incarnation of the Idea; the state is but an agency in the service of man.

Putting man at the service of that instrument is political perversion. The human person as an individual is for the body politic and the body politic is for the human person as a person. But man is by no means for the State. The State is for man.[14]

The people are the multitude of human persons who, united under just laws, by mutual friendship, and for the common good of their human existence, constitute a body politic. A person is a whole. Thus, the multitude of human persons is a whole of wholes. Is it therefore a mere sum of individuals? Not according to Maritain, who used the writings of St. Thomas to explain the whole of wholes:

"Among created things [St. Thomas writes], 'one is part of two, and two of three (as one man is part of two men, and two men of three). But it is not thus in God. For the Father is as much as the whole Trinity: quia tantus est Pater, quanta tota Trinitas."

The whole of wholes has become known as the concept of person in community. This notion is the basis of CST's recognition of the importance of intermediate associations.

The people are to be united under just laws. But experience has taught us that not all laws are just laws. It goes beyond the scope of this article to elabourate extensively on the origins of law here. CST is based on a natural law theory, which holds that the law of nature is written in the human soul; it is not something that comes from lawyers, kings, or priests, but it is complementary to human reason which can make us do good and abstain from evil. It is a "divine and natural" law.[16] Individuals unite through mutual friendship. Friendship is the leading force in providing justice. This is so because justice is not a fundamental source of law in itself. It is the application and interpretation of the law together with such principles as responsibility, liberty, and equality. Inherent in the quest for justice is the question of how can human charity be made the leading force to bring us justice?[17]

It follows that the common good of human existence is not merely the sum of individual wants and needs. It is likewise the whole of wholes and could be described as the whole of social conditions which make it possible for groups as well as individuals to reach their own fulfillment. It comprises respect for the person as such, the social well being and development of groups, and sustainable peace.[18] We saw that individuals constitute a body politic. The body politic is political society as a whole. The state is the topmost part of this whole. However, Maritain does not imply that the people united in the body politic have sovereignty. Sovereignty relates to a power separate from and above the whole ruled by the sovereign. The state therefore cannot be sovereign, nor can the people be sovereign, God alone is sovereign.[19] This view is contrary to the notion that the civil and the sacred have their own sphere. Maritain's work can best be understood from the historical context in which it was written. Not all Catholic thinkers shared his view. The work of Oswald von Nell-Breuning of the 1960s is not focusing on this absolute interpretation of divine sovereignty. Because of this, some premises on the origin of absolute sovereignty are no longer part of CST. They were (and are) in contradiction with the teachings of the Gospel itself. When asked whether He was the king of the Jews, Jesus answered Pontius Pilate that His kingdom was not of this world. Despite this, Maritain paved the way for modern CST and is still seen as one of the major contributors to the development of the notion of person within community.

Good citizens in the modern world

In 1986, the American bishops issued a letter to American Catholics entitled Economic Justice for All. They had to address questions other than those Maritain had to thirty years earlier. During the meeting of the Second Vatican Council in the early sixties, church leaders tried to come to grips with the modern world. In many ways they shifted from century-old conceptions and doctrines in favour of a more realistic approach. So, at the time the bishops prepared their letter, the church had embraced the concept of democracy and classic (Marshallian) ideas on citizenship. The church accepted that respect for human dignity was a democratic idea as well. It also accepted the idea of freedom of religion since it no longer meant to be free from religion (as was the experience of the church in revolutionary France), but the freedom for people to unite and express their religion. In 1986, the bishops wrote:

'The virtues of good citizenship require a lively sense of participation in the common wealth and of having obligations as well as rights within it. The nation's economic health depends on strengthening these virtues among all its people, and on the development of institutional arrangements supportive of these virtues.'[20]

The American bishops stressed that good citizens participate in the commonwealth and have rights and obligations within it. The notion good citizenship brings us to another dimension of citizenship: active citizenship. T.H. Marshall's 1949 definition got a very passive interpretation at first, when everyone focused on rights. The active dimension of citizenship came into focus in the sixties and seventies of the last century when it was translated as a question of political participation.[21] The bishops' letter points to (moral) obligations. An appeal for active citizenship will only be successful if persons feel part of a community. A living community is a product of reason and moral strength.[22] It implies a focus, an aim; in CST: the common good.

Maritain's vision echoes in the 1963 encyclical of Pope John XXIII, Pacem in Terris. In this encyclical, the Pope stated that the common good concerns all people, that all members must share in it, and that attention should be given to the poor and marginalized members of society. The state should assume a role in promoting the material as well as the spiritual welfare of its citizens. Liberals need not be worried by the role of the state in promoting spiritual welfare because it does not imply that the state should promote a single belief as the only way to reach spiritual welfare. The Declaration on the Liberty of Religion, Dignitatis Humanae, which was adopted in 1965, states clearly that freedom of religion is based on the dignity of the person. No one should be forced to act against his or her conscience. Freedom of

religion is a civil right.[23] The view of the church on the role of the state can be characterized by the ideas of human dignity, solidarity, and subsidiary. It is striking to see how various writers in the United States, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands all use the same words, but have very different interpretations. Also remarkable is the absence of the concept of subsidiary in the American debate. In order to understand CST's recognition of the importance of intermediate associations, we have to explore the meaning of human dignity, the common good, subsidiary and solidarity.

Respect for human dignity is the basis of current CST. The rights of a person are intrinsic; they do not stem from some social compact and thus cannot be alienated or abrogated.[24] Human dignity is about creativity, equality, and liberty. It encourages man to make use of his talents. It also includes responsibility, for oneself and for others, because the liberty to use his talents and to claim human dignity implicitly makes individuals responsible for the liberty and creativity of their fellow man.[25] The concept of the common good provides a balance between the rights of the individual and the greater good of society. But it is a very difficult concept. What is the whole of social conditions needed? Can we define what the common good in a given circumstance is? The perfect fulfillment of the common good is not something man will reach on earth. We can try to grasp it, but man is by nature imperfect. Not even a society of saints would do because even saints are not perfect. The impossibility of giving a definition of the common good prevents abuse of the concept. As no one can define it, it cannot be enforced on societies, something dictatorial and totalitarian systems did (and do) all the time. In those systems, the government, the state, believes it knows what is best for the people, and so all people are −theoretically- being treated equally. This idea of the "makeabilty of society" (the idea that government policies are the best way to bring about social change) is absent in CST. But even when societies are not able to define what the common good is, the duty of man to contribute to the common good. The common good is not only a duty of the state because of the concept of subsidiary. And all participants on various levels can have different views on what the common good should be in a certain situation (Maritain).

The origins of subsidiary can be traced back to the encyclical of Pope Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno. Written in 1931 to commemorate the 40th anniversary of Rerum Novarum, it introduced subsidiary and solidarity into CST. Subsidiary can mean a passing of powers downwards, but it can also mean a passing of powers upwards if that would better serve the common good. The state should not take upon itself what individuals can do better; but subsidiary also requires that the state should not shrink from doing what it can do better. It became a very important doctrine in Europe and can even be found in the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (although re-interpreted

in a restrictive sense). Linked with subsidiary is solidarity. The concept of solidarity is a very noble one, but has also been greatly abused by corporatism, and ultimately, Fascism. And even today it can give rise to great misunderstandings. For instance, the American professor Christopher Wolfe recently described solidarity as:

...the priority of the common good over all parties, ideologies, or partial interests in society[26]

This interpretation is not adequate. Solidarity is not about the priority of the common good, but about relations between people. Only in relation with other people can man become fully human. For this reason, citizenship should never be applied as an instrument to exclude other people or peoples from their fundamental rights. Solidarity means the willingness to see the other as another "self". Any injustice committed against another must be regarded as no less serious than an injustice against oneself.[27] Solidarity starts among the oppressed and excluded groups because of individual respect for each other in spite of the current – discriminatory - interpretation of a common good by a majority. CST holds that the common good should be interpreted from the perspective of those who are left out. The preferential option for the poor and excluded, which was developed in the discussion with Liberation Theology, is mandatory when working towards the common good.

In this section, we have looked at the current CST view on citizenship and the role of the state. We paid attention to the notion of active citizenship and the virtues the American bishops promoted in their 1986 letter. Finally, we looked at the four guiding principles in current CST. Respect for human dignity, the common good, subsidiary, and solidarity, are the main principles that define the role of the state. In the next section, we will focus on the principle of solidarity and the preferential option for the poor.

Catholic social thought and the reciprocal dimension of solidarity

The origins of "solidarity" can be found in the legal world. From the 16th century onward, the phrase in solidium pointed at "the whole, all those involved". The term in solidium was first used outside the legal world in 19th century socialist writing.[28] The writings of Hermann Pesch laid out the groundwork for the doctrine of solidarism. It was put forward as an alternative to socialism, since it advocated 'solidarity' between persons, regardless of the fact that some may be owners of capital and others disposed workers. Soon after that, it was to be found in the first encyclical of the Catholic Church on what has become known as the social question. The 1891 encycli-

cal Rerum Novarum was a cry of protest against the social injustice which labourers were experiencing. They were being exploited economically and had no way to fully participate in political life in order to bring about changes. Pope Leo XIII tried to bridge the gap between the rich and governing minority and the underclass majority by expressing his concern about this gap. Bridging the gap was a top-down process because workers were only allowed to use legal means (set out by the ruling upper class) to claim their rights. Overthrowing oppressive rulers (revolution) was not part of the Thomistic thinking in the 19th century. And this was in contrast with the writings of St. Thomas himself on tyrant murder and the obligations of a righteous ruler. But in 1891, the victims of oppression and injustice were asked to put up with their suffering in the hope of renewal in the next life. [29] For the next seventy years, this attitude remained in CST. A moral appeal was made to the ruling class, and the poor had to wait. The church stressed the importance of private ownership but did not answer the question how the poor should obtain this. This all changed with the installation of Pope John XXIII to the throne of St. Peter. He seems to have realized that the church's emphasis on the right of private property was being abused to obstruct social change. The Church's historical suspicion of the state, and even worse, state intervention, was also a major obstacle.[30] Seeing that the entrenched rights of the wealthy and powerful were the main obstacles to the exercise of the rights of others – especially the poor – the Pope made a radical choice. From then on the church would be a supporter of the welfare state and social teaching would express solidarity with the poor, even giving them preferential treatment. This resulted in a very radical statement in the constitution on the church in the world: Gaudum et Spes, which was adopted during the second Vatican Council. This stated that people are obliged to come to the relief of the poor and not so merely out of their superfluous goods. This was a very radical approach indeed. But it still was a top-down approach, appealing to the *haves* to show mercy towards the *have-nots*

The 1968 conference in Medellín, Colombia, of the Latin American bishops changed it all. In line with world-wide changing attitudes and the spirit of the sixties they formulated the opinion that the preferential option for the poor means "conscientization" of the poor. In other words, the church should educate the poor to be aware of the basic causes of their marginalization, and the church should help the poor to organize themselves to overcome this injustice and achieve liberation.[31] In principle, this is a very noble concept. However, the violence with which this liberation from the dictatorial governments of South America took place, made the Church think again. The Pope could not support a theology which encouraged people to liberate themselves by violence. Jesus did not preach the Gospel with an automatic rifle.

In 1978, Pope John Paul II was elected to succeed Pope John Paul I. After visiting Brazil in 1980, he declared solidarity with the poor, but this solidarity was not to be exclusive. He saw how western concepts of development and liberation where destroying local cultures, and in practice, led to more injustice, alienation, and poverty. At the same time the poor were declared to be the main agents. The poor should struggle together to improve their conditions.[32] The struggle for justice is not a class war in the Marxist sense. In a battle of "us against them" there can be no solidarity within a society as a whole.[33] Having lived with the "benefits" of Marxism and its views on liberty for most of his life has made the current Pope very critical of any reference to class struggles. Nonetheless, the rich should be aware that they are (in) directly responsible for the conditions of the poor. In Labourem Exercens, the Pope introduced the "indirect employer" metaphor: although we may not be direct employers who pay unjust wages, we still have a responsibility for the poverty and poor conditions many people are forced to life in.

We already paid attention to the fact that solidarity is about people, and that it implies the willingness to see the other as another "self". Pope John Paul II seems to have realized that the Church's attitude towards the poor was very paternalistic. He introduced a new concept of solidarity in which the excluded should be co-operating in order to fight injustice. Solidarity implies an element of opposition, but opposition only in service of the common good. This also means there should be room for dialogue. As the common good is no longer the sole responsibility of the state and as it can vary within intermediate associations (because of the principle of subsidiary), dialogue is needed with proponents of other conceptions of the common good and between in- and excluded. At the same time, the responsibility for society continues to pay attention to the excluded. Donal Dorr summarized the present concept of solidarity and the option for the poor as follows:

"It [the church] must be effective in solidarity with those who are powerless and voice less and must seek to empower them and give them back their voice. Catholic social thinking recognizes that the poor and powerless are God's favourites...They can no longer be seen as just the ones who are to be helped by others. They are called by God to be key agents, under God, in bringing justice and liberation in the world.[34]

In this section we looked into the origins of the concept of solidarity and the preferential option for the poor. We saw that the church moved from a very paternalistic concept towards a more balanced one. Solidarity seems to have two dimensions, a horizontal one and a semi-vertical one. Horizontal because it is necessary for the excluded to unite in order to obtain justice: the notion of person in society. And a vertical dimension, calling upon all

those people (and thus also those who execute power) who are (in)directly responsible for the exclusion, to their responsibility towards the poor and excluded. This reciprocal concept of solidarity – horizontally as well as vertically – can be understood, as Dutch Catholic thinkers in 1962 already acknowledged, from the semantic development of in solidium. In order to undertake a common task, we stand side-by-side. Our attention is directed towards undertaking the task. In this, solidarity differs from love. In love we stand face-to-face. Solidarity points towards the situation in which an individual is facing a challenge, which he cannot overcome on his own, he then may expect help from others. And when we see that a person is facing such a challenge, we are obliged to help to the best of our abilities. The first formula is about the helplessness of the person, it is an I-orientation: "I need you, so it is my right…". The second formula is focused on the duty to help. It is a you-orientation: "You need me, so it is my duty". Together they form the reciprocal concept: the "we"-formula. Together the (world) community faces questions which no man is able to solve on his own. Therefore it is our duty in solidium to face these questions.[35] Both the person and the community have responsibilities towards each other. Pope John Paul II formulated it like this in 1987:

"The exercise of solidarity within each society is valid when its members recognise one another as persons. Those who are more influential, because they have a greater share of goods and common services, should feel responsible for the weaker and be ready to share with them all they possess. Those who are weaker, for their part, in the same spirit of solidarity, should not adopt a purely passive attitude or one that is destructive of the social fabric, but, while claiming their legitimate rights, should do what they can for the good of all. The intermediate groups, in their turn, should not selfishly insist on their particular interests, but respect the interests of others."[36]

In- and exclusion are part and parcel of the concept of citizenship. We have seen that CST understands citizenship in terms of a person's relation with a community. The role of the state in defining citizenship seems less important. Important human rights can be claimed on the basis the fact of being a person rather than of being a state national. This makes it possible for citizens to defend themselves against an unjust state. The development is in line with the developments within Europe. The declaration on European Human Rights and the complementary status of European citizenship together with national citizenship point in the same direction in answering the question of how to protect citizens against injustice.[37]
In a more recent work,[38] Donal Dorr has tried to broaden the CST scope of exclusion to the "untouchables of society", those excluded on the basis of ethnic hatred, terrorism, ageism etc. CST points towards ways of giving these people a voice. One of the main points of criticism of communitaria-

nism focuses on this very point. To many observers, communitarian thinking is offering only an exit, but not a voice to minorities. In this respect, we can learn from CST that giving minorities and the excluded a voice, is part of the concept of citizenship. But there's more. Traditionally, the concept of community of CST has been a very specific one, based on the family, the village, the state and the world. Without losing this core, we should realize that there are more communities today that face the same questions of in- and exclusion. Therefore we feel that CST should, for instance, also look at (new) groups like women, the elderly, the handicapped, as well as ethnic or Internet (!) communities. This extension would fit perfectly in the notion of intermediate associations and it can offer a welcome perspective within the debate on citizenship in this new century.

The reciprocity of solidarity and the equal distribution of entitlements

The Dutch professor Kees Schuyt recently described four forces that determine the process of in- and exclusion.[39] We will describe those forces briefly here. The first force is the economic value that the excluded represent for society. The height of the value will determine how quick inclusion by society will take place. The second force is the moral approval or disapproval of society towards the excluded persons. The third force is the social cohesion within a group in order to defend the rights of that minority. More highly organized groups will be taken more seriously. The final force is the legal position the excluded have. Schuyt sees a hierarchy; on top are the economically valuable, morally admired, and highly organized people with strong legal positions. At the bottom are those who are economically non-valuable, morally suspect, unorganized, and barely legally protected.

According to Schuyt there are five strategies for approaching the excluded groups and people:[40]
1) *giving money*
2) *giving entitlements (rights)*
3) *giving political power*
4) *giving professional help, or better access to professional help*
5) *giving means to help themselves or to better their own situation*

Most governments will invest in policies two to four. Governments will seldom give the money and walk away. The fifth option, enabling, is seldom used. The focus on giving entitlements and professional help is determining the poverty debate, and, in fact, any debate on exclusion. Schuyt argues that simply giving rights and money without reciprocal obligations has proved to be unsuccessful. In this critique, he is not alone. Schuyt opts for an interes-

ting re-allocation of responsibilities of the welfare state. First, the state has a responsibility for production. Secondly, the state should hold individuals accountable for their actions. The third responsibility is to allocate commodities that are scarce. And, finally, the state should encourage solidarity with persons who have landed in desperate circumstances through no fault of their own.[41] But Schuyt is opting for a mere vertical concept of solidarity. This is again a top-down appeal. The state giving; the poor accepting. From CST we can learn that action can only be successful if the excluded are also called, to get organized to counter injustice and exclusion.[42] The reciprocal concept of solidarity calls for action on both sides. We must not assume that we know how to battle the forces of exclusion. We are not even able to set the agenda. We sometimes even have to keep in check our own desire to help:

The people who have been marginalized should be empowered to speak and act on their own behalf, so as to overcome their sense of helplessness. This means that those who have opted to be in solidarity with them often have to 'hold back'. And when they do intervene it should be to encourage or facilitate the disadvantaged people themselves in articulating their own experience and in planning realistic action.[43]

Solidarity within the concept of citizenship is a kind of emancipation. Helping people to become citizens who can hold their head up high and participate fully and with dignity in the life of their society.[44] They can hold their head up high, not because of rights and money, but because they have got there, with coaching, on their own. It starts at the level of the excluded, but it is an appeal to society as a whole. Solidarity is therefore not only about ensuring that nobody falls below a decent level of subsistence, it is also about giving people means to help themselves and to better their own situation. Seen in this way, the CST concept of solidarity is a dynamic balancing force in the process of inclusion and exclusion.

Giving people the means to help themselves presupposes the presence of rights. As we have seen, CST acknowledges basic rights as attributed to persons because of their human dignity. Rights are important because it is of no use to help people when they run the risk of losing everything again. Rights provide a framework on which the person can build his or her self-respect. This insight has been developed further in CST by emphasizing the right to work and property rights. Although hardly disputed in Western society, these two rights are very important points of debate in non-western societies.[45]

Conclusion

We started this chapter with an outline of citizenship and exclusion in an interdependent and globalizing world. Catholic Social Thought is based on the recognition of intermediate associations and therefore is not troubled by the notions of "the declining nation state" or "globalization". We started with a retrospective on the Catholic attitude towards citizenship in the 19th century and the first part of the 20th century. The gradual acceptance of modern citizenship meant for CST that attention shifted towards interpretation of good citizenship.

One of the main issues in the CST concept of good citizenship is solidarity. We found that solidarity has two dimensions. One dimension is the horizontal level between those who are excluded. A vertical responsibility consists of the haves (the rich, the indirect employers) with the poor, the excluded. CST has developed a concept of solidarity that goes beyond the traditional boundaries of respect for the individual and the obligations of society. The work of Donal Dorr made us aware that CST should broaden its definition of the poor to all those excluded from society, those who tend to fall beyond the reach of the intermediate associations.

Critics may argue that the CST interpretation of human values may not be as fully transcultural as assumed. The appeal for solidarity seems to work only in a society with harmony and consensus, a situation rarely encountered in real life. They may have a point there.

Reciprocal solidarity offers a counter balance to the process of exclusion and makes clear why a simple distribution of entitlements is not enough: because it does not encourage the excluded to overcome their helplessness. CST holds that solidarity should be achieved through a boundary-crossing citizenship in intermediate associations, by participation in common initiatives and finally not only by reading the Word but by living it as well.

Citizenship gives an opportunity and at the same time a moral obligation to look beyond the borderlines that have been drawn for political and legal reasons. With a legitimate focal point within the own nation or community, citizenship will not exempt someone from a more fundamental and ultimately prevailing responsibility as "world citizen". A non-excluding understanding of citizenship allows citizens to participate in different societal forms of co-operation, but also requires them to take action across the borders between states and associations.

Ernst M.H. Hirsch Ballin is member of the Council of State, Professor of International Law at Tilburg University and the former minister of Justice in the Netherlands (1989-1994).

Richard A.J. Steenvoorde, LL.M., is associate researcher at Globus, institute for Globalization and Sustainable Development of Tilburg University and visiting lecturer on Christian Democratic Parties and Principles for Sarum College's Certificate in Politics and Theology

Notes

1. *See* G. Mulgan, Connexity. How to live in a Connected World, (London: Chatto & Windus 1997) p. 202-203.
2. *See* B. Steenbergen, The condition of Citizenship (London: SAGE publications 1994) chapter 1.
3. Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
4. N. Kymlicka, *Return of the citizen: A survey of recent work on citizenship theory*, in Theorizing Citizenship, R. Beiner (ed.) (Albany: State University of New York Press 1995) p. 309.
5. K. Schuyt, *Aristocratisch Winkelen,* in De Volkskrant, December 22, 1999.
6. Pope Leo XIII, Diuturnum, Encyclical on the origin of civil power, (downloaded March 14, 2000) <www.Vatican.va/holy_father/> (originally issued 1881) at 12 [hereinafter Diuturnum].
7. Diuturnum, at 16.
8. Pope Leo XIII (1890), Sapientiae Christiana, Encyclical on Christians as Citizens, (downloaded March 14, 2000) www.Vatican.va/holy_father/ (originally issued 1890) at 6 [hereinafter Sapientiae Christiane].
9. Sapientiae Christiane, at 27.
10. Sapientiae Christiane, at 7.
11. Of course, other writers like H. Lubac, J. Murray, and R. Guardini have played a substantial part as well.
12. J. Maritain, Man and the State (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1951, edition used 1971) [hereinafter Man and the State].
13. Man and the State, p. 12.
14. Man and the State, p. 13.
15. *Quoting* St. Thomas' *Sum. Theol, I, 30, 1, ad 4,* in Maritain, *The Person and the Common Good* (1947), in The Social and Political Philosophy of Jacques Maritain. Selected Readings, J.W. Evans, L.R. Ward (eds.) (London: Geoffrey Bless 1956) at 105.
16. Catechism of the Catholic Church no. 1954-1955, edition used: Katechismus van de Katholieke Kerk (Baarn: Gooi & Sticht 1995) [hereinafter The Catechism]
17. *For a more detailed explanation see* A.M. Alting von Geusau, Keren de kansen? Op weg naar een nieuw millennium, (Tilburg: Tilburg University Press 1998) p. 154- 158.

18. The Catechism, no. 1906-1909.
19. Man and the State, p. 24.
20. Economic justice for all : catholic social teaching and the U.S. economy, (Washington: NC News Service 1986).
21. A. Etzioni, The Active Society, A Theory of Societal and Political Processes (London/New York 1968/1971).
22. Man and the State, p. 4.
23. Dignitatis Humanae *in* Constituties en Decreten van het 2e Vaticaans Concilie (Baarn: Stichting Ark 1965, edition used 1995) at 2.
24. P. Vallely, *Towards a new politics: Catholic Social Teaching in a pluralist society, in* The New Politics. Catholic Social Teaching for the Twenty-first Century, P. Vallely (ed.) (London: SCM Press. 1999) p. 160.
25. A. van Luyn, *Recht doen om gerechtigheid, in* Ontmoetingen van Geloof en Wereld. Perspectieven op Katholieke Levensbeschouwing, I.N. Bulhof, W.F.C.M Derkse, P.A. van Gennip, S.J.M. Waanders (eds.) (Best: Damon 1999) p. 177.
26. C. Wolfe, *Subsidiary: The "other" ground of limited government Catholicism, in* Liberalism, and Communitarianism. The Catholic Intellectual Tradition and the Moral Foundations of Democracy, K. Grasso, G.V. Bradley, R.P. Hunt (eds.) (Lanham: Rowman & Litlefield publishers, Inc. 1995) p. 81 and further.
27. Catholic Bishops' Conference of England and Wales, The common Good and the Catholic Church's Social Teaching (Manchester: Gabriel Communications Ltd. 1996) at 14.
28. L. Oeing-Hanhoff, *Freiheit und Solidarität, in* Personale Freiheit und Pluralistische Gesellschaft, G. Pöltner (edt.) (Wien: Herder 1981) p. 9. [hereinafter: Freiheit und Solidarität]
29. D. Dorr, Option for the Poor. A Hundred Years of Catholic Social Teaching (New York: Orbis Books 1992) p. 59 [hereinafter: Option for the Poor].
30. The attitude that can be found in the second section of this chapter.
31. The bishops were heavily critized by the affluent of the societies. They no longer provided tuition for them and started schools in the poor areas. *See* Option for the Poor, p. 226.
32. Option for the Poor, p.281.
33. Freiheit und Solidarität, p.11.
34. Option for the Poor, p. 378.
35. A. Ponsioen (edt), Welvaart, Welzijn & Geluk. Een Katholiek Uitzicht op de Nederlandse Samenleving, (Hilverum: Uitgeverij Paul Brand B.V. 1962) p. 112.
36. Pope John-Paul II, Encyclical Sollicitudo Rei Socialis (Oegstgeest: Stichting R.K. Voorlichting 1987 -dutch edition) at 39.
37. The protection against an unjust state might be the reason of Pope Leo XIII's rejection of unilateral citizenship. However historical circumstances and the church's interests seem to have played a more dominant role.

38. D. Dorr, *Can anything good come from Nazareth? Option for the poor revisited, in* Whose Ethics? Which Priorities? Catholic Social Thought in Transition, a Seminar in Cambridge (Cambridge: Von Hügelinstitute 1999).

39. K. Schuyt, *Aristocratisch Winkelen,* De Volkskrant, December 22, 1999.

40. K. Schuyt, *The sharing of Risks and the Risks of sharing: Solidarity and Social Justice in the Welfare State, in* Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. An International Forum (1998), vol. 1, no. 3, p. 307. [hereinafter: The Sharing of Risks]. The Sharing of Risks, p. 309-310.

41. An attitude that can be explained by the experiences of missionary workers

42. in the 1960's and which nowadays has become common good for all invol- ved in working in the developing countries. D. Dorr, *Can anything good come from Nazareth. Op*tion for the poor revisited

43. in: Whose Ethics? Which Priorities ? Catholic Social Thought in Transi-tion, a Seminar in Cambridge (Cambridge: Von Hügelinstitute 1999) p.4. *Compare* J. Waldron, Liberal Rights, Collected Papers 1981 – 1991 (Cambridge:

44. Cambridge University Press 1993). *See:* Pope John Paul II, Encyclical Centimus Anno (1991), *also* Option for the

45. Poor p. 341-342.

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Europe, yesterday's dream or tomorrow's?

Mr. J.J.A.M. van Gennip

The Christian Democrats have lost their monopoly on Europe. After three generations their ideals have been struck down in institutions. What is now the added value of the pioneers of Europe, the Christian Democrats, in the European elections on June 10? What Europe as yet misses, is a heart. The Christian Democratic candidates for parliament must radiate an atmosphere, warmth and a feeling of mandate. They do not come from Brussels. They come from the region and in that capacity are in Brussels. Towards a new European identity, past the chilliness.

It's all in the game: a year ago Chancellor Schröder still pleaded for a postponement of the arrival of the Euro, and many in his party were opposed to the introduction of the Euro anyway. And who else expressed skepticism about this common currency? Yes, certainly, the Dutch member of the European Commission, Bolkestein. We hear nothing more of his charivari concerning Europe these days. Now that centre-left, green-left and centre liberals carry clear joint responsibility in Europe for a European engagement in the Balkan: now that Van Mierlo has made an effort to answer to the Euro skepticism of the former liberal leader with a clear pro-European course and now that others than the Christian Democrats from the Netherlands to Berlin and to London also confess to Europe, Christian Democracy no longer has the monopoly on the European unification process. The important argument with the European elections – that Europe is only in safe hands with the Christian Democrats – is thereby for the first time put into perspective. Even stronger: the blazon of the European Christian Democrats is not spotless with such strange bedfellows as the Tories. Another handicap with these elections is the silting up of the Europe-engagement in such matters as competencies, transparency, the pace and the modalities of the expansion, the financial regime, the compensation of representatives. A political movement that has to rely on, as appeared in the Provincial States election, the motivation of its own supporters to go to the voting booth, will experience difficulties in these areas.

No, for some of our supporters Europe has even become a threat, a broken promise. The reform of the Common Agricultural Policy can be defended on its merits, but it causes investments based on earlier expectations to evaporate and it darkens the future perspectives of tens of thousands of farmers. The temporariness announced by everyone of the agreement of Berlin makes this future even more uncertain, while – however necessary – both the accession of Central European countries with their low agricultural costs, as well as the next coming world trade rounds and the – also not unjust – stricter European environmental approach will also face our farmers and market

118

gardeners. For others Europe is a threat with its one-sided emphasis on the economic, a certain vision of capitalism, a Brussels of lobbyists. It is opposite matters such as idealistic media, opposite technology steered by values and cooperatives aimed at more than free competition. Others again ask whether it is wise to put the nation state into perspective. It made The Economist expect that these feelings, this countermovement, would form the core of a reviving appreciation for the national identity, which would especially find root in a number of conservative and Christian Democratic parties!

What was a dream yesterday

We know the images of the burned barriers: the youths, who had a dream in the second half of the forties: never again war, no new dictatorship, security of food. To this extent a Europe without national borders was necessary, a Europe of reconciliation, of peace, free and without hunger.
The dream did not come out of nowhere: from the trenches of the First World War the prophets had already crawled: Count Coudenhove-Calergi, Christian Democrats such as Konrad Adenauer, Don Luigi Sturzo and Paul van Zeeland and industrialists. Morris Tabaksblatt tells, in his speech for the Chamber of Commerce of The Hague and surroundings in January of this year, the story of S.J. van den Bergh, who already said seventy years ago that he envies his grandchildren, who will experience the European unification. Too little and too late perhaps to avoid the next butchering, but sufficient to let others again dream on, and... act. From the end of the Second World War onwards, Pope Pius XII will not stop pleading for and stimulating the creation of the European unity, not in vague terms, but concretely. Thus, half a century ago, he already speaks about the necessity of a European monetary union. The spirits are ripe: the combination of thinkers, statesmen and the youths burning the barriers make a dream into an action plan, and into the beginning of reality. A different politics is possible, that of reconciliation between the nations; a bridge can be built between capital and labour, and thus no unavoidability of the class struggle; there is something such as an elementary right for food. It was a dream and an action plan, which captured interest for two and a half generations and which drove many into politics: a politics of content, visions and ideals. Those from the nineteenth century, who lost their youth in the trenches of Verdun and Ieper, Schuman, De Gaspari, Julius Raab and Adenauer: the generation of the interbellum: a Werner, Tindemans, Schmelzer, Delors and then later heirs such as Kohl and Martens, Lubbers and Prodi. It was a dream of almost three generations that was a unique historic project in the

hands of Christian Democrats for half a century. 'There was once a place like Camelot'. Certainly, later the grandchildren of the pioneers could say: our grandparents and great-grandparents, they were the founders of that Europe, that would bring reconciliation, peace, freedom and prosperity.

Struck down in institutions

The dream became one of the great projects of the second half of this century. It took shape in the form of institutions. The fifties were first and foremost the years of creating the primary conditions to make war in Europe impossible. If the two main ingredients for war were taken away from national sovereignty, war would be impossible: the European Community of Coal and Steel (ECCS). A clear ideal, symbol and instrument. The sixties would show the building up of institutions that would on the foundations of the reconciliation, as it was embodied in the ECCS, guarantee Europe freedom and prosperity. They are the years of construction of the European Economic Community, but not to forget also the years of the foundation of an institution, that really had to and could guarantee that hunger could be scrapped from the European vocabulary and be replaced by food certainty: the Common Agricultural Policy. Institutions and provisions that stood for ideals and clear political choices. This becomes less in the seventies, when the effects of everything that has been decided will change the countenance of Europe, nations growing towards each other. The dream of Europe is translated into the prices of butter, cheese and eggs, of coarse economic power politics, and of two steps forward and one step back. But still years in which the Euro sclerosis was overcome, the European Economic Community became an irreversible reality, with its attractiveness to outsiders, with its desire for democracy translated into direct elections. In the eighties it appears that the former chairman of the European Commission Hallstein will be right: the economic cooperation and integration was not a final goal, but a precondition for political integration. They became the years of the European Communities: more than economic, but still caught in the imbalance between the economic and the other areas of necessary cooperation and integration. The nineties, the years of the Union, bring the efforts to come to a broader and deeper integration in a new institutional phase. But we then also see the new tensions, which sometimes cruelly disrupt the dream. Certainly: the agreements to come to a monetary union have as an enormous side effect, that all participating governments get an indispensable crank to boost the engine of their economy, to harness the inheritance of decennia of overspending and to become an island of financial stability in a chaotic international financial landscape. But in all areas it is becoming

more clear, that the questions of the 21st century lie in more areas than that of the economic and monetary, and that European integration is also necessary for that: from the combating of crime to the foreign security policy, from the environmental problems to the asylum policy, from social issues to steering technology, and especially the individuality of our society and culture. It is about a different Europe and it is about the whole of Europe. The current Euro skepticism is not inspired by doubt over the question whether integration is necessary, but by doubt whether it isn't stranded in yesterday's agenda. The next decennium, the next century does not call for a Europe of abbreviations, from ECCS to EU, it calls for no less than a new political identity, and this identity only has one name: Europe!

A nightmare?

The real problem with Europe is that the debate has led to an agenda about the instrument and then especially as negative symbols: too high compensations and too large buildings, too detailed regulation and too much talking. We no longer hear what it actually started for. Coinciding developments have 'normalized' Europe with all accompanying peripheral phenomena. The discussion in the last decennium has especially been about competencies: from the parliament to the different areas of interest. What entrepreneurs notice of this, is that it was about standardizations, regulations, things that are no longer allowed or the other way around. This also brought a culture of influencing along with it, of a lobbyism comparable to the Washington corridors. A system of subsidy grants, that, even if it is transparent on paper, is inimitable: how come the flourishing Dutch province Flevoland is an underdeveloped area? How so the principle of registration and tendering when it concerns volunteer work and social consciousness in Central and Eastern Europe? Squabbling about compensations and salaries. Twenty years ago I pleaded for soberness, exactly because the striving for European unification must remain rooted in a breeding ground of idealism. There has been no realization of the factual recognition of European political parties, despite all attempts, despite my pleas for a provision in the Treaty of Maastricht. Why not? The foundation of real European political parties could have pulled the European ideal out of the ghetto of those twenty thousand civil servants, members of parliament, lobbyists and make a European 'bürgernatie'. The real democratic deficit is, that the parties have been made dependent on the Parliament: for subsidies, for meeting facilities, for their publications and studies, for the formation of opinions, and not the other way around! There is still this over accentuation of the economic and the commercial. Because of this research subsidies, scho-

larships, allocation procedures are over influenced by economic considerations and models.

A shielding of the domain of the non-commercial from the market is not to be expected from this Europe: in media policy, with pricing systems, the recognition of the individuality of cooperatives and in creating room for nonprofit institutions. Besides generous development aid there is also the unintended, but therefore not less real, effect of market disruption through the dumping of remainders and through restrictions of all sorts of natures. The policy, where aid and trade contest each other, is inconsistent. The European development aid may have a financial added value, but, as the Report about 'The Future of the North South Relations' of the Forward Studies Unit of the Commission wrote itself, it has not developed its own identity and added value in its policy: instead of coordinating and finding its own niches, Europe has simply become the next donor. And, according to many reports, a bad donor as well. With regard to the multilateral institutions, from the United Nations to UNESCO, who are screaming for a European input, there is often either a cacophony or a silence. And this while there are many global challenges. Many have the feeling that Brussels has simply become an extra administrative layer, because the growing degree of regulations and exercising of power has not gone paired with a proportional reduction of this at the 'lower' administrative bodies. But the most important is, that Europe doesn't seem to have a heart: Brussels is not a reference point in the European culture. It has remained an appendix in the world of the media, the arts, the academic discourse and even in the world of the development of political ideas. Few would want the creation of a European monism. But the fact that Brussels is not even a platform for the real debate on the future of society, is worrying.

Identification and proximity

The discussion about the instruments urgently needs to be replaced by the debate about what kind of society we actually want in Europe. What did it all start about again?

Asking this question, is the key for a recognizable, own Christian Democratic sound. In this way we can also escape from the overtaking maneuver of the 'Third Way' supporters, who are now propagating ninety percent of what was once our own body of thought as their own invention in the embrace of the 'neue Mitte'. In that way we can also escape from that awful trap, that the Christian Democratic identity is especially an 'anti' attitude: first against the communists, now against the social democrats. What story do we have for the grandchildren of those who burned the barriers?

What is the pendent of the demand for reconciliation, peace, freedom and no hunger, after 1957, after 1989? What are the key words of the dream that we, in the words of the Luxembourgian prime minister Jean Claude Juncker, have to give back to the new generation? The words are not final, but the main theme is already there: prosperity, participation, culture, security and still peace. But herein also lie the elements of that individual answer of the Christian Democrats, further than the third way, relevant for the 21st century.

First a prosperity, that is stable for the future

Then it is about work in the whole of Europe, now and in twenty years: to be able to handle globalization. Then it is about distributed prosperity: about a decent level of social security and about growth, which is especially qualitative and sustainable.

It is about notions such as participation, recovery of responsibility, corporative economy and horizontal subsidiary; it is about the translation of the principle 'let nobody be lost', and about the position of the nonprofit sector in the economy; a systematic and now and then radical focus on the future.

Then a society, that is accommodating

The rejection in the whole of Europe of the society as a jungle and the desires to be at home somewhere, to belong somewhere, means a re-appreciation of the region and of the regional community. It also means a clear shift of accent to the local community (whereby all these large-scale redivisions have become a phenomena of the 20th century instead of the next). It means re-appreciation of club life and 'last but not least' an employment system, which stimulates the combination of care and work, not the division, nor the elimination of one of these two. It means a systematic reassessment of the principle of subsidiary. A contemporary family policy: frameworks that create conditions for keeping together society; acknowledgement of the meaning of the social capital.

A culture of tradition and vitality

The area of culture, say individual European civilization, is probably the most distinguishing and characterizing domain of Christian Democracy, now that the Third Way supporters have converted to so many of our classical socio-economic and political views. It is about diverse, current and longtem matters such as: The choice for high-quality technology, but within a clear framework aimed at humanity and the order of the Creation. Man in the driver's seat of (bio)technology and not the other way around. An own demarcation line between the commercial and the non-commercial. An

own clear place and protection of institutions of the transfer of values, from family to education bound by identity. An own statue for churches and an acknowledgement of them as indispensable discussion partners of the government. Stimulation of forms of participatory art and culture. A systematic recognition policy with regard to regions, such as an individual architecture, which can also refer to the past, promotion or regional and national languages and expressions of culture, for example in the media, sufficient means for the care of monuments and cultural traditions. The right to one's own language and education of 'geographic' minorities, such as Hungarians in Slovakia and Rumanians, Germans in Poland, but with respect for the national unities. Integration of ethnic minorities in a balance of multiformity and naturalization. Attention for the spiritual and mental ecology in media and publications. The worthiness of protection of the human life in all phases as principle for care and legislation. Preservation of the Sunday as day for reflection, family, recreation, meeting. Stimulation of a new balance between the city, the green space, nature and the landscape. A policy that has the intrinsic value of the countryside, nature and landscape as basic principle, and not a derivative of city interests. It is not about enforcing certain values and cultural preferences. It is about nothing less than granting freedom, also to future generations, to choose for oneself what elements of the European legacy one wishes to adopt. The lack of such a clear protection of that legacy is throwing away the key of the safe in which the bonds lie, with which future generations can acquire an own European culture and civilization in their own way.

Security by conviction

124

Relevance of Europe for the citizens is at this moment a clear connection between a further integration and an improved combating of crime. A range of measures is needed for this, with as focus and symbol a strengthened Europol. But this is not enough: it is also about matters such as coordinated combating of corruption, knowing that so much black and grey money is circulating, that keeping the government and society 'pure' will become a new and gigantic assignment. It is about prevention and fighting the use of drugs. But what is truly characteristic of a Christian Democratic security approach is our view, that a safer society will only come about, if the citizens abide by the laws and regulations out of their own, inner conviction. A government can be helpful in this respect, but in the end security is a product of a society and a culture. Thus acknowledgement of, call it, transcendent values, a cohesive system of views, an internalization of this with individuals, but also a different balance between freedom-sociability-responsibi-

lity. And finally a systematic care for the public realm, the physical and the medial. A 'plaza culture' of meeting, neatness and respect: that is the individual, rich European pendant of 'fixing broken windows'.

Investing in peace

Where the previous points all had to do with the new internal identity of Europe, the call through the centuries of 'give peace' will also not grow silent in the coming decennia. Peace has now become the fruit of especially proactive policy, of investing and of the acknowledgement that chaos, poverty, environmental pollution and the violation of human rights, propagate in conflicts, violence and war. Europe needs the world for its own development in peace and security. The world needs Europe for a development in prosperity and stability. The external identity of Europe, its responsibility for worldwide arrangement, must be one of the core issues with Christian Democrats, also at times when it may score low in the opinion polls. The stability, the economic power, the culture, yes even – 'mark my words' – the food production are indispensable for the development of a stable world. And this means now, today, a common asylum policy, also preventive, also through common reception in the region of conflicts or natural disasters. It means a strengthening of the multilateralism, through engagement, through coordinated action, through Europe acting with one voice. External identity is also willing to pay the price to prevent violence and war, or where necessary to punish. It means accepting joint responsibility for a worldwide preservation of the environment. And especially the acknowledgment, essential for our conviction, that every human being has the right to a decent life, also outside of Europe.

Giving a new generation back its dream. That is the dream of quality, future stability, beauty, respect for the weak and for tradition, stimulation of the individuality and identification, the multiformity and the solidarity. Consciously working on a humane society. That is the dream of tomorrow, which needs to pull Europe out of the instrumental debate. What did it all start with again?

Mr. J.J.A.M. van Gennip is a member of the Netherlands' Senat.

Since when is man steward?

Drs. J.J. Boersema

All Christian parties (CDA, SGP, RPF and GPV) make use of the term stewardship in the context of their environmental politics. That the Creation was given to man under his supervision and that man thereby needs to act as a steward, cannot however be regarded as biblical. Nevertheless there are usable biblical principles focused on the relation man-nature which can lay the foundation under a general nature and environmental ethics.

"The biblical stewardship forms the heart of Christian environmental politics" says the party program of the RPF. Whoever consults the party programs of the CDA, GPV and SGP, will endorse this statement (see table below). The term stewardship thereby functions as a shibboleth: all Christian parties make use of it and the term is lacking with the other parties.[1]

The programs make clear that the term is used to typify the position of man in reality. The stewardship can be conceived as a view of mankind, which functions within a Biblical anthropology.

In this article I would first like to answer the question whether for such a view of mankind one can justly make an appeal to the Bible. Subsequently I will discuss the consequences of the negative answer to that question for a Christian inspired environmental problem. I will however start with some general remarks about the importance of a view of mankind in dealing with the environmental problem.

View of mankind important

Mankind maintains an intensive relation with his natural environment. This 'metabolism' with the environment has not remained without consequences, especially for this environment. Mankind has drastically changed the 'countenance of the earth'. He was thereby already confronted with the negative (side)effects of his actions at an early stage: becoming brackish, depletion, erosion and desert formation.[2] Also the extermination of plants and animal species has a long history, which according to some goes back to the Pleistocene (> 10,000 B.C.).[3] Of a later date, but still centuries old, is the local pollution of soil, water and air with toxic substances and substances in damaging quantities. That we can still speak about a modern problem despite this long history firstly has to do with the gigantic dimensions that this influence on the environment has taken on in our time and also the strongly increased knowledge of it. At least just as important is that it is increasingly seen as a problem, with all the variations that there can be in the actual formulation of the problem. This remarkable turn cannot be explained by the fact that in the past people were blind to the disadvanta-

ges, because for the most evident forms of environmental pollution it applies that the protest against it is almost as old as the pollution itself.[4] This change in thinking has more to do with the fact that people, more than in the past, see a coherence between all these different environmental problems, including the degradation of nature, and no longer classifies them under the category avoidable side-effects of our social development.[5] In the perception of many the environmental problems are inherent to this development and it is thus this development itself that is under discussion or should be. In this discussion the relationship between environment and society is described by making use of the key terms sustainability and (environmental) quality.

Of these two, the term quality has been described the least detailed. In government memorandums it especially refers to certain requirements that are made of products or of environmental compartments, such as soil, water and air. Others place the interaction between society and environment in a broader perspective with the term quality, namely that of livability or welfare for the people and that of the intrinsic (= non-instrumental or individual) value of the environment or parts of it.[6] This broad interpretation of environmental quality thus brings us closer to the more general concept 'quality of existence'. This broad description, which in my opinion deserves preference, also asks the intriguing and most important question whether the realization and/or maintenance of quality can always be unified with the other goal: sustainability. The requirements we make for the quality of our existence, threaten to exceed the capacity of this earth. The material through-put is much too high and the way in which we make use of the natural resources is often very inefficient.[7] One should thereby not only think of obvious matters such as production and consumption. Also when it concerns matters that appear immaterial such as democracy and human rights, the realization of quality is not without costs: it makes a claim on finite resources. Peacekeeping operations also cost material and fossil fuels. On the other hand we think that sustainability cannot be realized by passing the costs onto third parties, onto future generations, onto people living elsewhere or onto nature. It requires little knowledge to see that the current practices still mostly consist of such processes of passing it on. Sustainability can thus only be realized by drastically (re)considering the concept of quality. We are in fact searching for an interpretation of the concept of quality that is sustainable.

For an interpretation of such a concept of 'quality', it is necessary that man forms an image of his own role and meaning in the midst of his environ-

ment. We have hereby come to the philosophical/anthropological territory, because for this image the term cosmology seems fitting to me. Cosmologies can be considered as cognitive and mental representations through which people (and cultures) can succeed with more or less success, to survive and to give life sense and meaning.[8] The term contains the whole of views regarding reality, the forces that are active in it, and the individual role of man in it.[9] Löwith and along his tracks Wildiers regard three quantities of essential importance in a cosmology, namely God, man and the world.[10] These quantities form the triangle which forms the interpretation framework for reality. An interesting observation of cultural anthropologists in this respect is that these quantities, the actors in the triangle, can be found in almost all cultures, but that the way in which people make a representation of the way it works and the mutual relations between them differs. This last both applies within as well as between cultures.[11] The relation of man with his natural environment is closely related to the image that man has of himself.

Formulated and described in this way, the environmental problem touches the foundations of every culture. It is therefore praiseworthy that in their party programs the Christian parties explicitly speak out about the view of mankind and in fact about what is called cosmology here.
The CDA derives the beacons for its political conviction from the Word of God: public justice, spread responsibility, solidarity and stewardship. And there is the call for stewardship, for the care for the environment. We are not free to use the natural environment as we wish. The creation has been entrusted to us to till on and to keep for future generations. The Creator has placed the earth under the care of people. They must therefore handle the earth carefully, such that not only the current but also future generations can live on it. This means that people, as stewards, are responsible for the entirety of the creation.

Man as steward?

In the recent environmental debate the term steward(ship) is rightly associated with the Christian political parties. But however characteristic the term may be for the parties mentioned, this does not say that we are dealing with a Biblical term. The use of it in the four party programs does suggest this. The argumentation for this has the following general structure:
1. The world is seen as God's creation.
2. The creation has been entrusted to man.

3. With this entrustment, man must act as a steward.

The first point can be seen as a religious principle, which does not need any further argumentation as such. This is different for the second point. One can ask oneself whether this statement has been derived from the Bible, can be reduced to the Bible or otherwise is in line with the Biblical body of thought. It speaks for itself to first search in both stories of the Creation to find support for the statement. In the party programs an indirect reference is made to the second story of the Creation (Genesis 2:4 – 3:24). This is done through the use of the words 'build and keep' (RPF, SGP), 'till and keep' (CDA) and the modern alternative 'till and develop' (GPV).[12] We find both words in 2:15, where we read that man was placed in the garden of Eden by God "to till it and keep it". The assignment thus does not concern 'the earth' but is restricted to the garden in this story. It is possible that the garden must be viewed as pars pro toto and represents the whole earth. But then the question remains what we must understand by 'till and keep'. We do not know much about the activities of man in the garden of Eden, but we do know that man was driven out of this garden and that the relation with the earth and the environment drastically changed (3:17-19). The assignment is not repeated anywhere else. The earth will be stubborn with the attempts of man to harvest his daily bread on it. We can thus not automatically assume that also outside of the garden "creation was entrusted to man" on the basis of this second story of the Creation. In the first story of the Creation (1:1 – 2:4) both texts appear about the ruling over the animals and the subjecting of the earth (26, 28). This Dominium Terrae passage has been the subject of exegesis for centuries.[13] Whatever the explanation may be, what is definite is that in the text there is a description of the behavior of man with respect to the Creation. It does not say that the Creation is entrusted to man. The only things that are explicitly given to man in this story are the seed-bearing crops and all fruit trees; both are given to serve as food for man (1:29). The conclusion must thus be that both stories of the Creation offer no basis for the statement mentioned under point two.

What about the other parts of the Bible? Do they offer any clues? Did the situation not change after the flood?
In Genesis 9, after the flood, the vegetarian food supply of man is abandoned. "Every moving thing that lives shall be food for you; and as I gave you the green plants, I give you everything" (9:3). The difference with the first story of the Creation is evident, but it goes too far to speak of 'entrusting the creation' in this context. The relation man-creation as it appears in this passage, is on the one hand more limited because it is about the food supply

and on the other hand tougher, because it speaks of 'fear and fright' of man with the animals. In the context of this article all the other information from the Old and the New Testament cannot be discussed, for this I refer to the literature.[14] From that it also appears that a clear distinction must be made between the 'wild' nature and the 'domesticated' nature. For the association with the domesticated nature rules are given. The wild nature has a double-faced head: it enforces respect and instills fear, it can be both a blessing and a punishment. My conclusion is that also in the rest of the Bible no support can be found for the thought that man was entrusted with the creation. Although this in fact leaves the third statement dangling in the air, we still want to discuss it to see if stewardship is a usable concept for the attitude of man with regard to (parts of) nature.
Is the term typical for a caring attitude of man with regard to the natural environment based on the bible?

Unfortunately this search also seems to end as a disappointment. The word steward is lacking in the Dutch translation of the Old Testament and not only the word: the (modern) concept is also missing. Nowhere in the man-nature relationship is the position of man characterized with the term steward(ship). In English translations we find the word steward as a translation for a man who is housemaster or housekeeper.[15] We do find the word steward in the Dutch Bible translations of the New Testament, but then again not in connection with nature.[16] This is because in the Bible man is not seen as steward of nature. There is a moral tie with the domesticated nature and for the association with that nature rules are given. These rules go very far, the agricultural pets and the cultivated land even share in the rhythm of the Sabbath. The rest of nature, and that was the largest part in Biblical times, is not entrusted to man. Man can admire this nature, he can protect himself from the influences of that nature and he can even be scared of it, but nowhere is he appointed as steward over that nature. Man is also not appointed as the steward over the domesticated nature. In the Bible the steward is often someone who deals with the money and the expression 'stewardship economy' can be called a pleonasm against this background.

The image of the wise and sensible steward who properly manages the money and the goods of his master, has only been applied to the 'goods from nature' much later in history. It was presumably the seventeenth century English lawyer Sir Matthew Hale who was the first. In a much quoted passage he used the terms *viceroy*, *steward* and *bailiff*.[17] From the quote and especially from the explanation it becomes clear that we are rather far away from the modern use of the term with Hale. The idea of man as steward fits

with the image of the inhabited earth as garden and with the image of nature that has to be developed by man.[18] It also implied a firm acting of man against the unpleasant sides of the 'wild' nature: the cruel animals and the surplus of useless crops. This ideal of a conservationist, sweet and tame garden-nature has always been present in the western tradition. It is clearly inspired by the second story of the Creation and the desire for the return to the heavenly situation. But similar ideals can also be found with Greek philosophers.[19]

On the one hand this stewardship philosophy has over the past centuries led to much being done about the care of the landscape and about a better position of certain animals.[20] On the other hand it has also led to the fact that much of the wild nature, that we would now want to preserve, has disappeared as a result of active human intervenience.[21]

I would like to make the following conclusions on the basis of the above consideration:

1. The thought that the earth was entrusted to the care of man, cannot be marked as Biblical.

2. The image of man as steward over the creation, or over parts of the creation, cannot be found in the Bible.

3. The image of man as steward over the creation appears in the seventeenth century, but was at that time interpreted in a way that strongly differs from the meaning that is given to it today.

Consequences

What does this mean for environmental politics inspired by Christianity? Let me first start with a remark to put matters into perspective. It is of course not forbidden to redefine and to use a term that does not appear in the Bible as such and was introduced in history in a certain way. The concept of stewardship works well as a sign of recognition and as a Christian political party you may want to be very careful with such a clear shibboleth. From a programmatic point of view I could not point out a second. I do however think that the argumentation with it should remain pure. The reasoning that is now followed in the programs, does not seem kosher to me.

On a positive note I would like to bring forward the following. For that matter it does not concern a concrete environmental program, but points that seem usable to me as biblical principles. They are focused on the relation man-nature.

1. The earth is not only there for man and man is not the final goal of the creation. In the Bible nature has an 'individual value', a value that is not derived from the meaning of nature for man. The fact that in the Old

Testament (Genesis 9; Hosea 2) a pact is made by God with the animals is unique. We find this neither with the Umwelt of Israël, nor with the Greeks. From the story of the Creation and the story of the flood it can be concluded that God's care goes out to life in all its diversity. This idea can also be read elsewhere.[22] This can lay a foundation under a general nature and environmental ethics. For a justification of such an ethics no appeal needs to be made to a certain characteristic of an animal or plant, like the possession of a logos(Greek philosophy, the Church Fathers, Thomas of Aquinas) or the ability to suffer (Utilitarianists, Jeremy Bentham). Such an ethics takes the right to exist of non-human species as a principle and considers the extinction of them through human actions unacceptable.

2. The differentiation in the term nature that appears in the Bible and the distinction that is thereby made between domesticated and 'wild' nature can serve as a principle for a further elabouration of that general ethics. The association with and the responsibility for nature must thereby be further arranged. The nature controlled by man deserves its moral care. Many texts from the Bible, which are brought forward in the contemporary environmental debate as animal- and nature friendly, relate to that domesticated nature.[23] It is evident that in today's world this nature influenced by man is more sizeable that it was 2000 years ago. This means that the relevance of the rules that are given for our attitude towards that nature, has increased considerably. The Sabbath rhythm for example gives the possibility of restoration for man, land and animal. The meaning of this rhythm for our economic and social life is big and is insufficiently realized. Animals cannot become a means of production and the taking of an individual life is not something that goes without saying. The quality of the animal and plant life is a value in itself. The ways in which plants and animals are exploited in our modern society, is at odds with these notions.

3. With regard to the 'wild' nature man must take a reserved position. There is no basis in the Bible for the general statement that the earth was entrusted to the care of man. Protection against threatening dangers from nature or by forces of nature of course remains necessary and permitted, but for large parts of the other the reverse would sooner apply: nature must be protected against man. Our knowledge of complex systems is however limited and perhaps the human understanding is fundamentally limited. On this point we must also admit that there is less new than was long thought: the fundamental limits to the human understanding were already known to Job. And not only to Job: this realization can also be found in antique philosophy.[24] In many cases it would thus be better if we used the prin-

ciple of precaution. Safeguarding nature against harmful influences through human actions and where possible leaving it alone, would be very wise strategies. Knowledge of important resources of our cultures makes it possible to avoid the Scylla of the hubris and the Charybdis of dejection in the search for solutions.[25]

4. With the use of nature a goal-means consideration should be made. The pace at which man is currently bringing nature under his influence and the claim that man is making on that nature, are much too high. That high pressure on nature and the environment can only partly be explained and justified by the necessity to fulfill the primary necessities of a growing world population. Man does not have an automatic right of use of nature and its products.[26] Human values do not weigh more in that consideration because they are the values of humans.

1. The quality of the human existence will increasingly have to be derived from the quality of the non-human creation and not from the degree in which the non-human creation supplies us with material goods and services. This means, in short, that our norms and values system should become more 'green', not as a sauce over it, but from within. The position of nature will thereby change: it is no longer a source of prosperity but also a source of knowledge and inspiration and a touchstone for the level of civilization of a society. Nature cannot become a norm for a Christian but the quality of our norms can be told from our association with the creation.

Drs. J.J. Boersema has been working at the Ministry of Housing, Regional Development and the Environment since 1994, first as secretary of the Council for Environmental Protection and from January 1 1997 as project director. He is also associated with the Centre for Environmentology of the SU University Limburg. He obtained his Ph.D. with an environmental/theological thesis.

Notes

1. I call the four parties mentioned 'Christian' because they explicitly refer to the source of Christian thinking in their programs: the Bible.
2. For good overviews see: W.L. Thomas (1956), D.J. Hughes (1975), C. Ponting (1990, 1991), I.G. Simmons (1990; 1993).
3. Martin P.S. & H.E. Wright Jr. (eds) 1967; L. van Valen (1969); Martin P.S. (1973) and V.L. Smith (1975).
4. I use the term environmental pollution, because the protests in past times were mostly related to the health threatening forms of environmental decay that were a nuisance to people. Against all types of damage to nature and the extermination of animals that were deemed harmful there was much less protest against this before the nineteenth century.
5. C. Ponting (1990 and 1991) goes a step further. He deems the irresponsible association with the natural resources the most important reason for the disappearance of many past civilizations. His most powerful paradigm is Easter Island, where between approximately 1200 and 1700 a civilization was lost because of over-exploitation of the natural resources.
6. J.B. Opschoor & S.W.F. van de Ploeg in CLTM (1990), 101-103; J.J. Boersema (1993).
7. To this end see a.o. E.U. von Weizsäcker, A.B. Lovins & L. Hunter Lovins (1995), Faktor Vier. Doppelter Wohlstand – Halbierter Naturverbrauch. Droemer Knaur, Munich.
8. Cf. on this point the function of religion as described by W. Burkert in his Religion and the Creation of the Sacred (Harvard University Press, 1996).
9. See a.o. N.S. Hetherinton (Ed.) (1993), Cosmology. Historical, Literary, Philosophical, Religious, and Scientific Perspectives. Garland, New York; R.W. Lovin & F.E. Reynolds (Eds.) (1985), Cosmogony and Ethical Order. Chicago University Press, Chicago.
10. K. Löwith (1967) and M. Wildiers (1988). The term God needs to be regarded in its broadest sense here. All supernatural quantities are included in it.
11. C.J. Glacken (1967).
12. In circles of the GPV much use has also been made of the combination 'build and preserve' in the past, amongst others as the title of a study about the environmental problem of the Groen van Prinsterer foundation from 1974. The active alternative chosen now is typical for the development of the GPV.
13. For a recent overview see: H.J. van Soest (1996). My own view can be found in: J.J. Boersema (1997, chapter 2).
14. For example to the excellent booklet of C. Houtman (1984), Wereld en tegen-wereld, mens en milieu in de bijbel. Ten have, Baarn.
15. Genesis 4316, 19 and Genesis 441,4. In these texts it literally says: 'a man

above' or 'a man that stands above'. Three other Hebrew words, all also in the context of housemaster, we find in Isaiah 2215 Daniel 111,16 and in the Chronicles 2731,281. The connection with nature is lacking in these texts.

16. The most common word for steward (oικονόμμο_ the 'economist') appears a total of eight times. Four times in the Gospel of Luke (1242 and 161,3,8), two times in 1 Corinthians 41,2, one time in Titus 17 and one time in 1 Peter 410. All texts in the Gospel of Luke are about the management of money, in the letter to the Corinthians about the "mysteries of God", in Titus about the overseer as "keeper of the house of God" and in the first letter of Peter it is about the "good stewards over the many mercies of God". For the other word that can be translated as steward (_π____π__), the same applies. In Luke 83 in the meaning of housekeeper (without further description). The second time also, in Matthew 208, where it speaks of the overseer of the lord of the vineyard, this overseer has to pay the servants. The connection of the word steward to the care about (parts of) nature is missing in the Bible.

17. 'The end of man's creation was, that he should be the viceroy of the great God of heaven and earth in this inferior world; his steward, villicus (= farm-manager, JJB), bailiff or farmer of his goodly farm of the lower world". To this extent, Hale writes as an explanation, man was: "invested with power, authority, right, dominion, trust and care, to correct and abridge the excesses and cruelties of the fiercer animals, to give protection and defense to the mansuete (tame) and useful, to preserve the species of diverse vegetables (growing things), to improve them and others, to correct the redundancy of unprofitable vegetables, to preserve the face of the earth in beauty, usefulness and fruitfulness" (Sir Matthew Hale, 1677, The Primitive Originations of Mankind Printed by W. Godbid for W. Shrowsberry, London, 370.)

18. For a description of that development see J. Passmore (1974) and K. Thomas (1983). For the carry-over of the paradise/garden ideal in our western culture see: J. Prest (1981).

19. J.J. Boersema (1997, chapter 4).

20. Brian Harrison (1973, 786-821) for example points to the fact that the roots of the English animal protection organization (the RSPCA) must be found in humanistic Christianity ("founded largely by evangelical humanitarians").

21. Described by a.o. D. Harwood (1928); N.H. Pollock (1968); B. Harrison (1973); H. Ritvo (1987/1990) and R.D. Ryder (1989).

22. For example in Psalm 241: "The earth and all its fullness is of the Lord".

23. For example Proverbs 1210: "The just knows what belongs to his cattle".

24. A.o. with the Skeptics and with the Roman humanist Seneca: "We do not know everything, because the largest part of the universe, God, remains hidden for us" (Naturales Questiones VII, 30.4).

25. This hubris, pride, for example speaks from the title of a special edition of Scientific American (September 1989) about the environmental problems:

Managing Planet Earth. Dejection and pessimism, often under the cloak of realism, have one thing in common: they offer an alibi to not do what we as humans were called to do: make the best of it.

26. The terminology has been strongly colored of the course of time by this practical vision and reflect our value pattern. We thus speak about 'natural resources', about 'weeds' and 'vermin'.